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List of Abbreviations
228: The 1947 February 28 Incident
BSR: Benshengren (AAl A ) Sometimes referred to as “native Taiwanese.”
Those already living in Taiwan before 1945 and their descendents. This 
includes both the Hollo (M-/A) and Hakka ethnic groups.
CCP: Chinese Communist Party (l:[:I |s£| A I tS t/  ^  A )
CSC Central Standing Committee
iv
CSDP: Chinese Social Democratic Party
CU: Chinese Unification
DPP: Democratic Progressive Party
DW: Dangwai )> the Non Party opposition movement.
ESC: Election Survey Center (At National Chengchi University) (|§
KMT: Kuomintang (I:|:I H§ H  I I  ) also known as the Nationalist
Party.
JSP: Japanese Socialist Party
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
ME: Municipal Executive (Includes city mayors and county magistrates).
MKMT: Mainstream KMT (ZliMM) after 2000 known as the localised KMT
MMD: Multi-Member (electoral) District
MRG: Manifesto Research Group
NHI: National Health Insurance
NP: New Party ( i^rlSD
NCCU: National Chengchi University) (M iL fk  ?p
NMKMT; Non Mainstream KMT ( ^ ± ® J ©
NTU: National Taiwan University (@3L’n S X ^ )
NUG: National Unification Guidelines
PFP: People First Party
PRC: People’s Republic of China
ROC: Republic of China ( A ^ K i§ )
ROT: Republic of Taiwan (A flfA A nll)
SMD: Single Member (electoral) District
SNTV: Single Non-Transferable Vote
SQ: Status Quo
SVMM: Single, Non Transferable Voting in Multi-member Districts
TI: Taiwan independence
TIP: Taiwan Independence Party
TSU: Taiwan Solidarity Union (tA Ik)
WSR: Waishengren (A  A  A ) Those arriving from Mainland China after 1945
and their descendents. This group are also often referred to as 
“Mainlanders.”
Note on romanisation
Throughout this dissertation I have used the Hanyu Pinyin ) system of
romanisation. The first time any Chinese name, place name or term is used, and I have 
also added the Chinese characters in brackets. Therefore I use Li Denghui 
and Gaoxiong 1 have Wade Giles has only been used has been for Chinese
names of authors for works published in English, again The only other exception is I 
have used kept the commonly used spellings for Chiang Kai-shek Chiang
vi
Ching-kuo (WIS®) and Sun Yat-sen GAAf[Jj). Although the use of the Hanyu Pinyin 
system is controversial in Taiwan, I have used this system, as it is the most widely 
used in Chinese studies.
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Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan: 1991-2001 
Abstract
The year 2001 marked, the tenth anniversary of Taiwan’s multi-party elections, 
offering a timely opportunity to take stock of the state of party politics in Taiwan. This 
study examines evolution of party competition in Taiwan, looking at how Taiwan’s 
parties have adjusted to their new multi-party election environment. Have Taiwan’s 
parties followed a convergent or divergent pattern of competition? Or has Taiwan 
followed the common models of many new democracies of either a hegemonic one 
party dominant system or a completely unconsolidated system of weak catchall 
parties and personality orientated, issueless campaigns?
I argue that Taiwan has developed a healthy state of inter-party competition, in which 
parties and issues have mattered in the evolution of Taiwan’s democracy. Taiwan’s 
parties have shown reduced polarization, as election orientated leaders have pushed 
their parties towards a moderate centre in response to election results and public 
opinion. However, they have not merged into indistinguishable catchall parties. 
Instead, leapfrogging of policy positions has been rare, as movement has been within 
limits set out by party ideology and inner party factional balance. Within ten years of 
democratic elections Taiwan’s parties have swiftly institutionalised a pattern of 
competition similar to their counterparts parties of Western Europe, with the parties 
consistently stressing different issues and the public able to distinguish parties on core 
issues.
I show how the successful operation of Taiwanese democracy goes beyond the 
institutionalisation of party platforms. Taiwanese public opinion has been shown to be
sophisticated and moderate, consistently rejecting parties taking radical stances. 
Moreover, the Taiwan case shows having genuine opposition parties really makes a 
difference. Firstly, the rise of new electoral issues, such as political corruption and 
social welfare created new cross cutting cleavages, a phenomenon political scientists 
view as conductive to democratic stability. Secondly, ten years of multi-party 
elections have resulted a rapid transformation of mainstream norms towards the 
opposition’s position on many core issues. Products of these campaign debates 
include a much expanded and more inclusive welfare system, broader norms on what 
constitutes political corruption and stricter anti corruption legislation. Finally, on the 
most controversial issue in Taiwanese politics, the mainstream parties have reached a 
tacit understanding on many aspects of the national identity question. In short, I argue 
that democracy is working in Taiwan.
Chapter One: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of 
Taiwan
1.1 Introduction
The year 2001 marked the tenth anniversary of Taiwan’s multi-party elections. The 
National Assembly elections of 1991 and the forced retirement of the senior 
parliamentarians elected in the 1940s on the Chinese mainland signify the beginning 
of democratic elections that for the first time had the potential to bring about a 
change in the ruling party. Ten years have passed, offering a timely opportunity to 
take stock of the developments in Taiwan’s party politics.
When a country makes the transition from authoritarianism to electoral democracy it 
is not inevitable that the move towards democratic consolidation will be rapid. 
Whether or not the new democracy’s political parties can become institutionalised 
will be a critical factor in this consolidation process. Most democratic theorists 
agree that political parties are essential for a healthy democracy. For instance E. E. 
Schattschneider argues, “Modem democracy is unthinkable save in temis of 
political parties.”1 However, newer democracies have struggled to make the 
transition into liberal democracies with strong coherent political parties that offer 
the distinct policy platforms for voters to make an informed policy choice. Instead 
these parties are often largely vehicles for ambitious politicians to gain office; this is 
well illustrated by the fluidity of party break-ups and mergers in South Korea and 
Japan in the 1990s.2 Being the only Chinese democracy, Taiwan is an important 
case study for party scholars, as it has consolidated its democracy faster than most
1 Schattschneider, Party Govermnent, 1.
2 For analysis o f the malleability o f South Korean political parties, see Ahn Chung-si and Jauhg 
Hoon, “South Korea,” 142-151.
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other new democracies, and comparative studies have shown Taiwan’s political 
parties to be comparatively institutionalised.3
The focus of this study is to analyse the pattern of party competition that has 
evolved in Taiwan’s first decade of democratic elections. Have Taiwan’s parties 
followed a convergent pattern of competition common in many western 
democracies, in which though ideological distance is limited, parties still offer 
consistently distinct policy platforms? Or has competition been divergent, resulting 
in highly polarised parties, with all its dangers for political stability? Or has Taiwan 
followed the common models of many new democracies of either a hegemonic one 
party dominant system or a completely unconsolidated system of weak catchall 
parties and personality orientated, issueless campaigns?
In order to study the evolution of party competition in Taiwan, I examine how 
Taiwan’s parties have adjusted to their new multi-party election enviromnent. 
Therefore this work is about party change in Taiwan. Party change is a broad 
concept, defined by Robert Hannel and Kenneth Janda as, “any variation, alteration, 
or modification in how parties are organized, what hmnan and material resources 
they can draw upon, what they stand for, and what they do.”4 This research focuses 
on one aspect of this definition, by examining what Taiwan’s parties stand for, more 
specifically how and why have parties altered their election platforms and what 
these developments can tell us about the state of Taiwan’s democracy.
Contrary to previous works and the recent pessimism over Taiwan’s democracy, I
3 See Stockton, “Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in East Asia,” 94-119; Blondel and 
Marsh, “Conclusion,” 337-339.
4 Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory o f  Party Goals and Party Change,” 275.
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argue that Taiwan has developed a healthy state of inter-party competition, in which 
parties and issues have mattered in the evolution of Taiwan’s democracy.5 Taiwan’s 
parties have shown reduced polarization, as election orientated leaders have pushed 
their parties towards a moderate centre in response to election results and public 
opinion. However, they have not merged into indistinguishable catchall parties. 
Instead, leapfrogging of policy positions has been rare, as movement has been 
within limits set out by party ideology and inner party factional balance.
Taiwan did begin democratic elections in 1991 with a predominant party and 
polarised positions on the one core electoral issue. However, within ten years of 
Taiwan’s parties have swiftly institutionalised a pattern of moderate differentiation 
in party competition similar to their counterparts of Western Europe. In other words, 
although ideological distance between parties is limited, the parties consistently 
stress different issues and the public are able to distinguish between parties on core 
issues.6
The pattern in elections has been that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP placed new issues on the electoral agenda. Although the ruling
Kuomintang (KMT IMS'®!) initially rejected these policy proposals, later it often 
attempted to steal these popular issues. However, since both the public and parties 
see issues as owned, in most cases issue stealing has failed and issue ownership has
5 For examples o f influential works that see a limited role for issues in Taiwanese elections see 
Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, 43-50; Similarly John Hsieh blames Taiwan’s electoral system for the 
way elections are candidate rather than party orientated, see Hsieh, “The SNTV System and its 
Political Implications,” 193-213; For a negative appraisal o f the development o f Taiwan’s democracy 
see Kuo, “Taiwan’s Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective,” 85-111; The pessimism over 
Taiwan’s democracy has been evident since late 2000 in Taiwan’s media and in my interviews with 
KMT and pro KMT academics.
6 For patterns o f  party differentiation in mature democracies see Budge and Klingemann, “Finally! 
Comparative Over-Time Mapping o f  Party Policy Movement,” Figures 1.1-1.25.
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nremained intact. A party can be said to own an issue when it dominates emphasis 
of this issue during a campaign and is associated in the public mind with that issue. 
Ian Budge and Judith Bara note the importance of such party differentiation in 
democracy, “The essential democratic requirements for an electoral mandate policy 
are that there is some difference between parties so electors can make a choice: and 
that once elected the party will do more or less what it promised to do when in 
government.”8
However, the successful operation of Taiwanese democracy goes beyond the 
institutionalisation of party platforms. The Taiwan case shows that having genuine 
opposition parties really makes a difference, as the consequent democratic electoral 
debate has brought tangible benefits to Taiwanese society. Firstly, the rise of new 
electoral issues, such as political corruption and social welfare created new cross 
cutting cleavages, a phenomenon political scientists view as conductive to 
democratic stability.9 Secondly, ten years of multi-party elections have resulted in a 
rapid transformation of mainstream norms towards the opposition’s position on 
many core issues. Products of these new values include a much expanded and more 
inclusive welfare system, broader norms on what constitutes political corruption and 
stricter anti corruption legislation. Finally, on the most controversial issue in 
Taiwanese politics, the mainstream parties have reached a tacit understanding on 
many aspects of the national identity question. In short, I argue that democracy is 
working in Taiwan.
7 For an introduction to the premises o f issue ownership theory see Petrocik, “Issue Ownership in 
Presidential Elections,” 825-850.
8 Budge and Bara, “Introduction: Content Analysis and Political Texts,” 9.
9 Chu and Lin, “The Process o f  Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan,” 80.
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In order to examine the pattern of party competition in Taiwan in election 
campaigns I focus on the following empirical questions throughout this dissertation: 
(1) Have issues been important in Taiwanese elections? (2) Which issues have been 
most salient? (3) How do Taiwan’s parties differ in their issue emphasis and 
ownership on the core electoral issues? (4) How and why have the parties adjusted 
their issue emphasis and ownership? (5) What are the implications of these 
developments for the quality of Taiwan’s democracy? I employ a combination of 
source materials to measure and explain party change over this period, including 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis of election propaganda, public opinion 
surveys, and interviews with experienced politicians and political scientists.
1.2 Layout of the Dissertation
In the introductory chapter I first outline the core questions driving this thesis and 
my main arguments. Next I place my research in the context of general and 
Taiwanese literature on the two core areas of this research: measurement of party 
policy change and explanations of party change. Also the main data sources and the 
research methods used to answer the questions listed above are explained. Next in 
chapter two I give a brief introduction to developments in Taiwanese electoral 
politics, both before and after democratisation, introducing Taiwan’s political parties, 
political system, and broad trends in election results, party identification and issue 
emphasis. I show how Taiwan’s parties have stressed issues and do stress different 
issues.
Chapters three to five examine party change on the core electoral issues in greater 
detail in three issue case studies. These are social welfare, political conuption and 
national identity, three of the most salient issues not only in Taiwan but also in most
5
contemporary democracies. In each case study chapter I the measure party change 
and issue ownership using election propaganda content analysis, political scientist 
and elite interviews, and party image survey data. After introducing the background 
to each issue, I show the issue emphasis trends for the whole decade and then look 
in more detail at the developments of the main sub-issues. In all three cases election 
orientated leaders and factions have moved their parties towards more centrist 
positions in response to public opinion and election results. However, leapfrogging 
has been rare, as movement is constrained by the strength of party ideology and 
more conservative factions and leaders. The constraining role of ideology has been 
strongest in the case of national identity. Parties have had more room to manoeuvre 
with social issues, thus the only case of successful KMT issue stealing occurred 
with National Health Insurance in the social welfare chapter.
Finally in the chapter six, I review the main findings on how and why Taiwan’s 
parties have changed in the first decade of multiparty democratic elections, and 
outline what this study can tell us about the state of Taiwanese democracy.
1.3 Data and Methodology
This study places itself in two related fields of political science: (1) measurement of 
party change and (2) explanations of party change. Taiwan scholars have touched 
upon these two areas; however, their principal focus has been on Taiwan’s transition 
to democracy, while the subsequent operation of party politics has been a sideshow 
in this literature.10 At the time of writing there are still only two academic book 
length studies of Taiwan’s political parties in the 1990s, both rely largely on
10 Lin, “Paths to Democracy”; Rigger, Politics in Taiwan; Chao and Myers, The First Chinese 
Democracy.
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qualitative sources and both are on the DPP, while none have been published on 
either the KMT or New Party (NP This study attempts to fill this gap, with
a comprehensive examination of party platform change during Taiwan’s first decade 
of multi-party elections.
1.3.1 Measurement of Party Change
There are numerous potential data to measure party platform change, including 
manifestos, public opinion surveys, elite surveys, elite inteiviews, and election 
propaganda.
Party election manifestoes or platforms issued prior to each election campaign are a
rich data source on party policy priorities and have a long history as a source
12material to measure party change. Ian Budge and Judith Bara note the importance 
of these documents in a democracy as they give “voters an indication of what 
parties would do if elected and thus offering them a basis for informed policy 
choice.”13 Of course few voters have the time or patience to read through such 
lengthy documents but as Budge notes, “it nevertheless strongly influences media 
discussion during the election campaign.”14 Indeed manifestoes are the core data 
source for the most comprehensive cross-national study of party policy preferences, 
the Manifesto Research Group (MRG). The MRG coding scheme was developed by 
a research group of the European Consortium for Political Research in 1979. This 
system for content analysis of election manifestoes includes fifty-seven basic policy 
issues, and has been applied to analyse national election manifestoes in twenty-five 
democracies over the 1945-98 period.15 Unfortunately, all three parties in Taiwan 
have only issued such documents since 1998; therefore these cannot be employed 
for the entire period in question.16 Liu Tsung-wei made the fust attempt to
apply the MRG framework to the Taiwan case. He carried out content analysis of
11 Rigger, From Opposition to P ow er; Guo (^ P lE ^ ), The DPP s Painful Transition.
12 For a review o f manifesto research see Budge, Robertson and Hearl, eds., Ideology, Strategy and 
Party Change in 19 Democracies, 19-21.
13 Budge et al, M apping Policy Preferences, 9.
14 Budge, “Parties, Programs and Policies,” 699.
15 Budge et al, M apping Policy Preferences.
16 Liu, “Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change in Taiwan from 1989 to 1998,” 4.
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the candidate policy section of electoral gazettes for Legislative Yuan elections 
between 1989 and 1998.17 However, the gazettes show the policy proposals of 
individual candidates, rather than the party as a whole, and voters may not pay 
much attention to the long list of candidate pledges, as in some cases there are up to 
forty candidates in a multiple member district.
The most common method of placing political parties by scholars applying 
variations of the Downsian proximity and its related directional theory has been 
survey data.18 Respondents are asked to locate political parties (and sometimes 
themselves) on various policy spectrums. Since this form of questioning has been 
used in the United States (US) National Election Surveys for several decades, it 
offers valuable data on the extent the public sees parties as having changed over 
time, if they have converged or diverged. The issues that have received the most 
attention in US politics are race, abortion and social welfare.19 Survey data is also 
the most commonly used method for measuring party position in Taiwan, with two 
main directions of research. Firstly, researchers at National Taiwan University (NTU 
ll§-Lltn ?§f ^ I f l)  asked respondents if they view parties as representing certain policy 
opposites such as Chinese unification or Taiwan independence, tolerating or 
attacking corruption.20 In contrast, National Chengchi University’s Election Study 
Center ( n;M P; has taken a more orthodox approach. It
asks respondents to place themselves and parties on key issue spectrums such as 
independence versus unification. These have been employed by John Hsieh (M'fM 4-') 
to show changing positions of both parties and respondents in the 1990s.21 
Although these studies are useful in showing the electorate’s party image, there may 
well be a discrepancy between this public image and that which the party wishes to
17 Liu, “Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change,” 3-4. These gazettes are issued to every voter a few  
weeks before the voting day. These show a picture o f each candidate, their party affiliation, work 
experience, education, and main policy goals.
!S The initial impetus o f this tradition came from Downs, An Economic Theory o f  Voting. This was 
followed by a number o f variations on his approach such as Hinich and Munger, Ideology and the 
Theoiy o f  Political Choice; Iverson, “Political Leadership and Representation in West European 
Democracies: 45-74. For the directional alternative see Rabonowitz and Macdonald, “A  Directional 
Theory o f  Issue Voting,” 793-817. While for an approach combining proximity and direction see 
Merrill and Grofman, A Unified Theoiy o f  Voting.
19 For example Abramowitz, “Issue Evolution Reconsidered,” 1-24.
20 Examples o f this approach have been You Public Opinion and Taiwan s Political
Change, 65-105; Chen “The DPP’s Party Image.”
21 Hsieh, “Continuity and Change in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics,” 32-49.
project.
A method that has seen growing use has been elite surveys, involving either political 
scientists or politicians being asked to place parties on policy spectrums. Castles and 
Mair, Laver and Hunt, and Huber and Inglehart carried out the most large-scale 
cross-national expert surveys.22 Surveys of politicians have also been on the 
increase in recent years. For instance, the British Representative Survey asks MPs to 
locate their parties on a number of spectrums.23 Similarly, Herbert Kitshelt has 
created a database of surveys of mid-level party activists in four East European 
countries.24 Such elite surveys have been less popular in Taiwan, in the only 
example I am aware of Lin Chia-long OfcfcHiI) used the NTU party image questions 
mentioned above for a sample of 66 legislators between 1995 and 1996.25 Although 
these studies have been useful for placement of parties, the use of different scales on 
each occasion has limited their value for showing party change.
In modem democracies election advertising is a central component of parties’ 
campaigns. However, this source has been neglected by political science as a means 
of plotting party change. Systematic time series content analysis has only been 
conducted in the US26 and to date only one comparative volume on election 
advertising has been published.27 Election advertising research in Taiwan has 
mainly been carried out by advertising scholars rather than by political scientists. 
These content analysis studies of political advertising in Taiwan have two major 
drawbacks: first, they tend to focus solely on single campaigns,28 and, more 
importantly, each uses a completely different coding scheme, making time series
22 Castles and Mair, “Left Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements,” 73-88; Laver and Hunt, 
Policy and Political Competition', Huber and Inglehart, “Expert interpretations o f  Party Space and 
Party Location in 42 Societies,” 73-111. This project even included left-right placements for three 
Taiwanese parties!
23 See Norris and Levenduski, “The Iceberg and the Titanic. Electoral defeat, Policy Moods and 
Party Change”; Norris, “New Politicians: Changes in Party Composition in Westminster,” 22-43.
24 SeeToka, “Party Positions,” 180-205.
25 Lin, “Paths to Democracy,” 434-442.
26 For example Anne Johnston carried out a study o f 1213 presidential ads between 1952 and 2000. 
Johnston, “Videostyle Differences in Issue and Image Ads.
27 Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, eds., Political Advertising in Western democracies.
2S For an example o f a single campaign project see Zheng ( £ j | > I t ) ,  “An Analysis o f Party 
Newspaper Advertisements and Media Policy During the 1995 Legislative Yuan Election,” 1-32.
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com p arison  im p o ssib le .29
The final and most common method of measuring party change has been qualitative 
analysis of data sources such as party documents, propaganda and elite interviews. 
This has been popular in the Taiwan case. For example, Shelley Rigger and Guo 
Zhengliang’s ($|5IE^) treatment of the developments in the DPP and Alexander 
Tan’s study of the KMT in the 1990s. This qualitative approach can give the 
reader a colourful portrait of party developments. However, when used in isolation 
this can also suffer from being impressionistic and biased in favour of certain parties. 
Moreover, such data is rarely of value for cross-national comparison.
From the above review it is clear that though political science offers the researcher 
numerous potential methods to measure party change, other than opinion surveys, 
systematic methods have rarely been applied to the Taiwan case. Since all the 
measures listed above have their pros and cons, this research uses a combination of 
research methods to plot party change, including qualitative and quantitative content 
analysis of party election propaganda, existing survey data, and elite interviews. 
Reference is made to both Liu Tsung-wei’s gazette findings, and the two main 
Taiwanese schools of survey data. However, the bulk of data used is original and 
groundbreaking. Next, these new datasets are outlined:
1.3.1 a) Newspaper Advertisements
This study represents the first attempt to use newspaper campaign advertisements to 
measure party change in Taiwan. Newspaper ads are relatively easy to obtain, 
represent the public face of a party rather than that of only a single candidate, and 
receive considerable media attention in Taiwan,31 In countries where no manifesto 
is issued, content analysis of election newspaper advertisements offers a valuable 
alternative. I carried out both qualitative and quantitative content analysis of all 
election newspaper advertisements for every national-level election from 1991 to
29 For example, Chen (|iHil;S') and Chen (|5jR1It'l$iQ> Content Analysis o f  N ewspaper Reports and 
Advertisements during the 1989 Elections.
30 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, Guo, The D P P ’s Painful Transition', Tan, “The Transformation 
o f the Kuomintang Party,” 149-164.
31 An example o f  this was the wide media coverage o f Chen Shuibian’s ([ifcKH) advertisement 
showing a picture o f his son in army uniform, saying, “Next year he will do military service, his 
father is Chen Shuibian.” Lianhe bao, March 6, 2000, 7.
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2000 for the thirty-one days prior to voting day and from the three newspapers with 
the highest readership:32 China limes Zhongguo shibao), Lianhe bao
United Daily News), and Ziyou shibao (f=j Liberty Times).33
Advertisements were collected for Taiwan’s three major parties in the 1990s: the 
KMT, the DPP, and the NP. A total of 1,665 advertisements were collected and a 
total of 27,834 “quasi sentences” coded.34 All the texts in the advertisements were 
analysed; the only exceptions were candidates’ biographical details or details of 
campaign rally announcements. Three main kinds of advertisements were coded: 
official party advertisements, candidate advertisements, and advertisements bought
35by anonymous or support groups. The author has combined the scores of the three 
categories into a total proportion of issue emphasis for each party per election, 
which I term “total ads.” In this research the advertising statistics used are for 
official ads or total ads, the former reflects the party image the party centre is trying 
to create and the latter shows the overall image that the voter will receive. In the 
first stage, the proportion of issue emphasis for each advertisement is calculated, 
and then this figure is used to find the proportion of issue emphasis for the party 
dming the entire campaign. This data can offer information on the relative party 
issue emphasis over a single campaign and position or issue emphasis change over 
the entire decade. This data can show if the parties are converging towards the 
centre or diverging towards the poles. In addition, the scores of groups of issues or 
issue domains can be combined to test in which broad areas parties have the greatest 
conflict.
This research project follows the basic structure of the MRG coding scheme, with
32 In 2000 a nationwide survey found the following readership figures: China Times 38%, Lian 
hebao 36.7%, Ziyou shibao 35.4%. See Zhang and Fu (fU U lL ) eds., Taiwan Region Social
Change Basic Survey Project, 91.
33 These three papers also reflect the main political currents, with Zhongguo shibao closer to the 
mainstream KMT, Lianhe bao sympathetic with the non-mainstream KMT and the NP, and Ziyou 
shibao closer to the DPP. This is apparent by the fact that throughout the 1990s the NP and Song
Chuyu (5t?5§9i§t) in 2000 did not have a single advertisement in Ziyou shibao, and in the 1991 and 
1992 elections Lianhe bao was free o f DPP advertisements.
34 A “quasi sentence” is the verbal expression o f one political idea or issue. Since one sentence 
may include a number o f  arguments, sentences may be divided into quasi sentences that are 
divided by commas, semicolons, or colons. For details see Budge et al., Mapping Policy 
Preferences, 96-103.
33 Although these advertisements are anonymous or taken out in the name o f obscure groups, in 95 
percent of the cases the political inclination o f the advertisement is obvious. O f course, 
determining whether the party centre funded the advertisements is more difficult.
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the additional categories adopted by Liu Tsung-wei.36 The main difference is that I
* 37subdivided two issue categories, and added five new categories to capture 
references to parties and candidates;38 a list of the categories and domains 
employed in this project is presented in Table 1.1 The advantage of using the MRG 
coding scheme is that it has been used comprehensively in 25 countries over the 
post-war period and proved to be applicable to varying political systems.
Therefore, this coding scheme also offers the potential of cross-national comparison, 
and in chapters three and four I do compare my Taiwanese data with MRG findings 
in Japan. It is encouraging methodologically that the revised MRG coding scheme is 
applicable to the Taiwanese data. Table 1.2 shows that my coding scheme was able 
to pick up the vast majority of issue references, with only 10 percent of quasi 
sentences falling into the uncategerizable/others domain.39
1.3.1b) Television Advertisements
The importance of TV advertising in Taiwanese elections has risen rapidly since the 
mid-1990s. While the KMT had only 149 minutes of campaign TV ad time in 1991, 
it had almost 17,000 minutes in 2000 !40 However, since I was unable to collect 
complete sets of TV spots for every election I have only carried out qualitative 
analysis of TV ads for 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2000.
1.3.1c) Elite Interviews
During two periods of fieldwork in Taiwan in 2000 and 2001 1 carried out a broad 
range of in-depth interviews. These fell into three main categories: experienced 
politicians, political scientists, and grassroots level party activists. Requests for
36 See Lin, “Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change,” Table 2.
37 This paper subdivides the category “political authority” (305) into “Political Stability” (305A), 
“Government Competence” (305B), and “Other Parties’ Lack o f Government Competence” (305C). 
Also “Taiwan Independence: Positive” (111) and “Taiwan Independence: Negative” (112) have been 
subdivided to include “Pure Taiwan Independence” (111A), “Diluted Taiwan Independence” (11 IB), 
“Taiwan Independence: Negative” (112A), and "Chinese Unification” (112B). See Tables 1.1 and 5.1 
for details.
38 This group is designated as Domain 9 . 1 did not use Domain 8 to avoid confusion with Agasoster, 
“A Framework for Analysing Local Party Policy Emphasis in Scotland,” 76-89.
39 Similarly, only 4.5% o f issue references in Liu’s study fell into the “others” category. Liu 
Tsung-wei, “The Effects o f  Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.1.
40 Fell, “Political Advertising in Taiwan.”
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interviews were sent to over 100 politicians and I interviewed a total of 66 
experienced Taiwanese politicians. The list of respondents is in Appendix 1. My 
main criterion for selection was politicians that had been involved in a minimum of 
three national level elections and those that held important decision making 
positions in their parties during the 1990s. The respondents included 30 from the 
DPP, 22 from the KMT, nine from the NP, and five from the People First Party (PFP 
On average each interview lasted 45 minutes. Most questions focused 
on politicians’ perspectives on their parties’ issue campaign emphasis and change in 
their party over the 1990s. Unlike Lin Cliia-long’s study almost all my questions 
were open ended and I only attempted to quantify answers on a small minority of 
questions.42 In addition, I interviewed 15 leading political scientists in Taiwan to 
gain their views on party and election change during this period. They are also listed 
in Appendix 1 and were selected on the basis of having published journal articles on 
Taiwan’s electoral politics either abroad or in Taiwan.
1.3.2 Explanations of Party Change
Most party theorists agree that established parties are conservative organisations 
averse to change. As Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda put it, “decisions to change 
a party’s organization, issue positions or strategy face a wall of resistance common 
to large organizations.”43 However, there is less agreement on explanations for 
party change. I divide these into categories that focus on the following explanatory 
variables: 1) inner party politics, 2) electoral competition, 3) external shocks, 4) 
incumbent versus opposition status, 5) institutional factors, and 6) party ideology.
41 The reason for the lower KMT number was a higher refusal rate.
42 Lin, “Paths to Democracy.”
43 Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory o f  Party Goals and Party Change,” 261.
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1.3.2a) Inner-party Politics
Robert Hamiel and Kenneth Janda note that “party change does not just happen,” 
and that change tends to come from two inner party factors; leadership change, a 
change in dominant factions, plus an external stimulus for change, such as electoral 
defeat.44 Alexander Tan made the first attempt to apply this theory to Taiwan, 
showing that a combination of all three factors contributed to the transformation of 
the KMT over the last two decades 45
Many theorists on party behaviour in the US also stress parties’ internal dynamics. 
For instance, Laurel Elder’s “Elite Power Struggle Model” argues the key 
determinant of change is internal power struggles among the party elites 46 
Similarly Abramowitz and Saunders contend that since the early 1990s there has 
been a shift in the balance within the US Republican Party in favour' of its more 
conservative wing, as represented by figures such as Newt Gingrich, resulting in a 
radicalisation of the party.47 While Edward Carmines and James Stimson’s “issue 
evolution theory ” argues policy change on the race issue is driven by replacement, 
as racially liberal Democratic representatives replaced conservative Democrats in 
Congress 48 Many also see a change in party leader as a critical internal factor for 
party change. According to Harmel et al, “the leader and the leader’s own wishes 
may be the ultimate cause of change.”49 For instance, Abramowitz and Saunders 
see the rise of Reagan and Clinton in the Republican and Democratic parties as 
contributing to the radicalisation of both parties.50
44 Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory o f Party Goals and Party Change,” 261.
45 Tan, “The Transformation o f  the Kuomintang Party,” 149-164.
46 Elder, “Theories o f Party Behaviour.”
47 Abramowitz and Saunders, “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,” 634-52.
48 Carmines and Stimson, Issue Evolution.
49 Harmel, Uk, Tan and Janda, “Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party change,” 4.
50 Abramowitz and Saunders, “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,” 634-52.
14
Taiwan scholars have also given considerable attention to inner-party factors in 
explaining party change. Because of the KMT’s tradition of authoritarian leadership, 
change has often been attributed to its party chair. For instance, Linda Chao and 
Ramon Myers particularly stress the role of Chiang Ching-kuo and Li
Denghui (^^$11) in the democratisation process.51 In fact, in my interviews by far 
the most common explanation for the KMT’s changes in the 1990s was the 
influence of its former chairman Li Denghui. In contrast, changes in the DPP’s 
factional balance have been used to explain the party’s national identity positions. 
For instance, Cheng Tmi-jen (IlfSifcfll) and Hsu Yung-ming ( t^ k ^ J )  claim the 
DPP’s passing of the Taiwan independence clause (TIC) in 1991 was the result of a 
factional pact.
1.3.2b) Electoral Competition
Electoral considerations are one of the most commonly raised explanations for party 
change in the literature. For example, much of the work on party policy change 
follows a Downsian tradition, which assumes one-dimensional political competition 
in which parties or politicians are essentially vote seeking and free to make any 
policy moves in search of their ultimate goal of winning office, and will converge 
on the median voter.53 This approach has been popular among Taiwanese scholars. 
For example, Wu Yushan (^ |3 l|_L|) argued that vote-maximizing strategies explain 
Taiwan’s parties’ movement towards the centre in the 1990s.54 Similarly, Ming 
Juzheng (^M iE ) described how Taiwan’s public opinion has had a centrifugal
51 See Chao and Myers, The F irst Chinese Democracy.
52 See Cheng and Hsu, “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment” 137-173.
Downs, An Economic Theory o f  Democracy, 117-18.
54 Wu Yushan, “Moving towards the Center: Taiwan’s Public Opinion and Mainland Policy Shift.”
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impact on Taiwan’s political parties.55
Election results are often raised as an important factor in party policy behaviour. 
David Robertson proposed the idea that parties adjust according to expectations of 
whether an election will be competitive or not. If it is likely to be competitive, 
parties will move to the centre, and if not then parties will move away from the 
centre.56 Robert Harmel and Kemieth Janda have noted that for vote seeking parties, 
“the more pronounced their electoral failures, the more likely they are to change.”57 
While Attila Agh’s study on the impact of election results on the Hungarian Socialist 
Party shows that as well as party defeats, the effect of election successes must also 
be considered.58 In fact in Taiwan many politicians and political analysts explain 
the parties’ changes as responses to crucial election defeats or victories.59
Some researchers stress changes in the inter-party competitive environment as a 
stimulus for party change. For instance, Bonnie Meguid has shown how established 
West European parties have adapted their positions in response to the challenge of 
new rising parties, such as green or far right parties.60 Similarly Ian Budge raised 
the idea of a “Marker Party Model,” in which parties will adjust in order to maintain 
the distinction between themselves and neighbouring parties.61 While Robert 
Harmel and Lars Svasand propose that an established party will change in response 
to a new party if its poor electoral results can be attributed to its new competitor.62
55 Ming Juzheng (HdJHiE), “Centrifugal Competition and the Development o f Republic of China’s 
Party Politics,” 142-156.
56 Robertson, A Theory o f  Party Competition.
57 Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory o f  Party Goals and Party Change,” 284.
58 Agh, “Defeat and Success as Promoters o f Change,” 427-444.
59 In my interviews the most commonly cited defeats were 1991 for the DPP and 2000 for the KMT.
60 Meguid, “Competing with the Neophyte.”
61 Budge, “A New Spatial Theory o f Party Competition,” 443-467.
62 Harmel and Svasand, “The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties’ Platforms,” 315-340.
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In the Taiwan case it is likely that the appearance of new competitors such as the NP 
and PFP will affect the policy positions of the original dominant party, the KMT.
The final aspect of electoral competition is the sociological groups parties chose to 
target. In the initial post war period studies found stable party-voter linkages, 
therefore parties focused on mobilizing their own supporters to vote. However, the 
weakening of party loyalties since the 1970s has meant parties must now target 
independent voters to a greater extent.63 This question of targeting is raised in 
Robert Rohrschneider’s study of campaigning, which argues that parties will use a 
traditional ideological message when concentrating on mobilizing traditional 
supporters, but apply a broader inclusive approach if the focus is chasing new
, 64voters.
1.3.2c) External Shocks
Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda’s “Integrated Theory of Party Change” also 
raises the possibility of external shocks contributing to party’s changes in direction. 
The example they offer is the impact the fall of the Soviet Union had on many West 
European Communist parties.65 However, in the Taiwan case the key external shock 
appeal's to have been the Chinese Communist Party’s military threats.
1.3.2d) Incumbent Versus Government Status
Former opposition parties are likely to change their policy positions on coming to 
government office. For instance, Shaun Bowler has proposed that incumbent parties 
should move less as they are tied by their records and are less able to raise new
63 Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck ed., Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.
64 Rohrschneider, "Mobilizing versus chasing,” 367-382.
65 Harmel and Janda, “An Integrated Theory o f  Party Goals and Party Change,” 276.
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issues than challengers.66 While Susan Stokes has noted the trend that many Latin 
American presidential candidates have campaigned on economic expansion 
platforms but adopted financial neo-liberalization on coming to power.67 This 
variable should also be considered in the Taiwan case as the former opposition DPP 
gained control of most local governments in 1997 and became the national ruling 
party in May 2000.
1.3.2e) Institutional Explanations
Kaare Strom offers a useful attempt to synthesize previous conflicting research on 
party behaviour. He divides parties’ goals as vote seeking, office seeking and policy 
seeking, and shows how organizational and institutional constraints will affect the 
priorities of the parties in question.68 This institutional approach has had some 
impact on Taiwan where a number of scholars have stressed the importance of 
electoral systems in determining party issue emphasis. For instance, John Hsieh and 
Lin Jih-wen (^fl> C ) both blame the extremist stances of Taiwanese politicians on 
its electoral system of single, non-transferable voting in multi-member districts 
(SVMM).69 However, the impact of electoral systems should not be exaggerated, as 
Taiwan uses a mixed system of SVMM for Legislative Yuan and National Assembly 
elections but also single member districts (SMD) for local executive and 
presidential contests.
1.3.2f) Ideology
Party ideology refers to the set of basic core values that are taken as accepted by a
66 Bowler, “Voter Perceptions and Party Strategies,” 61-83.
67 Stokes, M andates and Democracy.
68 Strom, “A Behavioural Theory o f Competitive Political Party,” 565-598.
69 Hsieh, “The SNTV System and its Political Implications.”; Lin, “The Consequences o f Single 
Non-Transferable Voting Rule.”
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political party, which Ian Budge notes, “provides politicians with a broad conceptual 
map of politics into which political events, current problems, electors’ preferences 
and other parties can all be fitted.”70 Therefore party ideology contributes to the 
conservative nature of parties, constraining party policy movement or policy 
leapfrogging.71 In contrast to the attention ideology has received among academics 
studying western political parties, Taiwan’s political scientists have neglected the 
impact of ideology 011 party change.
The role of party ideology is central to the issue saliency theory developed by Ian 
Budge, which offers an alternative view of party competition in which parties do not 
necessarily take confrontational stances on the same issues; instead, parties are more 
likely to “talk past each other” (i.e., are more likely to stress issues that favour their 
own side and ignore or deal cursively with issues that would either damage their 
own position or favour opponent parties).73 Therefore, in electoral campaigns the 
key objective of party leaders is to set the political agenda on issues that favour their 
party or damage their opponents. Most electoral issues tend to be valence rather 
than confrontation positional issues; parties see the electorate as accepting one 
stance, and thus rather than arguing against other parties’ positions, the tactic is to 
target other more favourable but related issues. For example, in Britain, the 
Conservative Party is associated with lower taxes and reducing social welfare 
provisions, while the Labour Party is seen as raising taxes and preserving the 
welfare state. However, rather than calling for hospital closures, the Conservatives
70 Budge, “A  New Spatial Theory o f Party Competition,” 446.
71 The only exception should be with ideologically contiguous parties.
72 An example o f the ideology-orientated approach is Budge, Robertson and Hearl ed, Ideology, 
Strategy and Party Change.
73 Budge, “Parties, Programs, and Policies,” 695-716; Petrocik, “Issue Ownership in Presidential 
Elections,” 825-850.
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will call for tax cuts and the Labour Party will emphasize the importance of a 
welfare system rather than calling for higher taxes.
Saliency theory does allow for party policy movement: parties will adjust policies or 
the saliency of issues in the hope of improving electoral fortunes. However, 
movement is within ideologically delimited areas and leapfrogging should be the 
exception. There are a number of reasons why this ideology is so binding. First, 
if a party changes its policies too radically, its image is likely to become 
indistinguishable from other parties. Second, by changing too much, a party may 
lose the support of its core supporters and activists. Third, although politicians aim 
to gain office, for many the goal of gaining office is to implement policy. Lastly, 
when a party deviates from its core values to an unacceptable degree, this shift is 
likely to lead to political realignment as politicians and their supporters switch 
allegiance according to their core values. One example is the formation of the 
Social Democratic Party in Britain in 1983, prompted by Labour’s rapid shift to the 
Left. In Taiwan, the decision to form splinter parties—such as the NP and the
Taiwan Independence Party (TIP, 311II] I I )—was justified in terms of their original
parties’ “betrayal” of their national identity ideals. Changing core party principles 
can prove a painstaking process, even when the positions in question are the 
equivalent of electoral suicide. Party ideology tends to play a unifying role not 
only for party elite and activists but also for the party’s core supporters. Instances 
of the difficulty of fundamental ideological change are the decades required for the 
Labour Party to abolish the clause in its party charter calling for large-scale 
nationalisation and the numerous failed attempts by reformers in Taiwan’s DPP to 
revise its Taiwan independence clause. In short, party ideology should constrain 
parties from leapfrogging each other on core political issues.
In this study I test the key explanatory variables suggested in the party change 
literature on the Taiwan case. In each case study chapter I examine party change in 
terms of the following variables: 1) inner party politics, 2) electoral competition, 3) 
external shocks, 4) incumbent versus opposition status, 5) institutional factors, and 6)
20
party ideology. Under the heading of inner party politics I look at the impact of 
leadership change and inner party factional balance. In the electoral competition 
section I examine the extent that parties have followed public opinion, reacted to 
electoral results, adopted a strategy of mainly chasing new voters or mobilizing 
traditional voters, and adjusted in accordance to the inter-party electoral 
environment. In the external shock section the main item of importance will be the 
China threat. Next I look to see whether issue stress has differed when parties have 
been in or out of office. In the institutional section I look at the impact of electoral 
systems on party policy emphasis. Finally in the ideology section, I am interested to 
see the extent ideology has constrained movement away from core principles.
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Chapter Two: The Taiwanese Context
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I first set the scene with a brief introduction to the history of Taiwan. 
After looking at the developments on Taiwan prior to 1945, the initial chaotic period 
of ROC rule is introduced. This is followed by a review of the 47-year Martial Law 
period of 1950-1987. This includes outlining the political and constitutional system 
established after the KMT regime moved to Taiwan, the rise of the opposition 
movement, and the limited democratic reforms under Chiang Ching-kuo. Next, I 
discuss the more extensive political and constitutional changes in the Li Denghui 
era. Section 2.3 reviews the main national elections since the end of Martial Law, 
trends in party vote and seat shares, and party identification. Then section 2.4 shows 
some broad trends of issue emphasis for the whole decade from my newspaper ad 
content analysis. I show how Taiwanese parties have stressed issues in elections, 
that three of the most salient electoral issues are social welfare, political corruption 
and national identity, and that Taiwan’s parties do show contrasting issue emphasis,
2.2 Brief History of Taiwan
2.2.1 Taiwan Before 1945
Taiwan is an island approximately the size of Wales, located in the western Pacific, 
160 kilometres from China’s Fujian (^gH) Province. As late as 1600 Taiwan 
remained on the periphery of the faltering Chinese Ming Empire. It was largely 
populated by the ancestors of today’s aboriginal peoples ( J j f C ' H E l S ) ,  and apart from 
Penghu (0 'M  the Pescadores), there was little permanent Han Chinese settlement on 
Taiwan. However, for the last 400 years Taiwan has been dominated by two 
influences, China and international politics. Repeatedly, the balance between these
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two forces has determined die island’s fate, as Taiwan has changed hands on no less 
than five occasions, and in each case Taiwan’s residents had no say.
The island had its first nominally unified government under the Dutch, who ruled 
from 1622-1661. It was during this period that the first large-scale migration of Han 
Chinese to Taiwan took place. After almost forty years on Taiwan, the Dutch were 
expelled by the Chinese Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (ffl^Tfj also known as 
Koxinga), whose regime controlled the island until it was taken over by the Qing 
Dynasty in 1683.74 For the first time Taiwan was formally incorporated into
the Chinese empire, becoming part of Fujian Province. Han immigration to Taiwan 
continued throughout the Zheng and Qing periods, so that by early in the Qing era 
the majority of the island’s residents were Han Chinese. Initially Taiwan had a 
largely self-sufficient agricultural economy, but by the late 19th century it 
increasingly became involved in the region’s growing international trade. Taiwan 
had a number of treaty ports and became a major exporter of agricultural products, 
such as tea, sugar and camphor, and an importer of opium.75
Taiwan changed hands for the fourth time in 1895, when following the China’s 
defeat in the Sino-Japanese War the Treaty of Shimoneseki ceded Taiwan to Japan. 
For fifty years Taiwan was ruled as a Japanese colony, its economy was structured 
to supply the needs of its colonial masters. The island was cut off from Mainland 
Chinese influences to the greatest extent in its modem history. Although some 
limited modernization had taken place in the late Qing period, the Japanese era saw 
much faster development of the island’s infrastructure, agriculture, and food
74 For an account o f the Dutch and Zheng era in Taiwan see Willis, Jr. “The Seventeenth Century 
Transformation,” 84-106.
75 For the Qing era see, Taiwan: A New History, 107-200.
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processing industry. By the end of the Japanese era Taiwan had become one of the 
most developed parts of Asia outside Japan. Many Taiwanese who had been through 
the Japanese education system thought of themselves as Japanese, taking Japanese 
names and volunteering in the Japanese war effort.76 Even today many older 
generation Taiwanese look back on this period as a golden era.
In 1911, sixteen years after Taiwan fell into Japanese hands the Qing Dynasty was 
overthrown and the Republic of China (ROC) was established. Although the KMT 
was involved in the initial founding of the ROC, the party did not hold central office 
until 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek (JjWf-Ci) achieved a partial unification of the 
country following the Northern Expedition, setting up his capital in Nanjing (]$Pa<). 
However, during most of the Republican period neither the KMT nor their 
communist rivals showed any interest in Taiwan. In Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over 
China, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong even talked
of offering support to the Taiwanese in their independence movement!77
2.2.2 Taiwan’s Incorporation into the ROC
Following Japan’s defeat in the World War Two and in accordance with the Cairo 
and Potsdam Agreements, Taiwan was handed over to the ROC government in 
October 1945. After a fifty year gap Taiwan was once again a Chinese province. 
Although most Taiwanese initially welcomed KMT troops, corruption and misrule 
of the KMT regime soon soured relations between the Taiwanese and their new 
rulers. Tensions reached a climax in the spring of 1947, following what became 
known as the February 28 Incident (228 Incident). An accidental shooting of a
76 See Lamley, “Taiwan under Japanese Rule,” 201-260.
77 Snow, Red Star O ver China, 128-129.
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bystander in a scuffle over the attempted arrest of a vendor selling contraband 
cigarettes sparked off riots and led Taiwanese to take over running most towns and 
cities of the island. Although the KMT governor held negotiations with the 
Taiwanese Settlement Committee, he had secretly telegrammed for hoop 
reinforcements from the mainland. When these troops arrived thousands of the 
islanders were massacred, particularly educated members of the elite that had been 
involved in trying to keep order and negotiate. Since the crushing of this Taiwanese 
uprising the 228 Incident became a taboo subject for over forty years. The 228 
Incident and the severity of KMT rule during the long subsequent Martial Law years 
showed Taiwanese the futility of open opposition, and for decades parents taught 
their children to avoid discussing politics. The legacy of the initial period of KMT 
rule in Taiwan was the creation of the cleavage of ethnic injustice and Taiwanese 
versus Chinese identity that remains significant to this day.78
2.2.3 The Martial Law Years
Following the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War, Martial Law was declared on 
Taiwan in January 1950 and remained in effect until 1987. There was a massive 
immigration wave in 1949-50, as the ROC’s forces, civil servants and institutions 
fled to Taiwan. This group and their descendents became known as the Waishengren 
(A liiA  henceforth abbreviated as WSR, meaning from outside the province), and 
make up approximately 15% of the population. While those Taiwanese that had 
lived through Japanese rule and their descendents, are known as the Benshengren 
(Alii' A  henceforth abbreviated as BSR, and meaning of this province), and make 
up approximately 85% of the population.
78 On the 228 Incident see Kerr, Formosa Betrayed', Phillips, “Between Assimilation and 
Independence,” 275-319.
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In late 1949 few in Taiwan or the US expected the KMT regime to survive long, 
however, it was saved by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. As a result of this 
the US protected Taiwan with its Seventh Fleet, and in 1954 signed a Mutual 
Defence Treaty with the ROC. The KMT had initially set up a provincial 
government structure in Taiwan, but after the ROC central government arrived in 
Taiwan, the two bodies administered completely overlapping territory. However, 
since the ROC still claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China, it was 
unacceptable to remove either layer of government. Therefore a system of 
government was established in accordance with the 1947 ROC Constitution, a 
constitution designed for all China, but from 1949 could only be applied in Taiwan. 
The government structure included two national elected bodies, the National 
Assembly (IMIJ^^Clir) and the Legislative Yuan The former was
responsible for electing a president and constitutional revisions, while the latter was 
the law making institution. The Executive Yuan, headed by the premier, handled the 
day to day running of the government. In theory this meant there were two heads of 
state, the president and the premier. However, since Chiang Kai-shek, and then his 
son Chiang Ching-kuo held the presidency for almost all the Martial Law period, 
political reality dictated that Taiwan had a presidential system.79
Although Taiwan only held its first multi-party democratic election in 1991, it has a 
long history of conducting competitive non-partisan elections.80 Elections with 
restrictive franchise qualifications were held late in the Japanese era for village, city
79 On the ROC government structure see Tien, The Great Transition, 105-161.
80 I date the first democratic election 1991, as prior to this date elections were supplementary rather 
than complete re-elections o f  the national parliaments, only after 1991 did elections have the 
potential to bring about a change in the ruling party.
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and county councillors. However, the scope of elections expanded most rapidly after 
the KMT took over Taiwan. First in 1946 elections were held for city, town and 
district consultative councils, and by 1955 the offices open to direct election 
included town, city and county councillors, municipal executives (ME: including 
county magistrates and city mayors) and provincial assemblymen. Taiwan 
established a routine of regular local elections that has continued almost 
uninterrupted to this day.81 Other than the Single Member District (SMD) or “First 
Past the Post” elections for ME, most elections in Taiwan have Multiple Member 
Districts (MMD), in which the top vote getters up to the district magnitude are 
elected.82 During Martial Law there was a state of ethnic segregation in central and 
local politics, as while the high positions of the central government and its 
representative organs were dominated by WSR, those elected in local elections 
tended to be exclusively BSR.
Although local elections were used to justify the ROC’s claim to be “Free China,” in 
reality they fell far short of being fully democratic. Firstly, under Martial Law it was 
forbidden to form political parties and there were severe restrictions on 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly. The two opposition 
parties played no more than a token role, becoming known as “flower vase parties” 
An attempt was made in the late 1950s by WSR intellectuals and 
Taiwanese politicians to form a Chinese Democratic Party. However, following the 
imprisonment of its key instigator Lei Zhen ( I f f t )  in 1960 the movement
83 • *collapsed. The KMT dominated elections throughout the first three decades of
81 The one occasion o f  elections being postponed was in 1978 following the US announcement that 
it would end diplomatic relations with the ROC.
82 The district magnitude refers to the number o f candidates that can be elected in a voting district, 
this varies according to the district’s voting population, and the average district magnitude is 4.5.
8J On the Martial Law party system see Tien, The Great Transition, 64-104.
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ROC rale on Taiwan, Elections were actually very competitive, with competition 
occurring between KMT affiliated local factions rather than between political 
parties. When the KMT regime moved to Taiwan it lacked grassroots support, 
therefore it chose to establish a patron client relationship with local elites, which 
involved an exchange of economic privileges for political support. As a result, until 
the 1990s the vast majority of KMT candidates were from local factions.84 
Although there was often room for independent candidates in multi-member 
constituencies, the KMT did not face even a semi-organized opposition until the late 
1970s.
The second democratic weakness of early elections was that they were only local 
elections. The highest elections were for the Provincial Assembly, while the national 
level Legislative Yuan, National Assembly representatives elected in 1947 on the 
Chinese mainland remained frozen in office. The justification was that national 
elections would have to wait until the recovery of the Chinese Mainland and if these 
bodies were totally elected in Taiwan, they would cease to represent all China. 
Therefore though Taiwan had regular elections, central government and parliaments 
remained insulated from local public opinion.85 Other high level posts remained 
appointed, for instance the Provincial Governor, as well as the mayors of Taibei and 
Gaoxiong (MM)-86
Although on paper there was a separation of party and state institutions during 
Martial Law, the two were in reality overlapping. Therefore it became a prerequisite
84 Chen, “Local Factions and Taiwan’s Democratization,” 174-193.
S5 For the Martial Law era electoral politics see Tien, The Great Transition, 162-194.
86 Taibei and Gaoxiong mayors had originally been elected posts, but the KMT actually withdrew 
these direct elections in 1967 and 1979 respectively.
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for anyone seeking high office in the central and provincial government, the military 
and civil service to be a KMT party member. Moreover the KMT’s total political 
domination enabled it to accumulate a vast real estate and business empire, 
something that became known as the party assets (MM)- Finally, even if candidates 
wished to challenge the legitimacy of the KMT regime, this message was hard to get 
across with a KMT dominated electronic and print media.87
The state of elections only began to change in the 1970s. A combination of 
diplomatic, political, social, and economic developments contributed to the rise of 
the opposition movement that eventually became the DPP. Firstly, from 1969 the 
government began to open up a limited number of supplementary seats for election 
in the national parliaments. The subsequent pace that seats were opened up for 
direct election was exceedingly slow. Even in the final supplementary election in 
1989 only 30% of seats were contested, with parliamentarians elected on the 
mainland in the 1940s still in office. However, these limited national level elections 
gave the opposition the platform to attack the KMT at election time. Another factor 
was the diplomatic setbacks of the 1970s, which damaged the KMT’s claims to be 
the sole legitimate government of all China. Particularly harmful was the expulsion 
from the United Nations (UN) and loss of US diplomatic recognition. Moreover as 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began to develop economically it made some 
proposals for peaceftil unification under the one country two systems model in the 
1980s. In addition, after Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father in the 1970s there 
was a slightly more relaxed political environment for the opposition to develop. One 
writer described this as a transition “from hard to soft authoritarianism.”88
87 On the Martial Law era media system see Tien Hung-mao, The Great Transition, 195-215.
ss Winkler, “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan,” 481-499.
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During the Martial Law years Taiwan experienced rapid economic growth, with an 
average growth rate of 8.9% between 1951 and 1984, a phenomenon that has 
become known as the “Taiwan economic miracle.”89 These economic trends 
resulted in the creation of a much-expanded middle class, and when the new 
opposition emerged its initial strongest support came from urban middle class.90
In the late 1970s and early 1980s an opposition movement began to coalesce of anti 
KMT figures that collectively known as the Dangwai (DW meaning outside
the party. Some had local factional backgrounds, while others were KMT defectors 
or democracy activists. When the DW movement began to challenge the KMT, 
Chiang Ching-kuo reacted harshly by rounding up and putting on military trial 
almost all the leading DW figures following a human rights march in 1979, which 
was known as the Gaoxiong Incident However, the movement soon
recovered, with wives or defence attorneys of the prisoners standing for election. 
Gradually the disparate group moved from setting up associations towards founding 
a political party, nominating a slate of candidates, and presenting voters with a 
common policy platform. In its early stage the movement was not a nationalist 
movement. Apart from an antipathy to the KMT, its main common denominator was 
a belief in democratisation. As former DW leader, Chen Zhongxin recalled,
“Our main demands were democracy, freedom, the right to form associations, and 
freedom of speech and publication.”91
Tien, The Great Transition, 17.
90 This support tended to be from employees o f private companies or small entrepreneurs rather than 
those from the military, civil service and education or “j u n g o n g j i a o ”  ( i |[-£ ^ )sec to rs , who remained 
supportive o f the KMT.
91 Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
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By the mid 1980s it was increasingly difficult for the KMT to crackdown on the 
opposition, as it had done in 1979. When in 1986 the DPP was illegally formed, 
instead of mass arrests Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated the move and in an interview 
with an American journalist talked of ending Martial Law. Even though not yet a 
legal entity, the DPP conducted its first campaign as a party in 1986. During its 
initial five years the DPP suffered serious factional infighting over the party’s policy 
line and methods. While the New Tide Faction (fjf'/HJM) promoted the use of extra 
parliamentary methods and called for declaring Taiwan independence, the Formosa 
Faction ( H i l l l )  called for reform within the existing system and maintaining the 
position of Taiwanese self-determination. The DPP was able to expand its support 
base gradually on a platform of democratisation, self-determination, and ethnic 
justice. However, it drifted to a more radical stance, reaching a climax when in 1991 
the party passed the Taiwan Independence Clause (TIC which called for
a declaration of a Republic of Taiwan. "
By the termination of Martial Law in 1987 the KMT had also become a 
fundamentally different party from the 1950s. The WSR domination of party and 
government positions was gradually been eroded under Chiang Ching-kuo, a 
process described as Taiwanisation. Taiwanese politicians had risen from not a 
single member of the party’s central standing committee in 1952 to 57.1% in 1993.93 
Also the party had almost ceased to even pay lip service to the slogan of recovering 
the Chinese mainland, instead it increasingly based its legitimacy on its economic 
record, democratic reforms and electoral performance.
92 Cheng and Hsu, “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment,” 137-173.
93 Huang, “Elections and the Evolution o f  the Kuomintang,” Table 5.4.
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2.2.4 The Li Denghui Era
When Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, his Vice President Li Denghui succeeded 
him to become the first Taiwanese president. Although Chiang initiated democratic 
reforms, their speed and scope increased under his Li Denghui. In the 1990s a series 
of constitutional revisions radically altered the structure of the ROC government 
system. Firstly, there was a huge expansion in offices open for direct election, 
culminating in the first direct presidential election in 1996. Also the overlapping 
government structure was radically streamlined. In the late 1990s the whole 
provincial government structure was abolished, then in 2000 the National Assembly 
was frozen, moving the power for constitutional reform to the Legislative Yuan.
Another major change was in the ROC’s foreign and cross-strait relations. The ROC 
enacted a policy known as “pragmatic diplomacy,” which involved an attempt to 
expand Taiwan’s official and unofficial relationships, even with countries that had 
diplomatic relations with the PRC, and to enter international organizations, even 
where the PRC was a member. Although the 1990s saw a huge expansion of 
economic links between the PRC and Taiwan, the political divide between the two 
sides has widened.
Since the late 1980s as inter-party competition increased, inner party conflict has 
also been on the rise. While inner party conflict subsided in the DPP after 1991, 
there were constant power struggles within the KMT between pro-Li Mainstream 
(MKMT jrijuM ) and anti Li Non Mainstream (NMKMT factions,
resulting in four splinter groups breaking away.
The Li Denghui era came to an end in 2000 when his handpicked KMT successor
32
Lian Zhan (M U) was defeated by the DPP’s Chen Shuibian (IMM-lfi) hi the second 
direct presidential election.
2.3 Broad Electoral and Political Party Trends.
In this section I review the main national elections since the end of Martial Law, 
trends in party vote and seat shares, and party identification.
Table 2.1 shows the national level elections held between 1989 and 2002, and 
political analysts’ view of which party won and lost each election. The table reflects 
the regularity of the election calendar, with high-level elections held almost every 
year. In some elections even where the KMT gained a clear majority of votes and 
seats it is seen that the opposition party won if it increased its seats and votes 
sufficiently, therefore 1992 and 1995 are seen as KMT setbacks. A number of 
elections are seen as especially significant. Firstly, 1989 was the first election with 
legalized opposition parties. 1991 and 1992 saw the first complete re-elections of 
the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan respectively. While the DPP’s 1991 
defeat is seen as a repudiation of its radical Taiwan independence stance, the 1992 
Legislative Yuan election is seen as the beginning of the DPP’s moderation and the 
KMT’s split, which subsequently led to the formation of the splinter NP in 1993. In 
1994 the first elections for Provincial Governor and Taibei mayor were held, and are 
significant in placing Chen Shuibian and Song Chuyu on the national
stage.94 Also 1995 was seen as a great triumph for the NP and it appeared that 
Taiwan was moving towards a multi-party party system. The first direct presidential 
election was held in 1996, and was the KMT and Li Denghui’s greatest victory.
94 Prior to 1994 elections for Taibei mayor were last held in 1964, after a popular independent 
politician had defeated KMT candidates twice in succession these elections were suspended in 1967.
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While for the DPP 1997 was significant as it won over half the local executive seats, 
and for the first time its vote share exceeded the KMT’s. 1998 is seen as a revival 
for the KMT and as a NP collapse. The second presidential election was held in 
2000 and the DPP victory resulted in the first change of ruling party through 
elections. Both 2000 and 2001 were disasters for the KMT, as it lost first the 
presidency and then its majority party status in the Legislative Yuan. 2001 is seen as 
victories for the DPP and Song Chuyu’s creation, the People First Party (PFP H; 
Ift) both of which expanded their seat shares.
The electoral trends are represented in three figures. Figure 2.1 shows the parties’ 
vote shares, Figure 2.2 shows the parties’ seat shares, and Figure 2.3 shows party 
identification. Although variations in patterns of both seat and vote share are 
affected by different levels of elections and election systems, there has been a 
gradual decline for the KMT from about 80% of seats and 70% of votes in 1991 to 
about 30% for both in 2001. There has been a corresponding rise for the DPP from 
16.71% and 22,17% in 1986 to 38.66% and 33.38% of seats and votes respectively. 
On party identification, if the NP’s score is added to the KMT’s, Pan Blue95 
identification remained constant at about 40%. However, from 2000 there is a 
severe drop so that even if the PFP identification is added Pan Blue identification 
falls to about 30%. The rise of DPP party identification has been steadier, rising 
from only 7.8% in 1990 to 33% in 2002, making it the party with the highest level 
of identification in Taiwan. The trends on election results and also party 
identification show that compared to neighbouring democracies such as South 
Korea or Japan there has been much more stability in Taiwan’s party system. The
95 The term Pan Blue r i f  iLTQ refers to the KMT and it’s splinter groups the NP and PFP. This 
colour is used, as the background of the KMT party flag is blue. The DPP and its allies are referred to 
as Pan Green (£?$§u| l).
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major political parties in 1989 were the KMT and DPP, and remain so to this day.
2.4 Broad Trends in Issue Emphasis
This section looks at broad trends of issue emphasis for the whole decade from my 
newspaper ad content analysis. I employ this data to offer some preliminary answers 
to my research questions of do parties stress issues at election time, if so what are 
the salient issues, and do the parties actually differ in their issue emphasis? In this 
section I argue the data shows issues do matter in Taiwanese elections, that three of 
the most salient electoral issues are social welfare, political corruption and national 
identity, and that Taiwan’s parties do show contrasting issue emphasis.
2.4.1 Do Taiwan’s Parties Stress Issues?
Firstly, I look at whether parties stress issues in their election propaganda, Taiwan’s 
elections have the reputation of being candidate rather than issue centred. However, 
this can be tested in Table 1.2, which shows the issue domain tables for 1991-2000 
from my newspaper ad content analysis.96 This shows party positive/negative 
categories actually score higher than candidate positive/negative categories. 
Moreover, apart from the party/candidate and uncategorizable domains, actual issue 
domain references make up almost 70% of newspaper ad issue mentions. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that although candidates are important in Taiwanese elections, 
parties do stress issues.
2.4.2 What are most Salient Issues in Taiwan’s Elections?
Table 2.2 compares issue saliency using three indices: 1) my official newspaper ads 
content analysis issue top ten, 2) Liu Tsung-wei’s election gazette content analysis 
issue top ten, and 3) my elite survey. According to my official ad dataset, if party 
and candidate categories are excluded, the most salient issues are “Political 
Corruption,” “Taiwan Independence,” “Government Competence” and 
“Democracy.” Using a similar coding scheme but different dataset Liu Tsung-wei
96 Issue domains are the broad issue areas, for details o f the categories within each domain see Table 
1. 1.
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found “Welfare State Expansion” was by far the most stressed issue by Legislative 
Yuan candidates. In fact the only issue falling into both top tens was “Political 
Corruption.” To check the validity of these findings I asked Taiwanese politicians, 
“What have been the most salient political issues in Taiwan’s elections over the last 
decade (1991-2001)?” The results are shown on the Elite Survey column of Table 
2.2. This shows some support for both content analyses top tens, with a consensus 
among politicians that the most influential issues of the decade were national 
identity, political corruption, the economy and social welfare.
2.4.3 Do the Parties Differ on Issues?
The next question is were parties distinguishable in their issue emphasis over the 
1991-2000 decade? The similarity in top three issue domains shown in Table 1.2 
implies that Taiwan’s parties are focusing on the same issues. However, a picture of 
party differentiation is found on closer examination of the data.
Firstly, Table 2.3 helps to answer this query by comparing Taiwan’s main parties’ 
top ten issues in my official newspaper ads content analysis. Excluding candidate 
and party categories, the top issues for all three major parties are markedly different, 
with “Government Competence,” “Taiwan Independence: Negative” and “Political 
Stability” the most stressed issues for the KMT, “Political Corruption,” “Diluted 
Taiwan Independence,” and “Non-economic Demographic Groups”97 the top issues 
for the DPP, and “Taiwan Independence: Negative,” “Political Corruption,” and 
“Peace” the top issues for the NP. A similar picture of party differentiation is seen in 
Table 2.4, which shows the parties’ top ten issues in terms of frequency of appearing 
in parties’ annual issue top tens from my official ads content analysis. Out of nine 
campaigns, “Government Competence,” “Taiwan Independence: Negative,” and 
“Political Stability” were the most frequent issues in the KMT’s annual top tens, 
compared to “Diluted Taiwan Independence,” and “Political Corruption” for the 
DPP, and “Democracy,” “Political Corruption,” and “Taiwan Independence: 
Negative” for the NP.98
97 The MRG category is called “Non-Economic Demographic Groups,” but most references in this 
category in the Taiwan case were appeals to women’s issues.
98 Note that the lower frequency scores for the NP are due to it taking part in seven rather than nine 
elections.
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Table 2.5 offers further evidence of issue ownership, showing which issues from the 
major parties’ top ten lists overlap and which ones are exclusively stressed or owned 
by one party. Other than “Party Positive & Negative,” the only issue in the top ten 
for all three parties is “Political Corruption.” However, as I show in Chapter Four 
the KMT’s sub-issue emphasis of political corruption is quite distinct from both the 
DPP and the NP. In terms of issues, the DPP and the KMT have little in common; 
even the NP and KMT share only a concern for opposing Taiwan independence. In 
contrast, the lists for issues exclusively owned by single parties are far longer. The 
DPP has dominated the national identity issues of “Pure Taiwan Independence,” 
“Diluted Taiwan Independence,” and “Taiwan Nationalism,” along with “Freedom 
and Human Rights” and “Welfare State Expansion.” This is understandable as the 
motivation for many DPP members to participate in politics is a sense of Taiwanese 
nationalism and a desire to preserve the de facto independence of Taiwan. The KMT, 
on the other hand, controls the main economic categoiy of “Economic Growth and 
Prosperity;” this reflects the KMT’s confidence in handling the economy, 
particularly stressed since die successful withstanding of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis." Since the KMT was the ruling party in Taiwan from 1945 until 2000 it is 
not surprising that it has also owned “Political Stability” and “Government 
Competence” issues. The KMT, like conservative parties worldwide tend to stress 
“Law and order,” placing considerable emphasis on a number of criminal cases 
involving DPP representatives, and attacking the DPP for engaging in violence.100 
This seems to have had much success, as voters viewed the DPP as a violent party 
until the late 1990s.101 For the NP its stress on “Foreign Special Relationships” 
reflects its calls for better relations with the PRC and it has emphasized “Peace” due 
to its frequent warnings of war with China. Other issues exclusively stressed by the 
NP such as “Education” and “Culture” reflects its appeal to the urban middle class.
Lastly I compare my election propaganda findings with my interview data shown in 
Table 2.6.1 asked respondents, “What issues have you and your party stressed most
99 See KMT advertisement in Lianhe bao, November 24, 1998,1.
100 See KMT advertisement in Lianhe bao, November 21, 1994, 25. This advertisement attacks the 
DPP for its record o f inciting violence and drug dealing and shows a picture o f  a DPP campaign 
truck in a riot.
101 DPP Survey Research Department, “The 11* National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image,” 5.
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over the last decade?” Although all parties’ politicians agree that their most stressed 
issue was national identity, the rest of the top four issues show the parties’ 
dissimilarity, with economy, stability and prosperity most stressed by the KMT, and 
political corruption, democracy and social welfare for the DPR
In short, Taiwan’s parties do stress election issues. Where the parties do concentrate 
on similar issue domains; there are clear differences in the actual issues stressed. 
These findings hold across different electoral systems and levels of elections, for 
both advertising and elite interview data. It appears that the parties really are 
“talking past each other.” Having proved that Taiwan’s political parties have distinct 
issue positions over the 1990s, the next step is to look in further detail in the case 
study chapters to see whether issue ownership applies to individual elections and at 
the sub-issue level, and how the parties have actually changed, in terms of 
movement on the core issue areas of national identity, political corruption, and 
social welfare. A common claim is that Taiwan’s parties have converged on the 
centre, particularly in regard to the national identity question.102 However, such 
claims need to be tested empirically.
102 For example Wu, “Moving towards the Center: Taiwan’s Public Opinion and Mainland Policy 
Shift,”; Ming, “Centrifugal Competition and the Development of Republic o f China’s Party Politics.”
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Chapter Three: Social Welfare
3.1.1 Introduction
Social welfare remains a salient and divisive political issue in democracies 
throughout the world. The prominence of social welfare has increased as other 
features of the left right divide have faded in influence, such as nationalization 
versus privatisation, and relations with the Soviet Union. Although there was a 
consensus on the welfare state in many west European nations in the post war 
period, this began to break down in the 1970s with the rise of anti welfare state 
ideologies. The British Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher, the 
Scandinavian Progress Parties and the US Republicans since Reagan’s presidency 
campaigned on platforms of welfare state retrenchment and tax cuts. The polarizing 
nature of the welfare issue was apparent from the controversy over the first Clinton 
administration’s failure to introduce universal health insurance in the US.103 While 
UK voters have consistently listed healthcare as the most important question since 
the mid-1980s.104 Previous studies have also shown social welfare has been highly 
salient in Taiwanese electoral politics.105 Indeed welfare issues are the only 
component of the left right debate that divides Taiwanese parties. This is a spectrum 
in which the far right argues government priority should be economic growth, and 
supports maintaining the Martial Law welfare system of benefits restricted to pro 
KMT vocational groups, the centre right also has an economics first perspective but 
believes in limited expansion in contributory and means tested welfare schemes, 
while the centre left calls for a universal and equitable welfare state, but this should
103 See Skocpol, Boomerang.
10(1 http://vvww.mori.com/Doll5/trends/issues.shtml
105 For instance Liu Tsung-wei found welfare state expansion was the most stressed issue for 
Legislative Yuan candidates in their election gazette policy proposals. See Table 2.2 in this 
dissertation.
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be done without raising taxes.
In this chapter I show how as the scope of Taiwan’s elections was expanded in the 
late 1980s social welfare was initiated by the opposition DPP and was transformed 
from a latent issue into a highly salient political issue. Taiwan’s parties began with 
quite polarized positions on some welfare questions, with the KMT at the far right 
and the DPP at the centre left of the welfare spectrum described above. Electoral 
competition and public opinion have pushed politicians of all parties to give greater 
attention to welfare issues and take more pro welfare expansion positions. Social 
welfare has been the most contested case study in this dissertation, as the sociologist 
Wang Fuchang (EEfEiH) explains in Taiwan “everyone approves of social 
welfare.”106 In fact, the KMT’s successful stealing of the DPP’s National Health 
Insurance (NHI proposal is a rare instance of policy leapfrogging. To
avoid universal health insurance becoming a DPP vote winner, it was pre-emptively 
co-opted by the KMT. Therefore social welfare is a case of sub-issue rather than 
pure issue ownership, with the KMT owning National Health Insurance and the DPP 
dominating the pensions appeal. The parties have not converged at the sub-issue 
level as movement has been constrained by party ideology, past record and inner 
party factional balance. In particular, the continued strength of anti welfare state 
factions within the KMT has constrained the party from stealing other popular 
welfare appeals. Moreover, despite the contested nature of the welfare issue, it 
appears the public sees the DPP’s welfare promotion efforts as more convincing, 
with surveys showing the DPP perceived as the best able to handle social welfare
107issues.
106 Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taibei, October 26, 2001.
107 See Table 3.3 in this dissertation.
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Taiwan’s party positions on the welfare issue have been governed by the interaction 
of electoral, inner-party factional and ideological pressures. Election orientated 
factions and leaders have attempted to win elections with promises of broader and 
more inclusive welfare provisions. The DPP employed social welfare primarily as a 
vote-chasing tool. Following the DPP’s disastrous defeat in 1991, the DPP placed 
social welfare at the centre of the political agenda in its search for new issues to 
expand its voter support base. The most prominent of these sub-issues was pensions, 
and the DPP has consistently stressed the issue throughout the decade, linking it to 
corruption and ethnic justice. In contrast, the KMT’s broad support base ensured it 
used welfare to mobilise existing supporters. Social welfare issue was highly 
divisive for the KMT, with contradictory welfare messages coming out of the KMT 
camp throughout the decade. Since the NMKMT’s supporters were beneficiaries of 
the biased Martial Law welfare system, this faction called for maintaining the 
welfare status quo and opposing reckless welfare spending. However, the MKMT’s 
BSR and rural followers had been excluded from the welfare pie, thus this faction 
took a pro-welfare stance often indistinguishable from the DPP. Therefore, shifts in 
the factional balance between the MKMT and NMKMT dictated whether the KMT 
took a pro welfare expansion or conservative welfare stance. In contrast, the issue 
was not divisive for either opposition party’s expansion plans. The DPP’s welfare 
stress was initiated by election-orientated leaders, but had the support of all factions. 
The NP’s welfare conservatism made sense in its electoral appeal to the 
“jungongjiao” a collective term for the military, civil service and
education sectors, and the group that had the most generous welfare in the old 
Martial Law system. However, electoral forces have also stopped parties becoming 
too generous in their welfare pledges, as tax rises for increased welfare spending are
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even more a taboo in Taiwan than in the UK.
The parties have not converged on the welfare issue, as their contrasting welfare 
ideologies have guided their welfare positions and kept the parties differentiated. 
The standard welfare line taken by the KMT party centre, NMKMT and NP has 
been that the bias of the old Martial Law welfare system must be maintained, where 
welfare provisions are extended these should be contributory and means tested. 
Therefore though the KMT pushed the implementation of the universal NHI, it 
made certain the system was contributory and that its client groups paid preferential 
rates. It has been the conservative welfare ideology of these Pan Blue groups that 
ensured the KMT was able to resist calls for popular welfare schemes, such as 
pensions. Similarly, despite becoming the ruling party and the severe economic 
recession, the DPP’s record of welfare appeals ensures it continues to promote 
increased social welfare spending.
Comparative studies have shown that competitive political parties, strong social 
democratic parties, and labom* movements have tended to be critical factors in the 
creation of welfare states in democracies.108 However, Taiwan only has the first of 
these preconditions. The development of the social welfare issue in Taiwan shows 
the importance of competitive party politics, as according to Nika Rudra and 
Stephen Haggard, "democracy also provides incentives for political elites to 
compete for votes on the basis of providing such (welfare) benefits.”109 Democratic 
competition has caused mainstream norms on social welfare to change rapidly. 
Through electoral debate Taiwan has moved from a grossly unfair welfare system to
108 Kwon, “A Comparison o f East Asian Welfare Systems,” 27-75.
109 Rudra and Haggard, “Globalization, Domestic Politics and Welfare Spending in the Developing 
World,” 7.
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universal and more equitable welfare provisions. This is especially significant as 
socio-economic equality is a condition lacking in many new democracies, but 
widely viewed as being conductive to democratic consolidation.110 Moreover, the 
establishment of Taiwan’s new welfare state is all the more remarkable considering 
the hostile international environment for welfare reforms described by Joseph Wong, 
"The international deregulation of finance, labour market segmentation, 
trans-national movement of labour and the collapse of corporatist consensus 
building arrangements sabotage state efforts at promoting welfare reform or 
preventing welfare retrenchment.”111 In short, electoral pressures have made social 
welfare a highly contested issue, promoted reduced polarization and a more 
inclusive and equitable welfare system. However, ideological conservatism has 
maintained differentiation of welfare positions at the sub-issue level.
3.1.2 Chapter Overview
Following the brief introduction, section 3.2 outlines the developments of Taiwan’s 
welfare state before and after democratisation. Section 3.3 looks at broad trends of 
social welfare issue emphasis over the 1990s. Examining whether welfare issues are 
salient, if they are owned, if there is any change in ownership and if the parties are 
converging or diverging on the issue. In addition, survey data is examined to show if 
the public sees social welfare as an owned issue. In section 3.4 I review 
chronologically the welfare issue over the 1991-2001 campaigns, looking at the 
attention parties have given to social welfare in election campaigns, whether the 
issue is owned during individual campaigns, and if issue ownership has changed. In 
the next section I look in more detail at the evolution of the two main welfare
110 Linz and Stepan, Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation 12-13.
111 Wong, “Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Democratizing Taiwan,” 3.
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sub-issues: healthcare and old age welfare, examining whether parties have altered 
their positions and whether issue ownership also applies at the sub-issue level. In 
section 3.6 I evaluate the extent independent variables such as inter-party 
competition, inner party politics and ideology have pushed or constrained party 
change. Finally in section 3.7 I outline my main conclusions over how and why the 
parties have changed their social welfare emphasis and its significance for Taiwan’s 
electoral politics.
3.2 Social Welfare Issues and the Development of a Welfare System in Taiwan
The main welfare issues in Taiwan are outlined in Table 3.1. This table shows a 
number of significant trends. Firstly, welfare sub-issues have tended to be raised by 
the opposition DPP, forcing the ruling KMT to respond. Secondly, the scope of 
welfare sub-issues in Taiwan is much narrower than in the UK, as questions such as 
unemployment and housing have yet to become salient electoral issues. Instead the 
main focus of the welfare debate has been on health insurance and elderly welfare. 
Thirdly, many welfare sub-issues have been contested. For instance, though the 
KMT succeeded in stealing the NHI issue, its attempt to steal pensions in 1997 
failed.
Taiwan’s welfare state followed the pattern common to many authoritarian 
developing countries, initially developing a system benefiting mainly pro 
government groups. Like Park Chung Hee’s military regime in South Korea, the 
KMT was an authoritarian party attempting to employ welfare provisions to raise its 
political legitimacy. During the Martial Law era a generous and complex welfare 
system was built up that primarily benefited a number of pro-KMT occupational 
groups. First, in 1950 the Labour Insurance scheme was set up. The main recipients
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were workers in large state owned or private industries, most being members of 
KMT inn trade unions. Second, legislation in the 1950s and 1960s ensured that the 
“jungongjiao” group receives the most extensive welfare provisions on Taiwan. The 
“jungongjiao” are often referred to as the KMT’s “iron voters” (ffcJH)- According to 
political commentator Wang Fengquan (EE^lPj), “The KMT benefited by keeping a 
strong hold over certain key groups, the veterans, military, teachers and civil 
servants with pensions, social welfare and tax breaks.”112 Since a disproportionate 
percentage of the “jungongjiao” were WSR, the question of welfare reform was also 
closely linked to the ethnic injustice issue. The extent the welfare system was 
imbalanced can be seen from the fact that as late as 1991 74% of central 
government welfare expenditure was spent on the “jungongjiao” group.113 The 
unfair social welfare system did create resentment, however the prominence of 
democratisation ensured that welfare issues were not high on the electoral agenda in 
the 1970s or 1980s.
In the 1970s and 1980s as Taiwan’s economy grew, the existing labour, and 
“jungongjiao” insurance programs were gradually expanded in scope, so that by 
1994 60% of the population were covered by health insurance.114 However, the 
governing framework of Taiwan’s welfare system even in the late Martial Law era 
remained the far right model that concentrated welfare spending on the KMT’s core 
support groups.
Although Taiwan’s local government revenues are largely supplied by central 
government, both local and central governments provide social welfare seivices. For
112 Wang Fengquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, April 14, 2000.
113 Kwon, “A Comparison o f East Asian Welfare Systems,” 47-8.
1,4 Lu and Lin, “Social Welfare in Taiwan: Past, Present and Future, ” 12.
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example, the NHI, pensions for low income households and “jungongjiao” welfare 
schemes are administered by national government bodies, but city or county 
governments run old age day centres, and some have offered old age payments since 
1993. Therefore as the scope of elections has expanded candidates in both national 
and local elections have made repeated calls for welfare programs and there is a 
clear correlation between increasing expenditure on social welfare and Taiwan’s 
democratisation. Statistics reveal the link, as in 1952 social welfare accounted for 
only 5.61% of total government expenditure, but this rose to 10% in 1980115 and 
16.4% in 1999.116 According to former DPP legislator Lin Zhengjie 
“Before social welfare was a not a major item in Taiwan’s government budget, it has 
expanded in the last few years and a major factor has been democratic politics. Even 
though the government is increasingly in debt, politicians continue to give out 
money.”117 In fact, compared to the Four Asian Dragons, China and Japan, not only 
has Taiwan’s welfare state grown faster, it also spends more on social expenditure as 
a proportion of GDP.118
In the 1980s as party politics was beginning to develop, the opposition did raise 
some social welfare demands in their election platforms, calling for a NHI from 
1978, unemployment insurance from 1985 and pensions from 1991.119 However, it 
could not yet compete with democratisation or national identity on the electoral 
agenda, reviews of campaign reports show that prior to 1992 these issues played 
only minimal roles in elections. It was not until the early 1990s that welfare issues 
became salient and divisive at election time. However, though a regular feature in
115 Lu and Lin, “Social Welfare in Taiwan: Past, Present and Future, ” 8.
116 ROC Yearbook 2001.
117 Lin Zhengjie, interview by author, Xinzhu, September 21, 2001.
118 Aspalter, Conservative Welfare State Systems in East Asia, 7.
119 Chen, “The DPP’s Party Image,” 39.
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most 1990s campaigns, social welfare tends to be submerged by other issues and 
dropped in the final weeks of campaigns.
The expansion of social welfare in Taiwan has continued throughout the 1990s and 
into die 21st century. The most significant move away from the previous pattern of 
concentrating welfare on core pro KMT groups was the introduction of NHI in 1995. 
This trend toward more universal welfare coverage was also reflected in revisions to 
the constitution in 1997, which made commitments to provisions such as the NHI, 
and protection for disadvantaged groups such as women and the disabled.120 The 
scope of welfare coverage has gone well beyond healthcare. Unemployment 
insurance came into operation in 1999, offering insured workers that have been laid 
off short-term unemployment benefit, job training and assistance in finding new 
work.121 Although legislation has still not been passed for a Contributory Pensions 
Scheme, in 1994 the Living Allowance for Middle Lower Income Elderly People 
was intraduced, and this was followed up by the Welfare Allowance for Aged
i  9 9
Farmers m 1995. The process reached its climax in May 2002 when legislation 
was passed to fulfil Chen Shuibian’s 2000 election pledge of pensions.123
3.3 Broad Trends in Social Welfare Emphasis 1991-2001
In this section I look at broad trends of social welfare issue emphasis over the 1990s. 
Examining whether welfare issues are salient, if they are owned, if there is any 
change in ownership and if the parties are converging or diverging on the issue. In 
addition, party image survey data is examined to show if the public sees social
120 Ku, “Left or Right: The Taiwanese Welfare State at Crossroads,” 14.
121 Ibid., 16.
122 Ibid., 15.
123 www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/05/11/0000135552.
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welfare as an owned issue.
3.3.1 How Salient are Social Welfare Issues in Taiwan?
Table 2.2 shows three indicators of top ten issue salience between 1991 and 2001. 
These are my official newspaper ads issue top ten, Liu Tsung-wei’s top ten issues 
for Legislative Yuan candidates’ policy proposals in election gazettes, and my elite 
survey. From my newspaper ad data it appears social welfare is not salient, with the 
issue failing to make the combined top ten for the three parties. In contrast, Liu’s 
content analysis study found social welfare was the most heavily stressed issue for 
all parties’ candidates throughout the 1989-1998 period, with an average percentage 
of issue mentions of 10.1%.124 Similarly, in my elite interviews, politicians cited 
social welfare as the fourth most influential issue. These results are similar to 
another large-scale elite survey conducted by Lin Chia-long in 1995-6. This found 
politicians saw “social equality and social welfare reform” as the fourth most
* • 125important and pressing question. In short, all the data except newspaper ads show 
social welfare to be a highly salient electoral issue.
3.3.2 Is Social welfare an Owned Issue?
The next question is whether social welfare is an owned issue. Different data 
sources show though the DPP does give social welfare more attention, the issue is 
contested. Firstly, Table 2.3 shows the top ten issues in official newspaper ads for 
each party over the 1991-2000 period. Social welfare appears only in the top ten of 
the DPP, coming tenth with an average issue mention of 2.7%. The trend is similar 
in the frequency of issues appearing in parties’ annual issue top tens shown in Table
124 Liu, “The Effects o f  Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.1.
125 See Lin, “Paths to democracy,”578.
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2.4. Again social welfare only appears in the DPP’s top ten, coming fifth, and 
coming in its annual top tens on four occasions. The trend of issue ownership was 
also revealed when I asked politicians what issues they and then parties stressed 
most over the 1991-2001decade. The results are shown in Table 2.6. This shows that 
there is a clear difference, with the issue ranked fourth most stressed by the DPP 
politicians, but low on Pan-KMT priorities. Therefore at this stage of the analysis it 
would appear the issue is owned by the DPP. However, other studies show the 
contested nature of the welfare issue. For instance, Liu Tsung-wei found a similar 
level of stress for welfare state expansion in KMT and DPP legislators’ policy 
proposals,126 and Lin Chia-long’s elite survey found KMT legislators actually 
ranked social welfare even higher in importance than their DPP colleagues.127
The next question is has there been any convergence or leapfrogging between the 
parties on the welfare issue. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the three parties’ relative 
social welfare issue emphasis fluctuation in total and official newspaper election ads 
over the ten-year period. These figures can show in which years social welfare 
emphasis was especially heavy, if the issue is owned, and if there have been any 
cases of leapfrogging. Figure 3.1 shows that in total ads though the DPP has tended 
to talk more on social welfare, at times all three parties’ candidates have placed 
heavy emphasis on social welfare and there are a number of cases of leapfrogging. 
For instance, the KMT leapfrogged the DPP in 1995. The elections with the highest 
stress on social welfare were 1993-1995, 1997 and 2000. In Figure 3.2 there is a 
clearer pattern in official party ads, with the DPP dominating the issue and almost 
no leapfrogging between the DPP and the KMT or NP. For official ads the parties
126 Liu, “The Effects o f Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.9. This shows the 
average KMT mentions o f welfare state expansion was 11%, compared to 11,2% for the DPP.
127 See Lin, “Paths to democracy,”578.
placed most stress on social welfare between 1993-1995 and then in 2000. 
Throughout the decade the NP has given the least stress on welfare.
In fact the pattern of contestation and only limited ownership of the welfare issue 
mirrors that in Japan between the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP). From Figure 3.3, which compares these parties using 
MRG data, we can see though the JSP gave heavier welfare emphasis in seven out 
of 11 elections between 1960 and 1990, there were also cases of leapfrogging, with 
the LDP giving higher welfare stress on four occasions.128
In short the above data shows the DPP does give more attention to social welfare, 
however, the issue is contested, as KMT candidates also stress welfare at election 
time.
3.3.3 Public Opinion and Social Welfare
In this section I examine surveys to test whether campaign issue stress has rubbed 
off on ordinaiy voters’ party images. I am interested to see whether Taiwan’s voters 
see the parties as holding distinguishable and consistent positions over a period of 
time on the social welfare issue.
Unlike the unification versus independence issue, there is a lack of uniform survey 
questioning on party image regarding social welfare. However this can be remedied 
by pooling a number of different party image surveys, which reveal social welfare 
has increasingly been viewed as owned by the DPR First in 1995 and 1998 the 
Election Study Centre (ESC) asked respondents which terms (printed on an answer
128 Budge et al, M opping Policy Preferences, (CD-ROM).
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card) best described their first impressions of Taiwan’s main parties. These found 
that “promoting social welfare” was more associated with the DPP, with 3.1% in 
1995 and 3.9% in 1998 selecting this option as their first impression of the DPP, 
compared to only 1.3% in 1995 and 1.2% in 1998 for the KMT.129 The ESC also 
asked respondents to place themselves and the main parties on a social welfare 
versus economic growth spectrum, in which promoting social welfare equals 0 and 
promoting economic growth equals 10. The results for smveys in 1994, 1996 and 
1997 are shown in Figure 3.4, and show a consistent pattern of the DPP and NP 
viewed as being more pro social welfare and the KMT more pro economic growth, 
with the respondents locating themselves close to the centre. Unfortunately the 
wording of the question was altered to distinguish maintaining the existing social 
welfare system and actively promoting social welfare, the results of the 2000 survey 
are shown in Table 3.2. However, the trend is even clearer with the DPP seen as by 
far the most pro social welfare expansion, the NP, PFP, respondents and the KMT all 
located close to the centre, with the KMT the most passive on social welfare.130 The 
final survey data relevant to social welfare party image comes from the DPP Survey 
Research Department’s surveys in 1998 and 1999; these figures are shown in Table
1 T13.3. They asked, “Which party is most able to design a fair and reasonable social 
welfare system.” Again this shows that the DPP is viewed as a party better able to 
handle social welfare than the KMT or the NP. As the Director of the DPP’s Survey 
Research Department Chen Junlin explained, “The DPP is seen as weak
on cross strait, defence and the economy, and perceived as strong on environmental 
protection, opposing political corruption and social welfare.”132
129 Data supplied by Liu Yizhou (is!j§ij«|) from the ESC.
130 The data for Table 3.2 & Figure 3.4 were supplied by Sheng Xingyuan o f the ESC.
135 “DPP Survey Research Department, “ 11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image,” 3.
132 Chen Junlin, interview by author, Taibei, April 13, 2000.
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These surveys show Taiwan’s voters are aware of the social welfare issue, recognize 
the parties’ positions and see the parties as offering distinct positions on social 
welfare over a series of elections. There are not any clear signs of party movement 
or change in issue ownership; instead the data suggests stability rather than change. 
Despite the contested state of the issue at election time and KMT’s success in 
introducing NHI, since 1994 social welfare has been viewed by the public as a DPP 
owned issue.
3.4 The Electoral Politics of Social Welfare
This section reviews the development of social welfare issues in election campaigns 
over the 1991-2001 period. I look at the attention parties have given to welfare 
issues, the main sub-issues stressed, whether the issue is owned during individual 
campaigns, and if the issue ownership has changed
1992 Legislative Yuan Election
Although parties gave welfare more attention in 1992, it still was not the dominant 
issue, and was neither clearly owned, nor an issue on which parties were visibly 
wide apart. According to Lin Tse-min et al, “the DPP formally introduced its 
‘Welfare State platform’ during the campaign of the 1992 Legislative Yuan 
election.”133 This view was supported by a DPP TV ad titled “Because of us”
which after listing the DPP’s numerous policy achievements, stated one of 
its three main future goals was a “Welfare State” f?S>HJ[!!i).134 Politicians in the 
DPP also see 1992 as a turning point, the party’s new style was summed up by their
133 Lin, Chu and Hinich, “Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan,”463.
134 The other two were direct presidential elections, and reconstructing sovereignty.
52
leading strategist Chen Zhongxin (PAAflQ, “We were calling for social welfare, tax 
cuts and direct presidential election. It was more policy orientated.5,135 However, 
the picture is not so clear-cut when my newspaper data is examined in detail. Figure
3.1 and 3.2 show the level of stress on social welfare was still very low. Moreover, 
there were signs the issue was not yet owned, as the KMT gave more attention to 
welfare in its TV ads than the DPP, with six ads promoting its NHI plans. An 
interesting trend recurring over the decade was that KMT candidates were more 
positive about welfare than their party centre. In a sign of how independent KMT 
politicians are, their candidate Chen Hongchang actually parroted the
DPP’s official slogan of a “Welfare State.”136
1993-4 Executive Elections
The elections of 1993-4 mark the first peak of social welfare campaign emphasis 
and set a pattern of issue emphasis to be repeated throughout subsequent 
elections. In fact political scientist Hong Yongtai argued social welfare
• * 11*7had its greatest electoral impact m 1993. For the first time the DPP put 
welfare at the centre of its campaign, with welfare appearing in both years’ 
official slogans. The 1993 slogan was “Anti Money Politics, Clean Government, 
Love Taiwan, Promote Welfare, Good Government into the New Century” (jK 
'/M l while a year later it was “Big
Promotion of Welfare, Big Cultural Progress, Rebuild the Government,
Regenerate the Province and Cities” (^OAiHilllh A A A If® , B&/ftA'$ffl§, 
Tifff: A1I$J$t)-139 The DPP’s increased emphasis on welfare is also evident in
135 Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
136 Ziyoushibao, December 9, 1992, 21.
137 Hong Yongtai, interview by author, Taibei, March 21, 2000.
138 For example see Ziyoushibao, November 5, 1993, 17.
139 See Ziyoushibao^ November 11, 1994, 1.
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the newspaper ad data, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the DPP dominated the issue in 
both elections. In addition, welfare state expansion also featured prominently in 
the DPP’s issue top tens but was absent from the top tens of the KMT.140 The 
centrepiece of the DPP’s new appeal was old age pensions (A  J\ A A L  which it 
linked to both national identity and political corruption issues. An example of 
the DPP linking welfare to the ethnic question was the controversial ad titled 
“The Taiwanese have been slaves for 50 years!” This
full-page ad offered comparative statistics to show the huge gap in welfare of 
veterans compared to labourers, fanners, fishermen or businessmen. It stated 
“Actually Taiwan has the best welfare in the world, but only veterans enjoy it, 
while the Taiwanese are seen as slaves to provide for these people” (Lt J f  jib
i d i A
® )141 In these elections the KMT tried to either steer 
clear of the welfare issue or mock the failures DPP welfare pledges. Similarly, 
the NP showed it was located on the conservative side of the welfare issue when 
its leading figures Zhao Shaokang (jit AlSt) and Chen Kuimiao 
announced the NP is opposed to “vote buying style or free spending social 
welfare.”142
1995 Legislative Yuan Election
Despite the Missile Crisis, in 1995 Legislative Yuan candidates continued their 
social welfare pledges that cut across party lines. The contested nature of social 
welfare issue is visible in Figure 3.1, showing the issue emphasis for total 
newspaper ads, where the KMT leapfrogged the DPP. This was due to heavy
140 For the DPP see Table 2.8 and for the KMT see Table 2.7,
141 Ziyoushibao^ November 17, 1994,17.
142 China Times, November 5 ,1993 , 2.
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emphasis by KMT Legislative Yuan candidates. For instance, the KMT’s Wang 
Jinping (3r.^z;zP),143 and Huang Zhaoshun (JtHpJIlK)144 placed a series of ads 
calling for increased welfare provisions for the old, fanners and women. Clearly the 
KMT party headquarters was much more cautious on welfare spending than its 
independent minded party legislators. Thus in Figure 3.2 the DPP maintained its 
lead on the welfare issue for official ads. Moreover welfare came seventh in the 
DPP official ads top ten issues but was absent from the KMT’s top ten.145
The welfare emphasis of 1995 showed both continuity and some new patterns. The 
NP clearly restated its conservative welfare stance in its manifesto full-page ad, 
stating, “There are no free lunches; the NP opposes any vote buying type or free 
spending social welfare policies.”( A TYx A  £l
iw^Ji££rfC>146 With a new female Propaganda Chief Chen Wenqian 
If), the DPP’s official party ads had a new style, focusing heavily on women and 
childcare issues for the first time. For instance, a full-page ad DPP ad called for 
private and public companies to set up nurseries, child benefit, and lowering of the 
age to start compulsory education.147 Similarly the DPP “Women’s” TV Ad 0i§tC 
H§) ended with the slogan “Women’s Welfare State. Give Taiwan’s Women a 
Chance of Happiness” I p l l i tA A A ^ A I I l f r ) -
1997 and 1998 Executive Elections
After the lull in welfare emphasis in the 1996 presidential election, social welfare 
was once again high on the political agenda in 1997. As DPP chairman Xu Xinliang
143 China Times, November 2, 1995, 47.
144 China Times> November 11, 1995, 37.
145 See Table 2.8 and 2.7.
146 Lianhebao, November 18, 1995, 32.
147 Lianhebao, November 24, 1995, 12.
55
(IrMsJU recalled, “Basically we campaigned on social welfare orientated 
issues.”148 This is reflected in the higher welfare emphasis shown in Figure 3.1 for 
1997. However unlike the previous three campaigns it was KMT chairman Li 
Denghui that set the welfare agenda, with an attempt to steal the pensions issue.149 
As in 1995 the main parties competed for female votes with welfare promises. For 
instance, in the 1998 DPP “A Pao and A Qiao’s Welfare TV Ad”
H§), two comic characters complain about the costs of kindergartens and lack of 
social welfare, and note that social welfare is better in DPP areas. However, the 
KMT also made similar appeals, such as the 1998 “Gaoxiong Nutritional Lunch TV 
Ad,” which compared a Gaoxiong mother spending a relaxing
morning at the hairdressers and drinking coffee due to free school nutritional 
lunches, while her friend in DPP run Taibei city spends the morning preparing her 
kid’s lunch.
2000 Presidential Election
As in 1996 national security issues did feature in the 2000 election, but were only 
central in the last week of the campaign, leaving room for social welfare issues to 
develop. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that once again social welfare was high on the 
priorities of the DPP and KMT, though the DPP retained its lead on the issue. In 
official ads social welfare reached ten-year peaks for both major parties, coming 
third in the KMT and DPP’s issue top tens.150 However, there were significant 
differences in the welfare emphasis of the two main parties, with both focusing on 
owned welfare sub-issues. The KMT’s Lian Zhan again trumpeted the successful 
implementation of NHI and attacked reckless DPP social welfare spending. In
1,4S Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
199 I deal with this in detail in section 3.5.2.
150 See Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
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contrast, the DPP’s Chen Shuibian proposed his “333 Welfare Plan”
H ^ )  of NT$3,000 pensions for those over 65, child benefit for under threes and 
3% first time buyer mortgage rates,151 and “555 Child Care Plan”
I t e l l ).152
2001 Legislative Yuan and ME Elections
Since coming to power it appears the economic recession has made the DPP less 
enthusiastic about its welfare pledges. At a September 2000 press conference Chen 
Shuibian announced, “Social welfare can be put off, but economic development 
can’t be.”153 In the 2001 election the KMT attempted to initiate a new social 
welfare sub-issue closely linked to its attacks on the DPP’s failures of economic 
management, this was the unemployment issue. On 10 November 2001 the KMT 
organized simultaneous demonstrations in 22 cities and counties calling on the DPP 
government to tackle rising unemployment levels. KMT Chairman Lian Zhan led 
the Taibei march, and one of its main slogans was “DPP in power, guaranteed 
unemployment.”154 However, there were signs that despite the economic downturn 
and turnover of ruling parties, parties’ social welfare trends remained consistent. 
Firstly, the KMT did not follow up its initial focus on unemployment later in the 
campaign. Moreover, the DPP’s most controversial TV ad attacked fifteen KMT 
legislators for their “cruel” cutting of budgets for child welfare. This ad touched a 
raw nerve for the KMT as ten of these “barbarous” KMT legislators filed lawsuits 
against DPP officials for slander and violation of the election law155 and later the ad 
was blamed by a number of these KMT legislators for their election defeat.
151 China Times, March 2, 2000, 16.
152 China Times, March 9, 2000, 4.
153 www.taipeitimes.com/news/local/archives.2000/09/17/53615
154 www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/1 l/09/storv/0000111026
155 www.taineitimcs.com/news/2001/11/17/0000111883
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This section has shown how social welfare rose in salience in 1993 and has 
remained on the political agenda since. The main sub-issues have been NHI, 
pensions and women/childcare welfare. The DPP has given welfare more attention 
than other parties and in most elections appears to own the issue. However, the issue 
is highly contested and there have been cases of leapfrogging, such as in 1995.
3.5 Social Welfare Sub-issues.
In this section I look in more detail at how the two main welfare sub-issues have 
developed, if issue ownership applies at the sub-issue level and if ownership has 
changed.
3.5.1 National Health Insurance
National Health Insurance is an exceptional sub-issue, as it is a rare case of 
successful issue stealing by the KMT. The KMT was able to steal this issue from the 
DPP as in the late 1980s welfare was not yet a core component of the DPP’s party 
image. The KMT’s embracing of universal health insurance was a shift away from 
its traditional far right stance of concentrating welfare on pro KMT occupational 
groups. However, the degree of KMT change should not be exaggerated, as the 
KMT design of the NHI dictated that it was contributory and that its client groups 
still received preferential treatment. Moreover, after only two years of NHI coming 
into operation, the KMT attempted to introduce reforms that would have reduced 
the level of equality of NHI. The way that the cost of NHI has spiralled out of 
control has also contributed to the KMT’s reluctance to introduce contributory 
pensions.
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Although the numbers covered by existing health insurance schemes had gradually 
risen under Martial Law, Taiwan still had a very imbalanced welfare system. As the 
scope of elections widened, healthcare had the potential to be a hugely divisive 
political issue. Throughout the 1980s the DPP called for NHI, indeed DPP legislator 
Hong Qichang ( ^ t r f l l )  referred to it as one of their early policy achievements.156 
Therefore the KMT attempted to take the sting out of the issue by pre-emptively 
stealing it. First in 1986 Premier Yu Guohua ( f i l l ip )  announced the government’s 
intention to introduce NHI by 2000, and only two years later the target date was 
brought forward to 1995.
The KMT and government bureaucrats controlled the design of the new NHI plan. 
As Joseph Wong explained, “the KMT leadership played a supervisory role, 
ensuring that the NHI policy accorded with the party’s political and policy goals 
while insulating the bureaucratic policy process from outside influence.”157 The 
KMT was able to ensure a degree of continuity, as the system remained biased. Its 
core supporters such as the teachers and civil servants, and in the light of the 
MKMT’s increasing reliance on rural votes, farmers had preferential contribution 
rates, while the veterans and military personnel were totally exempt from NHI
I CO
contributions. Unlike the KMT’s inner party disputes over pensions in the 1990s, 
the move to wider welfare cover of NHI did not create divisions within the KMT. 
This was because there was a consensus within the high levels of the KMT that the 
party needed to respond to increased party competition, but also the KMT felt that it 
could design a welfare system to suit its own needs.
156 Hong Qichang, interview by author, Taibei, September 20, 2001.
157 Joseph Wong, "Resisting Retrenchment in Health Care,” 5.
158 For details o f  the contribution rates Aspalter, Democratization and Welfare State Development in 
Taiwan, 66-68.
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The Department of Health drafted NHI Bill was submitted to the Legislative Yuan at 
the end of 1993, and completed its third reading in the summer of 1994 with limited 
controversy and few amendments. According to former DPP legislator Lin Zhengjie, 
“Our NHI was passed after only two or three days (debate), even though this affects 
over 5% of our GNP.”159 The NHI has turned out to be an extremely popular system, 
with a 70% public satisfaction rate and 96.8% of the population insured by 1998.160 
Moreover the system is highly efficient, with waiting lists unheard of and a rapid 
increase in the number of doctors.
However, the NHI is a drain on Taiwan’s finances, with social insurance accounting 
for over half the government’s social welfare expenditure.161 Therefore in 1998 
the Executive Yuan proposed reforms that would reduce the level of equality of the 
scheme. However, a coalition of diverse interest groups was able to create sufficient 
cross party opposition to block these proposals.162 These failed marketisation 
reforms show that while the KMT could dominate the policy process in the early 
1990s, later, as Joseph Wong points out, “the era of top-down policy making in 
Taiwan is coming to an end.”163
Although the DPP had called for NHI in the 1980s, as soon as it was clear the KMT 
would push through NHI, the DPP abandoned this sub-issue. In contrast, it has been 
consistently stressed by the KMT and has been a clearly owned sub-issue since 
1992. Firstly, in 1992 the KMT placed a number of TV ads promoting its plan to
159 Lin Zhengjie, interview by author, Xinzhu, September 21, 2001.
160 Wong, “Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Democratizing Taiwan,” 11.
161 www.gio.tw/taiwan-website/5gp/vearbook/chptl9-1 .htm
162 For details see Wong, “Societal Mobilization and Social Policy in Democratizing Taiwan.”
163 Ibid., 35.
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introduce the NHI. As soon as NHI came into operation in 1995 the KMT began to 
trumpet its successful implementation. For instance, in a KMT TV ad a baby’s heart 
operation on the NHI is shown. A doctor explains how the NHI saves lives, and that 
such operations would have previously been too expensive for many families. Four 
months later in Taiwan’s first presidential election KMT TV ads listed the NHI 
among Li Denghui’s many achievements. In 1998 the KMT “Government Ability 
TV Ad”(fftJE&f b ^ H )  compared the KMT’s success in introducing NHI to the 
failure of Clinton’s welfare programme. In the 2000 presidential election the KMT 
had its peak welfare issue emphasis, the main reason was its message that its 
candidate Lian Zhan had been premier when the NHI Bill was passed and came into 
operation. For instance, a KMT ad showed a group of people at a bus stop in the 
rain and then a big umbrella covers them all, symbolizing the way Lian Zhan’s NHI 
covers everyone’s health needs.164 A number of full-page newspaper ads described 
how Lian Zhan forced through the NHI Bill despite much opposition, and how the 
scheme has grown in popularity.165 One headline claimed, “Even if you curse Lian 
Zhan everyday, you still carry Lian Zhan’s transcripts, the NHI Card.”
Since the KMT’s defeat in 2000 the party appears to have dropped NHI as a central 
election issue in the two subsequent elections. However, it is possible healthcare 
will become a divisive issue in the future, as the KMT’s Chen Hongji (|lji®§3£) 
remarked, “Once the NHI contribution rates were fixed, it has been almost 
impossible to raise them, as they will be used as an election issue.”167
164 Advertising expert Zheng Zilong rated this as one o f the best TV ads o f  the 2000 campaign. 
Interview by author, Taibei, April 11,2000.
165 See China Times, March 4, 2000, 5; China Times, March 4, 2000, 10.
166 China Times, March 4, 2000, 10.
167 Chen Hongji, interview by author, Taibei, September 14, 2001.
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The NHI is a case of the KMT pre-emptively stealing a marginal DPP sub-issue, 
then clear KMT sub-issue ownership. In addition, this case shows that western left 
right divisions do not apply in Taiwan. As the DPP legislator Chen Qimai (PjffS j|g) 
commented, “The KMT is a rightist party, closer to your (Britain’s) Conservative 
Party, but it passed the NHI, a policy which would be close to your Labour 
Party.”168
3.5.2 Elderly Welfare
Election stress on old age welfare came later than NHI, however, it has been the 
most salient welfare issue of the decade. Prior to democratisation old age payments 
were concentrated on the “jungongjiao” group to an even greater extent than health 
insurance, leaving the rest of the population to fend for themselves after retirement. 
However, this meant universal pensions had a wider potential appeal. Two types of 
pensions have been proposed in the 1990s. First, the DPP proposed “non 
contributory pensions” (A  A A A  henceforth termed “pensions”), while later the 
KMT’s alternative was for “contributory pensions” (III A A A ). Once the pensions 
issue was initiated by the DPP it become an owned issue, although later the KMT 
did attempt to co-opt this popular issues, this failed, leaving issue ownership intact.
The DPP first called for pensions in 1991,169 however this proposal did not receive
170any significant media attention. One year later the issue was raised by a number 
of DPP Legislative Yuan candidates. For example, in Tainan the DPP’s Su Huanzhi
168 Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.
169 Chen Mingtong, “The DPP’s Party Image,” 39.
170 I did not find any references to this proposal in either newspaper reports prior to the election or 
campaign reviews.
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G ^ ® )  made pensions the core theme of his 1992 campaign and according to Su’s 
2001 campaign website he was “the pioneer of old age pensions” (^ 5  
% ).171 However, as the issue was not promoted by the DPP party centre and the 
KMT did not get involved in contesting the issue, it remained a local rather than 
national issue.
The turning point for pensions came in 1993, when they became DPP central party 
policy and one of its central campaign issues. The director of the DPP’s Policy 
Coordination Department Chen Zhongxin recalled that, “Before when Su Huanzhi 
proposed pensions in Tainan (in 1992) it did not create a stir, but once the DPP 
proposed it, it had dramatic effects.”172 The issue became even more effective by 
the DPP’s linkage of pensions with the ethnic injustice of the existing welfare 
system, and arguing that if KMT corruption could be ended funding for pensions 
would not be a problem. An example of the DPP’s new pensions stance was a two 
horn long campaign video titled “Dignity in Old Age” 1 A , which
argued though the older generation had worked hard to create the economic miracle, 
now they were being neglected and needed to be taken care of with pensions.173 
The print media reported at length on the DPP’s pensions appeal. For example the 
China Times headline, “The DPP decides to play the Pensions Card against the Li 
Denghui Card.”( j ^ ^ j | t ^ i A ^ i  This quoted the DPP’s
Chen Zhongxin as saying that the DPP’s most effective issue is pensions.174 In the 
election debates, DPP candidates were very vocal on the issue, linking it with the 
ethnically imbalanced system and corruption. For instance in Gaoxiong County Yu
171 See www.a-de.coni.tw/sii/works06 ,htm
172 Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23,2001.
173 This practice o f  issuing campaign videos flourished for the next couple o f  years until it was 
superseded in importance by the cable news channels and paid advertising.
174 China Times, October 28, 1993, 2.
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Zhengxian (zfefljfcHc) stated that in the forty years since the KMT came to Taiwan, 
apart from taking care of veterans, it has done nothing for the other old people.175 
While DPP Zhanghua ME asserted that the degree of corruption in the KMT
authority is veiy serious, if the money wasted on government construction contract 
corruption could be removed, it would be enough to fund pensions for decades.176
In 1993 though the KMT steered clear of the issue in its ads, the KMT’s official 
position was opposed to pensions. The Minister of Interior Wu Boxiong’s 
statement reflected the KMT’s conservative position, “The government advocates 
that the elderly people live with or near their sons and daughters, so that care will be 
close by and the elderly will enjoy the natural bonds and ethical relationships
• 177between members of their family.” Some KMT candidates felt strong enough to 
toe the official party line on pensions. For example, the KMT candidate for Taoyuan 
Of^lS) ME said, “Pensions are like treating people to steak, then saying they could 
not pay as my father has no money.”
txiS-)l7S However, the issue was putting pressure on KMT candidates, with some 
attempting to steal the issue. In an article reviewing candidate policy forums it was 
reported that in Gaoxiong County KMT candidate Huang Baye (Hf AS?) offered 
voters NT$6,000 pensions in an attempt to outbid DPP’s Yu Zhengxian’s promise of 
NT$5,000.179 While in Zhanghua KMT candidate Ruan Gangmeng 
promised that if other counties offered pensions, Zhanghua would follow suit,180
175 China Times, November 18, 1993, 2.
176 China Times, November 18, 1993, 2.
177 ROC Yearbook 1994, 355.
178 http://www.new7.com.tw/weeklv/old/557/article022.html
179 China Tunes, November 18, 1993, 2.
180 China Times, November 18, 1993, 2. However, Ruan failed to keep this election promise.
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Following the 1993 election all six DPP elected ME began paying out pensions in 
an attempt to keep their election pledges. However, their appeals to central 
government to provide extra funding were ignored, and lack of funds forced almost 
all to suspend or water down payments.181
The pensions battle continued into the 1994 election campaigns, with DPP 
candidates again promising pensions, while the KMT strongly criticized these 
election pledges and mocked the inability of DPP local governments to deliver on 
then promises since 1993.
The importance the DPP placed on pensions is clear from a newspaper ad showing 
the many DPP policy achievements as fruit fallen from a tree, and the three 
remaining apples on the tree were pensions, media liberalization and UN
t 07
membership. " In response to KMT attacks, a DPP ad had the slogan, “If we can’t 
do it (provide pensions) we will resign’Xfi^^^OsfcT' I!!)- It had a picture of KMT 
corruption draining a resource pipeline, leaving nothing for the old people. The ad 
went on to refute the KMT’s argument that “pensions” will bankrupt the 
government, stating “The DPP’s Chen Dingnan promises that after being elected he 
will crackdown on special privileges and corruption, so that pensions can be paid 
out without raising taxes.” ISIfc
In 1994 the KMT and NP were united in attacks against DPP pensions policy. For 
instance in a KMT internal meeting Li Denghui made the comment that, “Making 
pensions pledges but asking others to wipe their arse, this is not reasonable.” ( |S ^
184 Many KMT ads attacked the
181 Aspalter, Democratization and Welfare State Development in Taiwan, 102. Only Xinzhu County 
was able to maintain payments.
182 China Times, 1 December, 1994, 47.
183 China Times, November 29, 1994, 40.
184 http://www.new7.com.tw/weeklv/old/557/articleQ22.html
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DPP’s failure to fulfil its pensions pledge since 1993. For example a KMT ad was 
titled “The DPP, Let Me Cheat You One More Time” I I ®  ^ 4® “  A ),
attacking the DPP for their failure to pay out pensions for more than four months, 
and how they had not kept their promise of resigning if they could not fulfil their 
pensions pledge. DPP party chairman Shi Mingde is mocked for once
again promising to resign this year as chairman and legislator if the pension pledge 
is not fulfilled.185 Another KMT theme was that DPP style pensions were a form of 
vote buying. At a KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) meeting in the 1994 
campaign Premier Lian Zhan stated “Using a few thousand dollars as a so called 
pension to buy votes is an insult to voters, once a party has reached that stage it will 
not have a future.”186 Similarly, a NP ad earned the slogan “Old People’s Welfare 
Should Bring Happiness, But Should Not Be Bought”
j§f),187 Both the NP and the KMT provincial governor candidates Zhu Gaozheng 
(Ai'SilH)188 and Song Chuyu189 argued pensions would bankrupt the provincial 
treasury. However, some alternatives were also proposed. For instance, the KMT’s 
Gaoxiong Mayoral candidate Wu Dunyi advocated a gradualist approach of 
increasing the scope of existing old age welfare provisions.190
With increased DPP attacks against the ethnic bias of the welfare system and 
growing NP encroachment into the KMT’s iron voters, the veterans, the KMT 
needed to show its commitment to veteran welfare. For instance, the 1994 KMT 
newspaper ad slogan, “What are they up to?” OiAlA'AA), in which the veterans are
185 China Times, November 25, 1994, 1.
186 China Tunes, November 1, 1997, 3.
187 China T m es , November 25, 1994, 12,
188 China Times, November 26, 1994, 4.
189 China Times, November 25, 1994, 2.
190 China Times, November 28, 1994, 7.
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praised for sacrificing their youth to protect and develop Taiwan and in return they 
deserve their welfare. Also it criticized the DPP for hying to create ethnic 
antagonism in its attack on the veteran’s welfare.191
Although the KMT was able to maintain more unity in the 1994 campaign, it was 
clearly felt the DPP’s pensions pledge was attracting voters. Therefore the KMT 
made attempts to defuse the issue in the same way as it had done with NHI, Firstly, 
the Executive Yuan’s Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) 
began to draw up plans for a contributory pensions scheme. Secondly, in a bid to 
sure up rural support for the KMT in the run up to the 1996 presidential election, 
legislation was passed for the “Old Farmer Allowance” The design of
the programme was almost identical to DPP style pensions, as it was neither
1 Q9contributory and nor means tested. This paid farmers over 65 a monthly 
allowance ofNT$3,000, and by 1999 had 703,000 recipients.193
In 1997 pensions once more topped the political agenda, though on this occasion the 
KMT attempted to steal the issue. This created more press coverage of a welfare 
issue in just over one week than in any other campaign in the 1990s. Li Denghui 
sparked off the controversy on 31 October at a rally supporting KMT Taibei County 
ME candidate Xie Shenshan (i^j^tXj). Li stated “In the past people have proposed 
this policy (pensions), but after coming to power they have not fulfilled their 
promises, stopping payments after just a few months. If Xie Shenshan is elected, it 
will not be a problem to make the payments all year, as we would not need a great
191 Lianhebao, November 17, 1994, 20.
192 For the first four years o f the programme there was limited means testing, then after 1999 it 
became universal.
193 Aspalter, Democratization and Welfare State Development in Taiwan, 75-78.
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deal of funds. I have confidence in his ability.”194 Following this Xie took the stage 
and explained that the NT$5,000 would be paid out to all over 65, including 
“jungongjiao.”195 This event was especially significant in that Li used the DPP term 
pensions rather than the KMT planned contributory pensions scheme.
This was the first time a central KMT figure had used this term favourably. The shift 
was even more extraordinary considering only a few days earlier the KMT 
Propaganda Department had issued a media ad titled “Green Government, A 
Guarantee of Failed Election Pledges” following its old line
of attacking the DPP for hying to cheat voters with its pensions pledge and failing 
to deliver.196 The China Times columnist Xia Zhen wondered whether Li’s
promise was not a form of bribe, writing, “If the DPP makes the promise, then the 
finances are not sufficient, but if the KMT makes the promise then there is enough 
money. After the election Taiwan can look disdainfully across the Taiwan straits at 
their one country two systems, as we have one country many systems.”197
There were two main responses to Li’s pledge, supportive from the DPP and pro Li 
MKMT, and opposed by the NP, NMKMT, politicians from the Executive Yuan and 
Provincial Government. DPP chairman Xu Xinliang responded that he was very 
happy to see Li Denghui was willing to implement the DPP’s pensions policy.198 
Many KMT ME candidates such as Liao Fengde in Yilan (^M ), Hong
Yuqin in Tainan County were very supportive of Li Denghui’s pledge at
the controversial 5 November, KMT CSC meeting.199 KMT Secretary General Wu
199 China Times, 1 November, 1997, 3.
195 China Times, 1 November, 1997, 3. Note that in previous DPP schemes veterans, retired teachers 
and civil servants that already had pensions were exempted.
196 China Times, 1 November, 1997, 3,
197 China Times, November 1, 1997, 3.
198 China Times, November 1, 1997, 3.
199 China Times, November 6, 1997, 2.
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Boxiong stated that Chairman Li Denghui’s support for Xie Shenshan’s pensions 
promise was not a case of the KMT making a policy shift. As months before four or 
five KMT nominated ME candidates had already made similar policy promises.200 
While the KMT Propaganda Chief Cai Bihuang backed up Li Denghui
trying to explain the difference between Xie Shenshan’s “senior citizen allowance” 
(M W P i a n d  the DPP’s pensions, how the pensions Li Denghui called for 
were a precursor before the “contributory pensions” scheme came into operation 
and that more funds would be available for pensions following the freezing of the
ooiProvincial Government.
The voices of caution came from Li’s rivals in the KMT such as Provincial 
Governor Song Chuyu and Gaoxiong Mayor Wu Dunyi; they were joined by those 
advocating prudence in the Executive Yuan. Song stated that there was no 
connection with freezing the Provincial Government and old age pensions,202 while 
later he said “it would be better to popularise running water before giving out 
pensions.”203 And when asked if he would claim an old age pension when he got to 
65, Song replied his mother and mother in law do not receive pensions, because he 
and his wife can settle the problem in a “filial way.”204 At the explosive KMT CSC 
meeting Wu Dunyi stated that though in 1994 DPP candidates proposed NT$5,000 
pensions, but he did not jump on the bandwagon, but he was still elected. Li 
Denghui’s response was, “You were lucky. This year the situation is different. The 
DPP proposed the old age pensions, but did not complete it, now the KMT can do it
200 China Times, November 4, 1997, 6.
201 China Times, November 2, 1997, 2.
202 China Times, November 4, 1997, 6.
203 China Times, November 5, 1997, 4.
204 China Times, November 5, 1997, 4.
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205and I guarantee we can do it better.” Other voices of caution came from 
Executive Yuan Premier Lian Zhan who called instead for implementing the 
CEPD’s contributory pensions scheme.206 While Jiang Bingkun the Head
of the CEPD pointed out that pensions given out by local governments camiot be 
viewed as a transition measure prior to the contributory pensions scheme.207
The NP also stood on the conservative wing of the pensions controversy. In 
response to Li’s policy shift the NP’s Zhou Yangshan(M\%[L\) stated, “Li Denghui’s 
words have broken the KMT’s earlier promise, did not take into account financial 
conditions, and are sure to have future repercussions.”208 The NP’s alternative 
proposal was “Filial Subsidies” of NT$20,000 per year to encourage
families of three generations to live together.209
The DPP attempted to take advantage of Li Denghui’s policy shift by proposing a 
“Respect the Elderly Allowance Bill” in the Legislative Yuan,
However, despite Li’s pensions promises, the KMT and NP combined to defeat the 
DPP bill in the Legislative Yuan on 6 November, 1997.210 Moreover, pensions 
disappeared from the political agenda when Li Denghui created a new controversy 
when he stated to a journalist from the Washington Post on 6 November that Taiwan
' y i  I
is already independent.” Although Li and his allies in the KMT had made an 
attempt to wrest the ownership of the pensions issue from the DPP, the KMT’s inner 
party disputes over the issue and its cynical blocking of the DPP pensions bill
205 China Times, November 6, 1997, 2.
206 China Times, November 6, 1997, 2.
207 China Times, November 6, 1997, 2.
208 China Times, November 1, 1997, 3.
209 China Times, November 28, 1997, 1.
210 China Tunes, November 7, 1997, 1.
211 China Times, November 9, 1997, 2.
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ensured that old age welfare remained a DPP owned issue.
A year later the pensions issue was less visible, hut the emphasis pattern returned to 
normality with the DPP raising the issue and the KMT losing its enthusiasm for 
pensions. In Gaoxiong DPP candidate Xie Changting (Hfiilj© made numerous 
welfare promises such as free false teeth, and old age pensions during recession.212 
The KMT incumbent Wu Dunyi’s stuck to his record of opposition to rash welfare 
spending, claiming that if Xie was elected implementing his welfare pledges would 
halt city government construction policies and all the city’s people would be the 
losers.213
Throughout the 1990s the KMT continued promoting the interests of the veterans, 
the group that benefited most from the existing welfare system. The KMT often 
played the terror card, trying to exploit the sense of crisis in the veteran community 
about DPP rule. For instance a 1998 KMT ad showed the face of an anxious veteran 
with the headline, “If this battle is lost, the Veterans will have no Guarantee” ( f j |7  
hn “IPgj A Y x P ¥ )  •214
The 2000 presidential election pitted the DPP’s Chen Shuibian, with a record of 
supporting pensions since 1994 against the KMT’s Lian Zhan and ex KMT Song 
Chuyu, both of whom had repeatedly opposed DPP style pensions. In the election 
all three candidates stuck to their previous policy positions. There were two main 
features to Chen Shuibian’s pensions message in 2000, firstly he attacked Lian 
Zhan’s failure to deliver on his promise to introduce the contributory pension
212 China Times, November 9, 1998, 2.
213 China Tunes, November 10, 1998, 5.
214 China Times, November 30, 1998, 10.
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scheme, and secondly he promoted his “333 Welfare Plan,” which included
pensions of NT$3,000 per month. For example, the newspaper ad titled “Lian
Zhan's Failed Promises” stated, “(Lian Zhan) has said three times (he
will introduce them (contribution based pension), but each time he has failed
without exception.” (m W iM ltW T  
m y215
The KMT message in 2000 was to again attack the DPP’s failure to deliver on 
previous pensions promises, the financial irresponsibility of DPP style pensions, and 
to promote the KMT’s alternative contributory pensions scheme. For instance, the 
KMT ad the headline “Let Me Cheat One More Time” (III^  Ff-lSfi— 16 was 
almost identical in message to the 1994 KMT ad titled “The DPP, Let Me Cheat You 
One More Time” ( ^ 5 1 ^ ;  17 This time Chen Shuibian was
attacked for using the promise of NT$5,000 pensions to get elected in 1994, and 
claiming his failure to make the payments led to his subsequent defeat in 1998.
Chen was attacked for once again trying to cheat voters with the same proposal.218 
In the 4 March debate Lian maintained his anti pensions stance, stating, “I oppose 
subsidy type old age pensions. As these are against the public interest, this is policy 
vote buying and is not an example that should be followed.”219 In a review of the 
various candidates’ social welfare policies the Minzhongribao (fx^r< El fit) noted 
that Lian Zhan called for a subsidy for three generations to be encouraged to live 
together or close by. 220 In addition, Lian was quoted as saying, “Subsidies that are
215 China Tunes, February 15, 2000, 7.
216 Ziyoushibao, February 21, 2000, 8.
217 China Times, November 25, 1994, 1
218 Ziyoushibao, February 21, 2000, 8.
219 China Tunes, March 5, 2000, 2.
220 Minzhongribao, March 10, 2000, 4.
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paid regardless of wealth cannot solve the real needs of old people and will only
991increase the burden on taxpayers.”" Fomier Provincial Governor, and now 
independent candidate Song Chuyu again showed the most caution on welfare. For 
example, though a Song ad promised free medical insurance for over 65s and 
vouchers on national holidays, it stated this should be means tested and criticized 
financially irresponsible pension promises. “
In the 2001 elections the KMT’s Lian Zhan again promised contributory pensions, 
however, it was not a focal point of the party’s campaign.223 In contrast, since 
coming into office the DPP administration has tried hard to implement its pledge of 
NT$3,000 pensions payments, either through legislation or executive decrees. And it 
is still the KMT that has been trying to block these welfare provisions.224 The 
process reached its climax in May 2002 when legislation to fulfil Chen Shuibian’s 
2000 election pledge of pensions was finally passed.225
In short, after the DPP placed pensions on the political agenda, they became a DPP 
owned issue. Although the KMT made some attempts to steal this popular issue, 
these failed, leaving issue ownership intact. As KMT legislator Chen Xuesheng 
U l i )  admitted, “Looking back over the last ten years, if there is one issue that the 
DPP controlled, then it is the pensions issue.”226
3.6 Explanations for Party Change
221 Minzhongribao, March 10, 2000, 4.
222 China lim es , March 11, 2000, 17.
223 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, October 19, 2001.
224 www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/12/20/storv/0000116569
225 www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/05/11/0000135552
226 Chen Xuesheng, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
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In the following section I attempt to explain these trends in terms of inner party 
politics, electoral competition, incumbency versus opposition status, institutional 
factors, and party ideology. I show how electoral forces have pushed the parties to 
give greater emphasis to welfare issues and moved to create a more inclusive 
welfare system. However the parties have not converged, as the conservative 
welfare ideology of the Pan Blue camp has resisted welfare state expansion.
3.6.1 Inner-party Politics
The internal balance of power within Taiwan’s political parties between ideological 
and more election orientated factions and leaders has had a major impact on parties’ 
welfare emphasis in the first decade of democratic elections. When the former 
control Taiwan’s parties, welfare tends to be a marginal issue and expansion of 
welfare provisions is resisted, while when the latter have the upper hand, calls are 
made for welfare expansion to win elections.
Throughout Martial Law the KMT party centre and the Executive Yuan determined 
welfare policy, the high levels of both being dominated by WSR, while elected 
representative organs remained rubber stamps for KMT policy. The KMT ensured 
that welfare provisions were concentrated on pro KMT occupational sectors. 
However, democratisation meant that for the first time elected politicians had the 
power to influence welfare policy. Moreover, democratisation altered the power 
structure within the KMT, as the party divided into two loose camps on the welfare 
issue. The Non Mainstream faction (NMKMT) tended to be WSR, with party centre 
or central government backgroimds. This group favoured only limited expansion of 
the existing welfare system. In contrast, the Mainstream faction (MKMT) tended to 
be BSR and elected officials. They favoured broader welfare provisions to enable
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them to win elections. Since elected officials owe their loyalty first to their electors 
rather than their party, the party discipline of KMT politicians deteriorated, 
becoming more similar to those in the US than West Europe. Therefore, KMT 
politicians often went against their party line by parroting the DPP slogan of a 
“Welfare State” in 1992. Similarly, Liu Tsung-wei found welfare state expansion 
was also the most stressed issue for KMT legislators in their policy proposals.227
Leadership has been especially significant in moulding the KMT’s welfare policy as 
the party has a tradition of power being concentrated in the hands of the party chair. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the conservative welfare policies of the 
NMKMT still prevailed. However, the fall of NMKMT Premier Hao Bocun 
^j) and the increasing dominance of the MKMT Li Denghui meant that the KMT 
became more pro welfare expansion in the mid 1990s. The 1995 Old Farmer’s 
Allowance and 1997 pensions pledges reflect the shift towards more universal and 
non-means tested welfare schemes. While Huang Baye was an exceptional case in 
1993, by 1997 KMT candidates were actually more likely to make pensions appeals 
than their DPP rivals. When I asked Li himself on the 1997 pensions issue shift his 
response was, “They are right. Old age pensions should be given and handicapped 
people need to be taken care of. However, these questions depend on whether the 
government has enough money. They must be done step by step.. .the KMT has a lot 
of money, we can spend much on elections, why not take care of these people?”228
However, Li’s populist policies were resisted by a coalition of the NMKMT, 
Executive Yuan and NP, preferring to perpetuate the welfare system that favour pro
227 Liu, “The Effects o f Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.1.
228 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
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KMT groups and limiting new welfare to means tested or contributory schemes. The 
showdown between the two KMT welfare camps came in autumn 1997’s pensions 
storm, as both factions employed pensions in then* inner party struggle between Li 
Denghui and Song Chuyu. Song and Li had been political allies since the late 1980s, 
however by early 1996 Li was beginning to view Song as a threat, and an obstacle 
to his plans for future KMT succession. As Song Chuyu and Wu Dunyi had well 
known anti pensions stances Li must have known his pensions promise would cause 
friction within the party and supply the opportunity to attack these rivals. Li 
Denghui tried to link the pensions issue to the abolition of Song Chuyu’s Provincial 
Government. Both Song and Wu risked losing credibility if they made a policy U 
Turn and backed up Li’s pensions pledge. The pensions issue offered them a chance 
to hit back, and both attacked the feasibility and suitability of Li’s promise. Finally 
Song and Wu were able to defeat Li by uniting with the KMT Executive Yuan 
figures to block the DPP’s “Respect the Elderly Allowance Bill,” and ensure that in 
later elections the KMT never again advocated DPP style pensions. Since Lian Zhan 
became KMT chairman in 2000, the influence of the NMKMT has risen; moreover 
it has allied with Song Chuyu and his PFP. Therefore the post 2000 Pan Blue camp 
has reverted to centre right welfare conseivatism.
In contrast to the KMT, social welfare has not been a divisive issue for the DPP; 
there have been no public factional disputes or voting against the party line over 
welfare policy. Welfare state expansion is supported by both election-orientated 
factions as a vote winner and ideological Taiwan independence factions due to its 
link to the ethnic injustice question. At the time of formation it was not inevitable 
that the DPP would become seen as principally a Taiwan independence party. As 
Cheng and Hsu note, “Had other DPP leaders been as skilful (as New Tide leaders)
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in promoting a different set of issues, such as social welfare, urban land reform, and 
even socialism, and had they done so before the New Tide raised the Taiwan 
independence issue, the DPP would have become a different type of party.”229 
Research shows that all DPP factions can be seen as pro welfare state expansion,230 
however the ability of the more social democratic New Tide and Welfare State 
Factions to maintain and increase their power within the party have helped to keep 
welfare on the DPP’s platform.
During the DPP’s first five years social welfare was no more than a secondaiy 
appeal for the party. This only changed with the rise of a string of election orientated 
leaders, such as Xu Xinliang, Shi Mingde and Chen Shuibian. Although it is hard 
for DPP party chairs to change fundamental party policy, they are able to control the 
tone of election campaigns. Thus once Xu Xinliang was able to consolidate power 
and control the DPP’s election campaign line in 1992, a new pattern welfare 
emphasis was set that has been continued by subsequent party chairs. According to 
Presidential Advisor Yao Jiawen($y||>C), the personality of the leader is important, 
he divided these into either refoimers or election orientated politicians ( 0
EgltJPc)* “The reason we (DPP) invest so much on social welfare is because of the 
personality of the leaders such as Xu Xinliang, Shi Mingde and Chen Wenqian, the 
party spokeswoman... I think that they are verging on the election orientated 
politicians.”231
Since the NP’s founders were mostly WSR and former members of the anti welfare 
state expansion NMKMT, the NP’s conservative welfare position is understandable.
229 Cheng and Hsu, “Issue Structure and the DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment,” 139-140.
230 Liu, “The Effects o f Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.13.
231 Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taibei, October 2, 2001.
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However, when the party merged with the Chinese Social Democratic Party 
Ifrf-frEgTfciC CSDP) in November 1993 it was agreed that though the NP would 
remain the party name, it would adopt the CSDP’s Party Platform.232 This would 
have given the NP a more social democratic stance, as according to political 
scientist Lin Shenqing this platform, “is the most progressive and
complete party charter of any of Taiwan’s parties.”233 However, as CSDP founder 
Zhu Gaozheng lamented, “later the NP broke its promise” and in the 1995 
Legislative Yuan elections, “Zhao Shaokang personally wrote a new policy proposal 
to be announced daily, it was a complete mess. The proposals had not been 
discussed at party meetings.”234 The CSDP group was excluded from the NP’s 
decision-making positions, and the NP remained dominated by its founders, most of 
whom were WSR with a conservative outlook on welfare. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show 
that until 1997 the NP did give some attention to welfare issues. However, the 
departure of moderates such as Zhu Gaozheng and the rise of extremist nationalists 
leaders such as Li Qinghua (2^J||lp) caused the party to abandon social issues and 
focus solely on identity.
3.6.2 Electoral Competition
According to the British political scientist Richard Rose, “Most politicians believe 
that their continued electoral success depends on their ability to maintain or increase 
an already high level of state provision of welfare.”235 The way Taiwan’s politicians 
have treated the issue implies that this observation also applies to Taiwan. I look at 
this variable in terms of whether parties are following public opinion, attempting to
232 China Times, November 13, 1993, 2.
233 Lin Shenqing, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.
234 Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.
235 Richard Rose, “Common Goals but Different Roles,” 15.
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mobilize existing supporters or reach out to new supporters, and how parties have 
responded to election results and the changing inter-party electoral environment.
3.6.2a) Public Opinion
Content analysis of election ads and reviews of media campaign coverage show 
politicians do stress social welfare and see the issue as a vote winner. Therefore it is 
possible Taiwan’s parties’ emphasis of social welfare is a case of following public 
opinion. For instance, according to the former KMT Secretary General Xu Shuide 
“It was a gradual trend that the people wanted to increase welfare, also 
the elderly population was increasing.”236 However, there is no clear trend of rising 
saliency. Moreover, if parties were blindly following public opinion we would 
expect a convergence of party positions on that of the median voter. However, 
Figure 3.4 and Table 3.2 show there was a wide gap between the welfare positions 
of all the major parties and the median voter. In any society there are multiple issues 
that the public stress but only those issues politicians chose to exploit will become 
politically salient. For example, there is no doubt that Taiwan has an appalling 
environmental problem, and that the public perceive of this problem, but politicians 
have rarely exploited this as a central electoral issue.237 Therefore the key factor 
encouraging candidates to employ welfare appeals is its instrumental value as a vote 
winning issue.
3.6.2b) Mobilising or Chasing?
The sociological groups targeted by parties’ election campaigns affected their 
welfare emphasis. For while the DPP raised the issue to chase new voters, the KMT
236 Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
237 An exception to this pattern was the DPP candidate Liao Yonglai’s call for a referendum on the 
construction o f a German chemical plant in the 1997 Taizhong County ME race.
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principally made welfare appeals to preserve its broad existing support base.
According to the Deputy Director of the DPP’s Xu Shufen the real
difference between DPP and KMT welfare policy is “The KMT has offered
» * ' ) ,iOselective social welfare to its supporters.”" The “jungongjiao” would have nothing 
to gain from the DPP’s promises of universal benefits and felt threatened by the 
DPP’s attacks on the existing welfare system. Therefore it was rational for the KMT 
to appeal to these supporters by preserving the bias of the existing welfare system. 
Moreover though the NHI Bill can be viewed as an attempt to use welfare policy to 
expand beyond its core voters, the KMT ensured the system remained biased in 
favour* of the pro KMT groups, as they received preferential treatment in their NHI 
contributions. By the early 1990s support for the MKMT faction was increasingly 
concentrated in rural areas and local factions, groups previously marginal to existing 
welfare schemes and that now demanded greater welfare. This can partly explain 
why the many KMT legislators were prepared to vote against the party line over the 
DPP’s amendment to Farmer Insurance Bill in 1995, and it was KMT ME 
candidates that initiated the pensions issue in 1997.
The primary objective of DPP welfare emphasis was to expand its support base in 
the early-mid 1990s. However, the issue was also used to appeal to the sociological 
group most supportive of the DPP, the BSR. With a disproportionate proportion of 
BSR involved in the private or underground economic sectors and thus excluded 
from the Martial Law era welfare system, it made sense for the DPP to call for 
universal benefits. The DPP’s attacks on the ethnically biased welfare system were 
also playing to the prejudices of its own supporters. Almost all DPP politicians are
238 Xu Shufen, interview by author, Taibei, April 13, 2000.
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BSR, of the 29 DPP politicians that I interviewed only two were WSR, and many 
DPP politicians cited the ethnic bias of the existing welfare system as a key factor 
motivating the party to stress welfare at election time.
Although most DPP core supporters are enthusiastic advocates of higher welfare, 
the party has been restrained from being too reckless on welfare spending by its 
small and medium enterprises (SME) followers. Since the 1980s businessmen from 
such enterprises have been an important source of votes and party funds for the DPP. 
This group is opposed to welfare increases that would require higher taxes and 
involve employer contributions. As the DPP’s XuTiancai explains, the
DPP’s “radical social welfare ideology has become a worry for SME that need the 
China market.”239 The DPP’s fear of losing the votes of small business was shown 
by the way it decided to drop the stock transaction tax from its 2000 election 
platform once it had been highlighted in the media.240
Initially five of the lowest support groups for the DPP were WSR, women, the 
elderly, rural residents and the middle class. In elections the DPP has attempted to 
use welfare appeals to expand into all these groups except WSR, as the probability 
of WSR realigning to the DPP was very low. In 1987 women made up only 32.4% 
of DPP supporters, while those over 60 accounted for 7.2% of DPP identifiers.241 
The DPP’s appeal to women became most intense in the 1995 and 1997 campaigns, 
in which Taiwan’s most charismatic female politician Chen Wenqian was the DPP 
Propaganda Chief. The kinds of issues focused on were childcare and women’s 
safety. By 1998 women made up 43.6% of DPP supporters, implying the DPP has
239 Xu Tiancai, interview by author, Tainan, August 25, 2001.
240 Point made by DPP’s Xu Shufen, interview by author, Taibei, April 13, 2000.
241 Lin, “Paths to democracy,” 424.
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made progress in attracting the female vote.242 The DPP also made pensions a core 
issue from 1993 to win elderly votes. However, the effectiveness of the pensions 
issue in increasing DPP support is in doubt, as in 1998 those over 60 only made up 
8.6% of DPP supporters, a veiy modest increase.243 The DPP also targeted the 
middle class with welfare pledges. According to former DPP Secretary General 
Zhang Junhong, “implementing a social welfare policy was important for the middle 
class and below and the DPP represents the middle class and below, and for them 
this policy was veiy attractive.”244
In order for the DPP to expand out of its initial urban strongholds and win in ME 
elections the party stressed welfare issues such as pensions to appeal to rural voters. 
There is a perception in Taiwan that welfare appeals are more effective in the 
countryside. As DPP legislator Shen Fuxiong QtMIM) stated about welfare pledges, 
“If we just write a blank cheque it won’t work in Taibei city, but I think it still works 
in rural areas.”-45 The DPP has clearly had some success in this rural expansion, as 
since the late 1990s it has improved its electoral performance in agricultural 
counties.
The initial support base of the NP and the groups it later chose to expand into were 
all beneficiaries of the old welfare system, therefore the NP held a consistently 
conservative welfare stance. The core supporters of the NP were WSR and in 
particular the veterans, therefore the NP was vocal in supporting the welfare of 
veterans, such as promoting the reconstruction of military villages.246 In fact both
242 Liu, “The Effects o f Electoral Laws on Party Competition,” Table 1.3
243 Ib id ., Table 1.4
244 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001
245 Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taibei, September 19, 2001,
246 For example see China Times, November 25, 1994, 12
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the NP and the NMKMT were able to benefit from the sense of crisis in the WSR 
community that a DPP government would threaten their position in society. The NP 
also hoped to expand beyond its initial WSR support base into the urban-based 
“jungongjiao,” who already had excellent welfare provisions. Therefore the NP 
adopted a conservative welfare stance, for instance it allied with the KMT to block 
the DPP’s amendment to the Farmer’s Insurance Bill in 1995. The party did make 
calls for targeted and means tested welfare programs. Political scientist Wu Chongli 
G^ItilO  recalled, “They stressed the idea of being the ‘spokesperson of the 
ordinary city people’ (/Jrifr K f'cllfA ) and began raising social welfare questions 
such as for handicapped people.”247 However as political scientist Chen Mingtong 
(T O M ) observed following the party’s collapse in 1998, “The ordinary city people 
are not a class and there is no such class consciousness, this cannot be the social 
base for a political party. For a party to try to make this its base is like constructing a 
building from the sand on a beach.”248 In the mid 1990s the NP’s Zhu Gaozheng 
advocated trying to expand support outside the big cities. Zhu explained, “I said (to 
NP leaders) you need to begin to show concern for farmers and workers. But I can 
tell you they are so lazy.”249 For the NP to make the kind of welfare appeals that 
would appeal to rural voters would have contradicted their conservative welfare 
position, therefore the NP never created a significant rural following.
3.6.2c) Election Environment
The parties’ changing welfare emphasis has also been affected by changes in the 
inter-party competitive environment. It was the unprecedented political challenge 
from the DPP that prompted the KMT to implement NHI. Therefore the KMT’s
247 Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.
24s China Times, December 6, 1998, 15.
249 Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.
83
early introduction of NHI was aimed at stopping health insurance welfare becoming 
a winning issue for the DPP. Indeed the KMT’s shift was similar to the way pressure 
of party competition prompted the LDP Prime Minister in Japan to embrace welfare 
expansion in 1973.250
In 1994 a lack of funds forced most DPP run counties to cancel or water down their 
pensions payments. If at the time the KMT central or provincial governments had 
bailed out the DPP local governments, the credit would still have gone to the DPP as 
by then the party image on pensions was fixed, and the KMT would gain nothing. 
Instead a far safer tactic was to employ pensions as a rod to castigate the DPP’s 
government ability.
The DPP’s welfare emphasis was also a response to the new electoral environment 
of the early 1990s. After Hao Bocun fell from power, the Taiwanised KMT could no 
longer be attacked as an alien regime. The DPP needed new issues to win elections, 
thus the DPP hoped to use welfare issues to combat the KMT’s key weapons; the Li 
Denghui card and vote buying. In the early 1990s campaigns Li campaigned 
extensively for KMT candidates, and this playing of the Li Denghui card put the 
DPP in severe difficulties. As the DPP’s Chen Zhongxin remarked in 1993, “The 
DPP will use the pensions card against the KMT’s Li Denghui card.”251 Similarly, 
Zhang Junhong recalled how the DPP used welfare appeals to cope with
the KMT’s increasingly vote buying, “This (KMT vote buying) created a stumbling 
block for the DPP in elections, and the way to break through this was to use another 
form of vote buying. That is what the social welfare policy was, (laugh). The
250 Kwon, “A Comparison of East Asian Welfare Systems,” 57.
251 China lim es , October 28, 1993, 2.
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promise of social welfare is a kind of vote buying. Contractual vote buying. In order 
to deal with the KMT’s huge corrupt vote buying methods and corrupt authority, the 
only way was to use this method.”252 The DPP’s pensions appeal also had a 
strategic element of tiying to force the KMT to treat elections as a party-to-party 
contest. As early as 1993 The DPP called for a party chairman’s debate and 
according to Chen Fangming by making the pensions appeal “we were
trying to seduce the KMT leaders to attack us, like Wu Boxiong or Li Denghui, then 
we could compete party to party.”
The policy flexibility revealed by the KMT’s attempts to steal DPP welfare appeals 
in the mid 1990s put the DPP in a serious dilemma, as eveiy time the KMT co-opted 
a DPP policy appeal, the DPP needed to search for new issues to win elections. As 
DPP Secretary General Qiu Yiren(jr|3fi|'fll) noted in 1998, “Actually many policies 
proposed by the DPP have been digested by the KMT. For example, the contributory 
pensions scheme and social military service. After the DPP proposes them, then 
regardless of planning the KMT announces that in 2000 or 2004 they will be 
implemented. Thus they digest the issue and it is hard to put issues on the 
agenda.”254 However, the KMT’s flexibility clearly has limits, thus since 1997 it 
has reverted to more conservative welfare positions, leaving the DPP dominating the 
welfare issue.
The arrival on the scene of the NP was a serious threat to the KMT, as the NP was 
appealing to the KMT’s core voters with calls for maintaining veteran welfare. 
Research has shown that WSR were more likely to switch their identification from
252 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
253 Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
234 China Times, November 25, 1998,4.
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the KMT to the NP.255 The KMT needed to prove it had the veterans’ true interests 
at heart; therefore from 1994 KMT ads stressing veteran welfare begin to appear.256 
This process reached a climax in 1995 when the NP’s threat to the KMT was at its 
peak, this was reflected by the series of KMT veteran orientated TV ads in 1995.
3.6.2d) Election Results
Both election victories and defeats have had considerable effects on Taiwan’s 
parties’ welfare campaign emphasis, with greater emphasis when welfare issues are 
seen as contributing to victories and abandoning the issue when it appears to have 
lost its appeal. The fact the KMT stressed the NHI from 1992 until 2000 in almost 
every national level election reveals the party must have seen the issue as a vote 
winner. However, following the KMT’s disastrous defeat in 2000 it has not made 
NHI a central theme in the subsequent 2001 and 2002 elections. Similarly, the KMT 
felt it could score points against the DPP by attacking the financial recklessness of 
its pensions pledge and mock the failure of DPP local governments to deliver on 
pensions promises. However, these attacks are not going to be repeated in 2004, as 
pensions were introduced by the DPP central government in 2002 and these 
payments have not caused the country’s finances to collapse.
By the mid 1990s some KMT politicians began to consider pensions a potential vote 
winner, as former Secretary General Xu Shuide remarked over the KMT shift, “Of 
course, elections are a reason.”257 There was a feeling within the KMT that the 
DPP’s pensions campaigns in 1993 and 1994 had lost the KMT votes, and that the 
KMT needed to steal this popular issue. The pensions issue put the KMT in a severe
255 See Shi (5® ® ® ), “Analysis o f Changes in Taiwanese Voters’ Party Identification.”
256 China Times, November 17, 1994, 20.
237 Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
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dilemma, as KMT legislator Chen Hongji (li^JrJf!?) noted, “This pension policy is 
irresponsible. However, if we oppose pensions we’ll be attacked.”258 In response to 
the DPP’s pensions slogans the KMT was forced to devise its contributory pensions 
scheme. A former KMT Propaganda Chief recalled, “Since 1993 the DPP has 
promoted pensions, through to 1997. But the KMT didn’t know how to fight the 
social welfare appeal, so finally we adopted the contribution based pensions scheme 
to distinguish ourselves.” However, by 1997 some felt the KMT’s pensions 
alternative put it at a disadvantage against the DPP and for the first time DPP style 
pensions briefly became official KMT policy. As a former KMT Propaganda Chief 
recalled, “The problem was ordinary people didn’t understand the difference 
(between the KMT’s contributory pensions scheme and the DPP’s pensions), so we 
simply used their term, though in our bones we were thinking of the contributory 
pensions. It (Li’s use of the tenn pensions was a deliberate mistake.”260
However, following the KMT’s serious defeat in 1997, the party never again 
proposed DPP style pensions.
The DPP’s worst election setbacks were the Taiwan independence campaigns of 
1991 and 1996. Most DPP leaders concluded the party needed to find new issues to 
fight elections on, and social welfare was one of the issues subsequently employed 
to try to breakthrough the bottleneck in DPP support. As DPP legislator Lai 
Jinlin(^M®lM) noted, “The decision for the DPP to focus on setting up a social 
welfare system and old age pensions was closely related to getting more votes.”261 
The first welfare campaign of 1993 set a precedent of welfare emphasis that was
258 Chen Hongji, interview by author, Taibei, September 14, 2001.
259 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
260 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
261 Lai Jinlin, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
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followed in subsequent elections. Numerous DPP politicians in my 2001 interviews 
argued the new welfare emphasis of the 1990s has actually worked for the DPP. 
Former party chairman Xu Xinliang stated, “Actually social welfare issues were 
more popular than the basic DPP demands (independence/nationalism). The social 
welfare demands could attract the middle voters.”262 While Chen Zhongxin noted, 
“Our strategy (1993-4) was veiy successful, that was the old age pension appeal.”263 
The fact the DPP has continued to use social welfare to attack the KMT even in its 
first post turnover election reflects the degree the DPP views it as a vote winner.
In addition, social welfare pledges were part of the DPP’s strategy of moving from 
local up to central government, a policy titled “the local surrounds the centre” (ffe A  
'felSi AA)- The DPP’s You Qing (A'/lf) summed up the mood of the day, “As we 
gradually moved towards becoming the ruling party we had to pay attention to 
issues like infrastructure, transport, social welfare and education. We had to show 
that we were not just limited to talking about self determination and cross straits.”264 
Moreover it hoped that if it could be successful at implementing its welfare policies 
it would show the DPP’s government ability in ME and later for national 
government.
Another reason for the DPP’s enthusiasm for social welfare and for the issue’s 
effectiveness was the way the DPP framed the issue as intimately linked to the 
salient questions of ethnicity and political corruption. Firstly, newspaper ads 
attacking the ethnic bias in the existing welfare system stirred up intense anti WSR 
passions at election times. In the same way the DPP was able to make the argument
262 Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
263 Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
264 You Qing, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
that rather than tax rises, by removing KMT corruption funding for welfare would 
be sufficient. As the DPP’s Chen Fangming recalled about 1993-4, “The strategy 
was simple. We just said that if we can stop the corruption then we could have more 
social welfare. Actually I know that there are many loopholes in this kind of 
propaganda.”265
Since social welfare is not a core ideological issue, Taiwan’s parties are more likely 
to tone down such appeals as soon as the issue appears to no longer be a vote winner. 
For example, there is a perception in some circles that now social welfare has less 
potential to increase votes. As the DPP’s Xu Tiancai commented “The DPP has 
always stressed economic redistribution, so it has struggled to attract centre 
voters.”266 This partly explains why though the DPP has continued to stress social 
welfare it has not been as central to campaigns as in 1993 and 1994.
3.6.2e) A Mandate Model?
It is a positive sign for Taiwan’s democracy that politicians are wary of voters 
punishing serious policy shifts or failures to deliver on their electoral mandates. 
Although social welfare issues offer politicians greater flexibility than national 
identity, change has also been heavily constrained by past record. Most politicians 
that took strong stands either for or against pensions” in the early 1990s debate have 
maintained remarkably consistent positions in the subsequent election debates.267 
For example, in a 2001 interview Wu Dunyi showed consistency in his arguments 
against DPP style pensions. Firstly, he linked pensions to vote buying, stating, “It’s
265 Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
266 Xu Tiancai, interview by author, Tainan, August 25, 2001.
267 The one exception to the rule is Li Denghui. In 1994 Li was on record as describing DPP pension 
as just a form o f  vote buying. However, since Li did not have such a strong anti pensions image, he 
could make the 180 degrees shift in his pensions promise.
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the DPP that has used this issue (pensions) to buy the hearts of those old people.”268 
Secondly, he claimed this policy would bankrupt the central, provincial or county 
finances, “Look how rich the US is, but they do not give old people NT$5,000 a 
month. Does Taiwan have the conditions to do this? Of course, not.”269 And lastly, 
he argued that such universal benefits would not help those that really needed 
financial help the most, “To a poor person NT$5,000 is not enough, but why give a 
rich person NT$5,000?”270
By attacking their competitors for failing to deliver on policy promises or making 
unprincipled welfare policy shifts voters are reminded of previous unfulfilled 
manifesto pledges. For instance, the KMT has relentlessly attacked the DPP for its 
failure to deliver on pensions since 1994. Therefore, though DPP ME were unable to 
completely fulfil their 1993 pensions promises, most continued watered down old 
age payments. The DPP’s earlier policy commitments have meant it would be 
difficult to abandon the issue even if it wanted to. As DPP campaigner Xu Qiongdan 
noted, “In 2000 we promised NT$3000 pensions, and it’s a promise that
971Chen (Shuibian) must keep.”"
3.6.3 Incumbency Versus Opposition
In Taiwanese political circles there is a common perception that the KMT was so 
conservative on welfare because of its government status, while the opposition DPP 
could just make rash welfare promises without the responsibility of how to fund 
these schemes. A former KMT Propaganda Chief commented that, “The KMT is too
268 Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
271 Xu Qiongdan, interview by author, Taibei, April 12, 2000.
90
conservative, as it was in power for over 50 years, so on the social welfare issue it
* » 979always worried about financial resources.” “ Similarly, KMT legislator Chen 
Xuesheng explained the rationale behind KMT welfare restraint, “It has felt that 
once you open the floodgates of social welfare, you can never close them. Once you 
make an election pledge you will be outbid, one promises NT$3,000 and the next 
will promise NT$5,000.” There was a clear trend that those most opposed to 
pensions were figures from the central and provincial government, such as Lian 
Zhan, and Song Chuyu, while KMT politicians seeking elected posts were a lot 
more positive about welfare expansion. A former KMT Propaganda Chief summed 
up the DPP’s tactics, “The DPP was the opposition party, and it didn’t care about 
whether there were sufficient resources. I’m going to give you a problem to solve, I 
will give them out and let the government worry about the necessary resources.”274 
Similarly, some in the DPP argue now the party is in power it should have a more 
restrained welfare policy. For instance, DPP legislator Shen Fuxiong stressed, “In 
terms of social welfare, I think that in the past we always talked about how we’ve 
got to give those people benefits. But again now we’re in power, we have to talk 
about the issue from a fiscal sense.”275
Flowever, there is a flaw in this argument. Firstly, when the DPP began to take 
power at the ME level in the early 1990s it tried hard to implement its welfare 
promises and continued to make welfare appeals. Moreover, despite the economic 
slump and the turnover in ruling parties there has been more consistency than 
change in parties’ welfare policies. The DPP in power is still viewed as more pro
272 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
273 Chen Xuesheng, interview by author, Taibei, September 14, 2001.
274 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001,
275 Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taibei, September 19, 2001.
91
welfare than other parties, and its recent passing of pensions legislation shows it 
intends to maintain this image. Similarly, since losing power, the Pan Blue camp 
dominated by Lian Zhan and Song Chuyu has reverted to an even more conservative 
welfare image than under Li Denghui.
3.6.4 Institutional Factors
According to political scientist Wu Yushan in Taiwan “The election system 
determines the issues and strategies (the parties pursue).”276 Since national identity 
issues are less influential in the SMD ME elections, and as much social welfare is 
provided by local governments, we would expect welfare issues would be most 
prominent in ME contests. However, my advertising data shows social welfare 
appeals cut across election systems, with heavy emphasis in SMD and MMD, local 
and national, legislative and executive elections. Campaign reviews show social 
welfare does receive more media attention in SMD contests, as in MMD there are 
just too many candidates for the media to report individual candidates’ policies. 
Although the most serious cases of welfare outbidding have occurred in SMD 
elections (1993, 1997, 2000), it also must be noted that KMT figures calling for 
caution on welfare were also loudest in SMD contests (1993, 1994, 1997, 2000). In 
short, the impact of electoral systems on welfare emphasis is at most limited.
3.6.5 Ideology
Since social welfare is not regarded as a core ideological issue in Taiwan, parties 
have more flexibility over whether to use this issue in campaigns, knowing that 
changes in policy are unlikely to lead to large scale mass or elite defections. 
However, in keeping with the definition that ideology is a “set of core values that
276 Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taibei, October 24, 2001.
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are taken as accepted by a political party,”277 the parties have created distinct 
welfare philosophies, and these differences have had a major impact on their 
changing welfare issue emphasis.
The KMT and NP’s views on die issue reflect a strain of thought common in many 
Asian ruling circles of avoiding what became known in Japan as the “British 
Disease,” of over-dependence on the welfare state. Indeed the KMT line echoes- 
proponents of Asian Values such as Lee Kuan Yew who argued that Western style 
welfare states are not only economically too expensive but also culturally 
inappropriate for Asian states to emulate.278 For instance, former Premier Lian 
Zhan argued against Taiwan adopting a European style welfare state, saying that 
instead of the state, the main providers of welfare services ought to be voluntary
• 279groups and private enterprises. Another feature of KMT and NP statements is 
that families should play an increasing role in welfare provisions, mirroring family 
centred welfare policies promoted by Christian Democrats in West Europe. For 
example, both the KMT and NP called for subsidies to encourage three generations 
to live together.280 There is also a view in the KMT that there is a trade-off between 
economic growth and social welfare, and as with the Japanese LDP the priority has 
always been economic growth.
The KMT advocates a combination of contribution-based schemes, and expansion 
of existing means tested welfare. The KMT has talked about contributory pensions 
since 1994, and like the NHI this would spread the burden of the pensions scheme
277 Chapter 1 1.3.2f).
278 White and Goodman, “Welfare Orientalism,” 11.
279 Ku, “Left or Right,” 16.
280 For the KMT see Minzhongribao, March 10, 2000, 4; For NP see China Times, November 28,
1997, 1.
93
between employee, employers and government, and only be available to those that 
have made contributions to the fund. Lian Zhan summed up the principles behind 
this scheme in the 2000 presidential campaign, “The design of the contribution 
based pensions scheme must be based on the principle of social justice and the idea
9 RIthat there are no free lunches.”
In contrast, the DPP has built up an ideology of using universal welfare schemes to 
create a fairer and more inclusive welfare system. Although the political scientist 
Ming Juzheng claims, “The left wing parties (DPP, TIP, TSU) are like liberal, 
socialist or social democratic parties,”282 social democracy has never even been the 
dominant ideology in the DPP. A more important ideological element of the DPP’s 
welfare appeal lies in its linkage with ethnic Taiwanese nationalism. Former DPP 
chairman Yao Jiawen summed up this view, “Social welfare is not simply about 
social welfare. Social welfare is should Taiwanese enjoy the national budget. 
Because the veterans and overseas Chinese enjoy those benefits but why don’t we? 
Only when you can say Taiwan is independent and the government is for the 
Taiwanese, then we can talk of social welfare for the people.”283
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the development social welfare in Taiwan’s electoral 
politics. As the scope of elections widened during democratisation the issue was 
initiated by the opposition DPP, which forced the ruling KMT to respond. At the 
outset of democratic elections Taiwan’s parties held polarized positions on the 
welfare issue. However, throughout the 1991-2001 period election orientated
251 Minzhongribao, March 10, 2000, 4.
252 Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taibei, November 5, 2001.
283 Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taibei, October 2, 2001.
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politicians of both leading parties have promoted an expansion of welfare schemes. 
As a result of democratic debate Taiwan has moved from a grossly unfair and 
inadequate welfare system to a more efficient, equitable and inclusive system. 
Although the gulf between parties on welfare has narrowed, change has been 
constrained by the conservative welfare ideology and past record of many in the 
KMT. The DPP has given greater attention to welfare issues and is seen by the 
public as more pro welfare than other parties, however, social welfare has been a 
highly contested issue. As former DPP legislator Lin Zhengjie commented on 
Taiwanese politicians, “No matter whether you’re pro unification 01* pro 
independence everyone seems to support the welfare state.”284 Social
welfare is a case of sub-issue rather than issue ownership, in which the KMT owns 
NHI and the DPP owns pensions. NHI is the most significant example of issue 
stealing in this study. Although the DPP had already called for NHI, it was not yet 
part of its party image, thus it was possible for the KMT to take control of this 
marginal opposition issue. In contrast, the pensions issue revealed the difficulty of 
stealing an owned issue, as once the DPP had gained a reputation for promoting 
pensions; the KMT struggled to challenge this ownership.
284 Lin Zhengjie, interview by author, Xinzhu, 21 September, 2001.
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Chapter Four: Political Corruption
"Corruption is frequently an integral part o f the political system- a part which we 
ignore only at our great peril. ”2S5
4.1.1 Introduction
Until the 1990s the main focus of political corruption research was on authoritarian 
or developing countries.286 Periodically corruption scandals cropped up in mature 
democracies, however, these were rarely central electoral issues that led to the 
downfall of governments. The turning point was the end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent fading of ideological left/right conflicts in most western democracies, 
giving political corruption the space on the political agenda to become one of the 
most salient issues of the last decade. Almost no democracy has been immune from 
high-level corruption scandals and this has contributed to reduced public confidence 
in parties and the demise of a number of long dominant political parties.287 In Italy 
corruption investigations led to the fall of the Christian Democratic led coalition 
that had ruled since World War 2,288 in Britain accusations of “sleaze” seriously 
weakened the reputation of the Major administration,289 and in Spain a string of 
corruption scandals contributed to the defeat of the Socialists after 14 years in
290power.
The issue has been equally salient in “Third Wave” democracies, such as Taiwan,
285 Scott, “Handling Historical Comparisons Cross Nationally in Comparative Political Corruption,” 
129.
286 For example see Heidenheimer ed, Political Corruption; Readings in Comparative Analysis.
287 On public confidence in political parties see Norris ed, Critical Citizens.
2SS Della Porta and Vannucci, “Corrupt Exchanges and the Implosion o f the Italian Party System,” 
717-733.
2S9 Leigh and Vulliamy, Sleaze.
290 Hey wood, “From Dictatorship to Democracy,” 65-84,
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where there is a widespread perception that corruption has actually worsened during 
the democratic transition. Although national identity is considered the most 
influential cleavage in Taiwanese politics, at election time political corruption issues 
are even more visible and received more attention in the campaign propaganda than 
any other issue in the last decade.291 Moreover, the opposition’s anti corruption 
campaigns were a critical factor in the KMT’s fall from office after ruling Taiwan 
for over fifty years.
This chapter shows how the Taiwanese opposition parties placed the latent issue of 
corruption on to the electoral agenda, and through repeated campaign emphasis 
made it arguably the most salient political issue in Taiwan. Party competition on the 
issue has been convergent. Although the parties started the decade with contrasting 
definitions of corruption, by the end of the decade of elections there was a much 
greater consensus on what constitutes corruption and the need for tougher 
anti-corruption measures. The parties are now less polarized on the issue, however, 
they remain differentiated, as inner party factors have constrained movement and 
stopped leapfrogging.
Clearly corruption is a valence rather than a position issue. All parties are officially 
against corruption. Even the most corrupt party will not openly advocate vote 
buying, gangster links or electoral fraud. However, this does not mean that it is in 
the interests of all parties to give the same emphasis to the issue, as voters see some 
parties as more corrupt than others, therefore parties viewed as clean will benefit 
from keeping the issue on the electoral agenda, while those tainted with corruption 
should try to steer the agenda on to other more favourable subjects. In this study I
291 See Table 2.2.
97
show how these tenets of issue ownership theoiy also apply to the corruption issue 
in Taiwan, with the DPP, and to a lesser extent the NP dominating the issue for the 
whole decade, individual elections and at the sub-issue level. Despite some attempts 
by the KMT to tar certain DPP candidates with the corruption brush, the DPP and 
NP’s anti corruption message has stuck in the public imagination, as surveys show 
Taiwanese voters have clear party images of the KMT as a corrupt party and the two 
opposition parties as clean.
Electoral factors were most critical in the DPP and NP’s decision to focus on 
corruption attacks. Both parties used the issue from the early 1990s to win elections 
and expand support levels, but also to create a more level electoral playing field, by 
removing the KMT’s inbuilt advantages such as party assets or vote buying. 
Although the KMT has grudgingly accepted many anti corruption measures, 
movement has been more heavily constrained than in any of the three case studies in 
this dissertation. The key variable for the KMT has been inner party politics, as its 
reliance on corrupt local factions, vote buying and party assets have prevented it 
from removing its corrupt image.
Democracy theorists argue that cross cutting issue cleavages are conducive to
292democratic consolidation. This chapter reveals political corruption to be the most 
cross cutting of the three case studies I examine. For while in both social welfare 
and national identity the DPP and NP/NMKMT are at opposite ends of the issue 
spectmms, on the corruption question these bitter adversaries found much common 
ground in attacking KMT sleaze.
292 Chu and Lin, “The Process o f  Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan,” 80.
98
The Taiwan case reveals the potential positive effects of multi-party democracy for 
tackling political corruption, as opposition parties can challenge and alter accepted 
but corrupt nouns of governance. Although PRC figures regularly condemn the vote 
buying of Taiwan’s elections, the PRC has also suffered from rising corruption in its 
two decades of market economic reforms, and this was one of the central grievances 
of the Tiananmen protestors in 1989.293 However, while Taiwan has had opposition 
parties since 1986, there has been no legitimate avenue for China’s citizens to 
challenge corruption associated with the CCP. Although democracy is not a panacea 
for political corruption, the Taiwan case offers support for Michael Johnston’s 
argument that, “high quality, well institutionalized political competition can help 
reduce levels of corruption.”294 Pillars of the KMT party state such as its party 
assets, vote buying and the corrupt patron client relationship with local factions 
were until the 1990s either openly or tacitly accepted as legitimate. The DPP has 
taken a latent political issue, corruption, and progressively broadened the scope of 
what is publicly acknowledged as corruption. Under the opposition’s relentless 
anti-corruption attacks, the KMT has been forced to change its positions, for 
instance promising to give up its business empire. By exposing cases of KMT 
government corruption and establishing new noims of clean governance it is 
possible that in the long term opposition parties can contribute to the creation of a 
cleaner political system.
4.1.2 A Framework for Analysing Political Corruption Issues in Taiwan
There is not a consensus on a simple definition of political corruption. Michael 
Johnston has noted that “corruption involves the abuse of public roles and resources
293 Hao and Johnston, “China’s Surge o f Corruption,” 80-94.
294 Johnston, “Party Systems, Competition and Political Checks Against Corruption,” 2.
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for private benefit,”" while James Scott’s definition is that corruption “involves a 
deviation (by public officials) from certain standards of behaviour.”296 However, 
this raises the problem of how these standards are fixed and who fixes them. 
Moreover, the distinctions between private and public can be blurred, especially in 
countries undergoing a democratic or market reform transition.297 The commonly 
employed standards for defining what constitutes political corruption are based on 
legal standards, public interest, or public opinion. Public interest definitions argue 
“if an act is harmful to the public interest, it is corrupt even if it is legal,”298 
however, the public interest tends to be defined by the incumbent elite. In addition, 
definitions change over time, as Pujas and Rhodes point out, “An act tolerated 
during a given period in a particular society may not be in another, since the values 
of that society will have changed.”299 Even within countries standards differ greatly. 
As the DPP’s Tian Xin (EEl/cfc) commented, “Cracking down on corruption has more 
appeal in urban areas and not much in rural areas.”300 In short, what actually 
constitutes corruption is a highly contested concept; standards vaiy cross nationally, 
within countries, both across party lines and over time.
Arnold Heidenheimer suggests a useful framework by distinguishing between 
“black, gray and white corruption.”301 “Black corruption” occurs when a “majority 
consensus of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and would want to see 
punished,” while in the case of “gray corruption,” “some elements, usually elites, 
may want to see the actions punished, others not, and the majority may well be
295 Johnston, “Corruption and Democratic Consolidation,” 5.
296 Scott, Comparative Corruption, 3.
297 Hao and Johnston, “China’s Surge o f  Corruption,” 80-94.
298 Gardiner, “Defining Corruption,” 32.
299 Pujas and Rhodes, “Party Finance and Political Scandal,” 740.
300 Tian Xin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
301 Heidenheimer, “Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption,” 161.
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ambiguous.” Finally in the case of “white corruption”, “the majority of elite and 
mass opinion probably would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of 
corruption that they regard as tolerable.”302 Such a framework corresponds with 
contemporary Taiwanese corruption terms “Black” and “White Gold”
which refer to the “nexus of politics and criminal elements”303 and “where business 
interests with deep pockets are able to influence the political process”304 
respectively. To circumvent definitional problems I have operationalised a 
framework that takes into account Taiwan’s fluid and ever expanding definitions of 
political corruption. This is outlined below in Table 4.1, which places the main 
sub-issues into either static categories of “White, Grey or Black Corruption,” or 
those that have over the last decade moved from “White-Grey, White-Grey-Black or 
Grey to Black Corruption,” I give details of these transitions in section 4.5, however, 
it should be noted that almost all sub-issues fall into the three transition rather than 
the static categories. Since survey data on the corruption issue in Taiwan is limited, 
I take the Taiwan’s leading political parties’ discourse on corruption in 2001 as my 
standard of which category to place each sub-issue.
I divide the development of the political corruption issue into three periods: a latent 
phase, a phase of issue development and the issue entrance phase. During the first 
phase many of the sub-issues that are listed in Table 4.1 already existed but came 
under the category or “White Corruption,” in that they were accepted components of 
Taiwan’s social and political system. In the issue development phase politicians 
initiated the corruption issue, and by campaigning on the issue through a series of 
elections the issue was placed on the public agenda and the actual parameters of
302 Heidenheimer, “Perspectives on the Perception o f Corruption,” 161.
303 Institute for International Relations, “Symposium Summary.”
304 Ibid.
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what constitutes corruption became increasingly broad. Next in the entrance stage 
the scope of what is viewed as “grey” or “black corruption” continued to expand 
and the issue moved on to the formal agenda for government or ruling party action.
4.1.3 Chapter Overview
Following this introduction, section 4.2 outlines the early development of the 
political corruption issue, the latent phase (1947-1991). Section 4.3 covers the broad 
trends of political corruption emphasis in campaigns over the 1990s. I review 
newspaper ad, elite survey and mass survey data to show if the issue has been 
salient and if any party has owned it. Section 4.4 reviews chronologically the issue 
over the significant national elections in the issue development (1992-1996) and 
issue enhance phases (1996-2001). In addition, I look at whether issue ownership 
also applies to individual campaigns, if issue ownership and the main corruption 
themes changed over the decade. Section 4.5 scrutinizes the issue in more detail by 
examining the major corruption sub-issues, to see if issue ownership applies at the 
sub-issue level, and how the parties’ definitions of corruption, actual positions and 
the sub-issue ownership have altered over the 1990s. Section 4.6 offers some 
explanations for the parties’ changing attention to political corruption, evaluating 
the extent that independent variables such as inner party politics, inter party 
competition, government versus opposition status, institutional factors, and ideology 
have pushed or constrained party movement. Finally, section 4.7 reviews the main 
conclusions of the chapter and the significance of political corruption in Taiwanese 
politics.
4.2 The Latent Phase: 1947-1991.
KMT corruption was a central Taiwanese grievance leading up to the 1947, 228
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Incident;305 however, following the KMT’s crackdown political dissent was 
silenced. Throughout the Martial Law era the main demands of the domestic 
opposition movement were democratisation and ethnic justice, rather than attacking 
KMT corruption. Almost all the conniption sub-issues listed in Table 4.1 would have 
come under the category of “White Corruption.” This was similar to how Jean 
Blondel described the infonnal system that existed in Belgium, Austria and Italy, 
“patronage had existed for so long and had become so much part of political and 
social life that it seemed to have been not just accepted, but even viewed as 
normal.”306 Two significant examples of what has retrospectively become defined 
as KMT corruption were the patron client relationship between the KMT and local 
factions, and KMT party assets.
When the KMT regime arrived in Taiwan it needed grassroots support for local 
elections, therefore it established a patron client alliance with the local factions that 
remained intact and unchallenged until democratisation. Taiwan’s foremost scholar 
on factional politics, Chen Mingtong outlined the main benefits that the local 
factions received in exchange for political support:307
1. Monopolistic economic activities in local areas with special permits from the 
government, as in banking, bus companies, credit unions, etc.
2. Special loans and credits with especially favourable terms from state owned 
commercial banks;
3. Local government public contracts; and
4. Land speculation in connection with urban planning and zoning for construction 
projects, or tacit permission to operate illegal businesses, such as gambling
305 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed.
306 Blondel, “Party Government, Patronage and Party Decline in Western Europe,” 251.
307 Cited in Tien, “Elections and Taiwan’s Democratic Development,” 19.
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houses and dance halls.
Whereas in Italy patronage was divided among the leading political parties,308 in 
Taiwan the beneficiaries were local KMT factions. Under this form of 
institutionalised corruption the KMT was prepared to tolerate corruption at the local 
level, while Taiwan’s central government and bureaucracy maintained a reputation 
of being relatively clean. In the words of political scientist Wu Yushan, “During the 
Martial Law era the cabinet, legislature and upper levels of the government were a 
self-sustaining privileged class. They were not connected to money or mafia 
interests. They had no need to deal with local factions. The KMT deal with local 
factions only existed at the local level.”309
During the KMT’s five decades in power it took advantage of its dominant position 
to accumulate a vast real estate and business empire, and set up monopolies for its 
own companies, making it the fifth biggest business syndicate in Taiwan and richest 
political party in the world. This meant that unlike its political rivals the KMT has 
never been short of campaign funds. The existence of the KMT’s alliance with local 
factions and its party assets reflect the weakness of using legal standards to define 
political corruption in an authoritarian context, as the KMT was able to design the 
legal framework that legitimised ruling party corruption. Although after leaving the 
KMT its former chairman Li Denghui stated “Before (democratisation) the KMT 
was even more dark and corrupt,”310 in this period most corruption sub-issues still 
fell into the category of “white corruption.”
308 Della Porta and Vanucci, “Corrupt Exchanges and the Implosion o f the Italian Party System,” 
717-733.
309 Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taibei, October 24, 2001.
310 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
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Initially the arrival of competitive party politics did not threaten political corruption. 
According to Christian Gobel, “Democratisation did not eliminate the clientelistic 
networks, but fostered their growth and diversification.”311 Firstly, as democratic 
competition became more intense and the KMT became more Taiwanised, the 
power of corrupt local factions and conglomerates moved up to the national level, 
leading to increased vote buying, gangster-party links and party-consortium 
collusion. Ramon Myers summed up this view, stating, “President Chiang had set a 
tone of severity throughout the government and provincial bureaucracy for not 
tolerating political corruption. But under various Lee administrations, a laxness in 
such behaviour became persuasive. The constraints that limited corruption in the 
past greatly eased.”312 The fact that both big business and local factions began to 
gain political influence through the Legislative Yuan is evident from the high 
proportion of business and factional candidates representing the KMT in elections 
since 1989.313
The movement of corruption from local to national level politics created a window 
of opportunity for politicians to manipulate this issue into a critical cleavage. The 
DPP/Dang Wai did make some anti corruption appeals in the 1980s. For instance, it 
called for illegal KMT assets to be returned to the state in 1983.314 However, it was 
not yet a central electoral issue. As Chu Yun-han and Lin Tse-min stated, “concerns 
about money politics, if any, had little effect on the party preferences in elections in 
the 1980s, when the main cleavage was the entangled issues of national identity and
311 Gobel, “Towards a Consolidated Democracy?”
312 Myers, Chao and Kuo, “Consolidating Democracy in the Republic o f China on Taiwan.”
313 For details see Shiau, “Elections and the Changing State-Business Relationship,” 223-4.
314 Chen, “The DPP’s Party Image,” 38.
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3 I sdemocratic reform.” This pattern even extended to the first full national election, 
for the 1991 National Assembly, in which my analysis of newspaper and TV ads 
found corruption was only a minor issue.
4.3 Broad Trends in Political Corruption Emphasis 1991-2000.
This section covers the broad trends of political corruption emphasis in campaigns 
over the 1990s. I examine whether political corruption has been salient, if it is an 
owned issue, and if the parties are converging or diverging on the issue. 
Furthermore, party image surveys are examined to reveal if the public sees 
corruption as an owned issue.
4.3.1 How Salient is Political Corruption in Taiwan?
Table 2.2 shows three indicators of top ten salience, these are my official newspaper 
ads issue top ten, Liu Tsung-wei’s top ten issues for Legislative Yuan candidate’ 
policy proposals from election gazettes, and my elite survey. All three show political 
corruption is one of the most salient political issues in Taiwan. Firstly, political 
corruption came first in the combined issue top ten for official newspaper ads, with 
an average issue mention of 13.2%. The issue is less salient in Liu’s study coming 
eighth in the top ten issues for 1989-1998. However, my elite survey found 
politicians ranked money politics the second most influential issue of the decade 
(1991-2001).
4.3.2 Is Political Corruption ail Owned Issue?
The next question is whether political corruption is an owned issue. Multiple data 
sources show a clear pattern of the issue being owned by the DPP and NP. Firstly,
313 Chu and Lin, “Elections and Elite Convergence,” 21.
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Table 2.3 shows the top ten issues in official newspaper ads over the 1991-2000 
period. For the whole decade political corruption came first in the DPP’s issue top 
ten, averaging 23.9% of issue mentions, compared to first for the NP with 12.3% 
and only ninth for the KMT with 3.5%. A similar pattern of issue ownership is 
found in Table 2.4, which shows the top ten issues in terms of the frequency of an 
issue appearing in a party’s annual official ads top ten. Political corruption featured 
in the DPP’s top ten in each election except 1997 and 1996, coming first in five 
elections (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 2000), compared to four times in the NP’s 
top ten, coming first once (1995). However, political corruption never even reached 
the KMT’s top five in a single election. These results are similar to Liu Tsung-wei’s 
election gazette survey, which found political conniption was the second most 
stressed issue for both the NP and the DPP; however, it did not feature at all in the 
KMT’s top ten.316
In Table 2.2 I showed that politicians see political corruption as a highly influential 
issue. Next I tested whether politicians see the issue as owned by asking “What 
issues have you and your party stressed most over the last ten years?” The results 
are shown on Table 2.6. There is a significant difference between the parties, with 
political corruption seen as the second most stressed issue for the DPP and NP, but 
absent from the KMT’s top five stressed issues. In short, though politicians of all 
parties view the issue as being important, it is seen as being owned by the NP and 
DPP. Indeed one former DPP legislator even claimed, “The NP focused on political 
corruption as much as we stressed democratisation.”317
316 Liu, “The Effects o f Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table 8.9.
317 Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taibei, November 9, 2001.
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The next question is have the parties been converging or diverging on this issue. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 plot the parties’ relative issue emphasis on political corruption 
for total and official newspaper ads between 1991 and 2000. A similar pattern is 
shown, with the issue dominated by the DPP, and to a lesser extent the NP. 
Ownership is especially strong in official ads. Other than 1996 when the main 
parties largely ignored the issue, there is only one case of the KMT leapfrogging the 
DPP, in 1997.318 Both figures also show that apart from the national identity 
campaigns of 1991 and 1996, political corruption has been heavily stressed in every 
election.
The pattern of issue ownership in Taiwan closely resembles that in Japan, with 
political corruption dominated by the two main opposition parties, the JSP and 
Komeito. From Figure 4.3, which compares the main Japanese parties using MRG 
data, we can see that between 1967 and 1996 there were only two cases of the LDP 
leapfrogging the JSP on the issue.
4.3.3 Public Opinion and Political Corruption
In this section I examine survey data to test whether Taiwan’s voters see the parties 
as holding distinct and consistent positions on the political corruption issue. A series 
of surveys reveals an even clearer pattern of issue ownership than on social welfare, 
with the KMT increasingly seen as a corrupt party, the DPP seen as a party that 
attacks corruption, but is not totally clean, and the NP as a party that attacks 
corruption and is clean.
Firstly, Table 4.2 displays a series of Lianhebao surveys. These show the percentage
318 This anomaly is explained in section 4.5.2.
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of respondents seeing the KMT as clean dropped from 37% in 1992 to 25% in 1996, 
against a corresponding rise for the DPP from 26% to 41%. The percentage of 
respondents seeing the KMT as corrupt rose from 28% in 1992 to 45% in 1996, 
against a corresponding fall for the DPP from 29% to 22%.319 ESC surveys asking 
voters for their first impressions of political parties also showed that while in the 
early 1990s none of the parties were primarily associated with corruption, by the 
mid 1990s the corrupt image of the KMT had sunk into the public imagination.320 
For example, in 1995 6,8% saw the KMT as corrupt and 4.1% saw the KMT as 
having gangster links as their first impressions. While in 1998 5.3% saw the KMT 
as corrupt, 3% saw it as having gangster links and 8% said the KMT had links to 
money politics as their first impression of the party. In contrast, the numbers citing 
the DPP and NP as corrupt were negligible in both 1995 and 1998. The DPP Survey 
Research Department earned out the final revealing survey in the late 1990s; the 
results are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.321 In response to the question why do you 
dislike the KMT, by far the most common reply in all three surveys was because the 
KMT was corrupt. In contrast, to the question of why do you like a party, the fact 
that the DPP was clean came second and that the NP was clean came first in all 
three surveys respectively.
The surveys cited above give an unambiguous picture of how the parties were 
viewed. Clearly the public does see the main parties as distinguishable on the issue. 
Increasingly the KMT is seen as by far the most corrupt, the DPP as relatively clean, 
and the NP as the cleanest. It can be concluded that although on occasions the KMT 
tried to paint the DPP as being corrupt, the DPP has retained its clean image. In
319 Schafferer, “The 1997 City mayor and County Magistrate Elections in Taiwan,” 26-27.
320 ESC Dataset, supplied by Liu Yizhou.
321 DPP Survey Research Department, “111,1 National Opinion Survey: Party Image,” 4-5.
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contrast the DPP and NP attacks on KMT corruption have stuck in the public’s party 
image.
In short, this section has shown how since 1992 political corruption has been one of, 
if not the most salient issue in Taiwan, and a variety of datasets reveal the DPP and 
the NP have owned the issue.
4.4 The Electoral Politics of Political Corruption
4.4.1 Issue Development Phase: 1992-1996
In the issue development phase the DPP and the NP initiated a latent issue, made 
specific anti corruption demands and expanded the issue firmly on to the public 
agenda in repeated election campaigns. Although my content analysis does not go 
back into the 1980s, the degree the issue agenda differed from the 1990s can also be 
seen from Liu Tsung-wei’s finding that though political corruption was a top ten 
issue for the DPP in all three legislative elections in the 1990s, it was absent in 
1989.322 During this issue development period the scope of what was commonly 
viewed as corruption broadened considerably, as sub-issues began to the make the 
transition from “white” to “grey” or “black corruption.”
1992 Legislative Yuan Election
1992 was a turning point for the political corruption issue, with the issue high on the 
agenda throughout the campaign. The KMT came under strong attack from both the 
DPP and KMT dissidents for its vote buying and golden ox candidates. In contrast 
to the DPP’s Taiwan independence orientated campaign in 1991, political conuption 
was its central issue for the first time. Its election slogan was “Anti Money Politics,
322 Liu, “The Transition o f the Democratic Progressive Party,” Table 8.
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Anti Special Privileges, Anti Military Power, Want Tax Cuts, Want Direct Election 
and Want Sovereignty.” , I v # # ',  Ix J M , ScllB l, l? z £ |I )323
Former DPP Propaganda Chief Chen Fangming summed up the strategy that the 
DPP began that year and followed throughout the 1990s, “In defence you can say 
that you are a veiy clean party and in offence we can single out the KMT as a 
corrupt party.”324 Figures 4.1 and 4.2 testify how the DPP had taken a clear lead 
over the KMT on political corruption, which it has maintained since. In addition, 
1992 represents the peak of DPP TV ads attacking political corruption. The slogan 
of the TV ad “He (KMT) does, I (DPP) don’t B” B) encapsulated the
DPP’s message on the issue, “Land speculation, he does, I don’t, golden ox 
candidates, he does, I don’t, making the national treasury the party treasury, he 
wants to, I oppose it, corruption, he does it, I expose it.” ax
*m m x, m b m m b , jttfv, m m m m .) in
response the KMT was at a loss over how to deal with these accusations, thus it 
Pied to avoid the issue. After the election it was felt that the issue had been very 
effective, as Chen Shouguo (I^tFI!) of the China Times claimed, “This election 
can be viewed as a battle between vote buying and anti vote buying, money politics 
and anti-money politics, the results show that the power of anti money politics was
,,315victorious. "
1993-4 Executive Election
Two significant events prior to the 1993 elections reflect the high salience, divisive 
and cross cutting nature of the corruption issue. Firstly, despite KMT opposition, the 
DPP allied with the NMKMT to pass the Mandatoiy Disclosure and Mandatoiy
323 Ziyoushiboo, November 20, 1992, 20.
324 Chen Fangming, interview by author, November 2, 2001.
325 China Times, December 20, 1992, 2.
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Trust Clauses to the Financial Disclosure Law of Government Officials. This 
landmark anti corruption legislation forced senior government officials to disclose 
all their assets and place them in a trust.326 Secondly, in August 1993 the NP was 
formed from members of the New KMT Alliance. According to the then KMT 
Secretary General Xu Shuide, the main factor inducing them to leave the KMT was 
“its inability to stop relying on factions and corruption.”327 Whilst in the KMT they 
had already been very critical of their party’s corruption problems and after 1993 the 
NP made clean government one of its central issues until 1998.
In 1993 and 1994 the DPP once again focused on KMT corruption, however, the 
scope of DPP attacks widened. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the gulf between the KMT 
and DPP on the issue widened considerably in both total and official ads. In both 
years political corruption came first in the DPP’s official newspaper ads top ten 
issues, including its peak emphasis of political corruption for the whole decade in 
1993 of 70.8% of issue mentions.328 The slightly higher KMT emphasis on political 
corruption in total ads shown in Figure 4.1 is because while official KMT ads 
ignored the issue, some KMT candidates made corruption accusations against 
incumbent DPP ME. Another new trend was the arrival of the NP as a realistic 
contender in elections, and it is noteworthy that political conuption came third in 
their official ads issue top ten in 1994.329
The main themes in DPP newspaper ads were much broader than 1992. On top of 
attacks on KMT money politics, and vote buying, the DPP condemned conuption of
326 Lin, “Paths to Democracy,” 443-444.
327 Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
328 See Table 2.8.
329 See Table 2,9.
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KMT ME and high level KMT officials, argued that by stopping corruption more 
social welfare could be provided, attacked the corruption associated with large scale 
central government projects, such as the Taibei metro, claimed that behind Li 
Denghui was a corrupt KMT and even offered concrete solutions to tackling 
corruption. Moreover, the DPP linked corruption to stability, challenging the KMT 
argument that only the KMT could guarantee stability. For example, one DPP ad 
asked, “What kind of stability has the KMT given the Taiwanese? It is a corrupted 
stability, a stability of government business collusion and dividing up the spoils.1’’(HI
W S r© 330
1995 Legislative Yuan Election
Although the missile crisis made headlines in 1995, domestic issues such as political 
corruption were also salient. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the two opposition parties 
again dominating the corruption issue. The DPP’s 1995 slogan was “Give Taiwan a 
chance,” and in a number of ads this was altered to “Give Taiwan the chance of a 
clean government.” ( I f l ncai t - '( I S ' i N f T h e  DPP slightly altered 
its political corruption style focusing on two major aspects: KMT party assets and 
gangster links. The NP gave its greatest emphasis to date on corruption, including it 
in its election slogan of “Chose the NP, No War, No Tax Rises, Catch Conuption 
and a Five Day Week.” (H ffM , 'W f j t  0 ) 332 Other
than linking then traditional enemy Li Denghui to corruption, the NP also adopted 
fresh anti conuption themes, such as the claim a hung parliament could help root 
out conuption and attacking the way the KMT tried to sneak in big business and
330 Lianhebao, November 18, 1994, 48.
331 Ziyoushiboo, December 1, 1995, 1.
332 Lianhebao, November 11, 1995, 38.
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factional legislators on its proportional representation (PR) list. The KMT’s 
response to the conceited DPP and NP attacks was weak, avoiding the issue in its 
propaganda.
4.4.2 Issue Entrance Phase: 1996-Present
The opposition’s anti corruption campaigns were so effective that by the mid 1990s 
the concept of political corruption became closely connected in the public 
imagination to the KMT. During the issue entrance stage by creating a new set of 
norms on aspects of the corruption issue, the opposition continued to expand the 
parameters of corruption, as more sub-issues became viewed as either “grey” or 
“black corruption.” The issue moved from the public to the formal government 
agenda as the KMT was forced to respond, first half-heartedly but later more 
radically on issues such as party assets, nominating “black gold” candidates and 
vote buying. I date this third phase from 1996 as at the National Development 
Conference (NDC) for the first time the KMT agreed to reform its party assets and 
abolish the corrupt village and township head elections.
Taiwan’s village and township head elections reforms reveal the constraints the 
KMT faces when trying to tackle its corrupt image. These elections have the 
reputation for having the worst level of corruption. To resolve this problem the 
KMT and DPP agreed at the 1996 NDC to scrap these elections and in the future to 
make the positions nominated by the ME. This created an outcry among KMT 
politicians that have long dominated these elections. And following the KMT’s 
disastrous performance in the 1997 ME elections and the rise of Lian Zhan to party 
chair, the KMT could no longer risk alienating its rural grassroots supporters. Thus 
it has disavowed its former promise, and since 2000 has attempted to block DPP
114
leg is la tio n  to ab o lish  th ese grassroots e lection s.
1997 Municipal Executive Elections
After the national identity orientated 1996 presidential campaign, the DPP returned 
to the political corruption question in 1997, with the election slogan of “Stability, 
Clean Government, New Government” (^PSr, The DPP’s core
theme was similar to 1995, focusing on attacking the KMT’s record of gangster 
politics, while the KMT’s style was closer to previous ME contests as it attempted 
to tar the DPP with the corruption brush. In fact, it appears from the newspaper ad 
data that the KMT has stolen the issue. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that for the first 
time the KMT actually leapfrogged the DPP. KMT stress on the issue was the 
highest for the decade in official ads, with 9.8% of issue mentions.333 Political 
corruption did not feature at all in official DPP newspaper ads. In 1997 there were 
only two official DPP newspaper ads, which focused on women’s safety and rising 
crime levels. Instead for the first time the DPP placed greater emphasis on TV ads, 
in which political corruption was heavily stressed. The former Vice Chief of the 
DPP’s Propaganda Department Yu Meimei stated that the objectives of
these TV ads were to, “to cement images... that the KMT has political corruption 
and is tied up with corrupt local factions, while in contrast the DPP has a clean 
image.”334 The effectiveness of the DPP anti-corruption message was recalled by a 
former KMT Propaganda Chief, “Then (1997) the political corruption question was 
always on the agenda. The KMT was straggling to defend itself, so that year we 
suffered blow after blow.”335
333 See Table 2.7.
334 Yu Meimei, interview by author, Taibei, September 27, 2001.
335 Former KMT Party Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
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1998 Legislative Yuan and Mayoral Elections
In 1998 the media focused on the Taibei mayoral contest, largely ignoring the 
legislative election. Thus though corruption attacks were at the core of DPP and NP 
ads, with the KMT represented by Ma Yingjiu the former Minister for
Justice, with his reputation for cracking down on vote buying, it was harder for 
corruption charges to have an impact. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the DPP did 
overtake the KMT on the issue, however the highest scores were for the NP with a 
record level of 30.5% of issue mentions in official ads.336 The DPP and NP themes 
were reminiscent of 1995.The DPP called on voters to “concentrate votes on the 
holy war of green versus black gold.” (M lz]P VS ® ^t^ I= l% )337 
While the NP attacked the KMT’s nomination of corrupt candidates on its PR list, 
stock market manipulation, and the link between corruption and their sworn enemy 
Li Denghui.
2000 Presidential Elections
Political corruption again received heavy media and advertising attention in 2000. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the DPP retained its dominance of the issue, as political 
corruption came top of its official newspaper ad top ten.338 The KMT did show 
more concern with corruption, as it came sixth in its top ten for official newspaper 
ads.339 However, this is largely due to ads attacking Song Chuyu for his role in the 
Xingpiao (J@y§l) embezzlement case.
A quote from Chen Shuibian in the third TV debate exemplified the way the DPP
336 See Table 2.9.
337 Lianhebao, December 4, 1998, 32.
338 See Table 2.8.
339 See Table 2.7.
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was able to use the issue to attack both its main opponents; “The former head of the 
Control Yuan Chen Lu an said that ‘the KMT is really rotten.’ The KMT
was rotten on the mainland and it has become even more rotten in Taiwan, whose 
responsibility is it? Actually in this election the KMT has two candidates, both 
formally held high positions in the KMT, with great power, are they not 
responsible?”340 As in previous years the DPP attacked the KMT’s party assets, 
vote buying and “black gold” record, what was new was the way the DPP 
emphasized the close intimacy between its main rivals, Lian and Song with 
infamous “black gold” politicians and the message that only a change of ruling party 
could root out “black gold.” In Taiwan’s political circles many believe the DPP’s 
“black gold” attacks were critical to Chen’s victoiy. For instance, the KMT’s Zhu 
Xiaoci claimed, “That year the DPP’s appeal caught the public mood.
People wanted to see a party turnover and political corruption swept away.”341
2001 Legislative Yuan and Municipal Executive Elections
The first post turnover election showed signs of change and continuity. Earlier in the 
year the DPP came under attack for vote buying during its party primaries and also 
was accused of “Greenification” (licj-ifr) of the state sector, when it gave jobs to its
342party members. The DPP came to power on an anti corruption election appeal, 
and though corruption allegations are still made against the new ruling party, their 
scale and frequency is markedly less than under the KMT. Since 2000 the DPP has 
moved to tackle the areas of corruption that had formally given the KMT an 
electoral advantage, most noteworthy were reorganizing local financial institutions, 
and attempts to pass legislation to end KMT party assets and basic level elections.
340 China Tunes, March 12, 2000, 2-3.
341 Zhu Xiaoci, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001
342 See vvww.Iibertviimes.com.tw/2001 /ncw/mar/11/today-plO.htm
117
Moreover, the initial post turnover elections show the DPP still sees profit to be 
made from the issue. For instance, on the eve of the 2001 election the DPP 
government has carried out highly publicized anti vote buying measures and the 
prosecuted an infamous KMT linked gangster politician.
This section has shown that the political corruption issue hit the political agenda in 
1992 and has remained there since. The opposition parties initiated the political 
coriuption issue and through election campaigns the parameters of what constitutes 
corruption have been expanded. Since 1996 the issue has reached the government 
agenda and serious legislation to tackle corruption has begun to appear. The political 
corruption issue has been owned by the DPP and NP in campaign advertising for 
almost every campaign, and this applies to total and official newspaper ads and 
there has been almost no leapfrogging between the DPP and KMT.
4.5 Political Corruption Sub-issues
In tliis section I review the development of the main political corruption sub-issues 
in election campaigns over the last decade. The questions to be answered are does 
issue ownership apply to sub-issues, and has this ownership altered over the decade. 
In addition, I examine how the parties’ definitions of corruption, actual positions 
and the sub-issues they stress have altered over the 1990s. As in Table 4 .11 divided 
the sub-issues into the static categoiy of “white corruption” and those that have 
made the transition to “black” or “grey corruption.”
4.5.1 “White Corruption”
Election Banquets
Election Banquets are the only sub-issue listed in Table 4.1 that remains in the
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categoiy of “white corruption.” While bribing voters with food and drink is a 
symbol of early 19th century electoral fraud in Britain, the question of election 
banquets has rarely been an election issue used to attack the KMT in Taiwan. 
Election banquets have long been the source of free meals close to voting day; 
candidates often compete to see who can hold the banquet with the most tables of 
voters. However, even on this sub-issue attitudes are changing, at least in urban 
areas election banquets are verging on becoming “grey corruption.” Increasingly in 
urban districts TV orientated rallies and fundraising events are replacing election 
banquets. For instance the former DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong (f^ J l 
boasted how he had filled 1,000 tables at such a fundraising banquet in 1995.343
4.5.2 “Wliite-Grey Corruption”
4.5.2a) Business Influence over the Political Process/White Gold (t=l^)
As democratisation took place and the costs of election campaigning rocketed, the 
influence of big business on government policy and in the elected assemblies has 
grown rapidly. The influence of conglomerates over the policy process has become 
known as “White Gold.”
The scale of business influence is apparent from a report that between 1998 and 
2001 41% of legislators had big business backgrounds, with construction or banking 
industry linked politicians most common.344 The popular term for such politicians 
is “golden ox,” which came into fashion in 1992 and has remained almost 
exclusively associated with the KMT. It was defined by Julian Baum as “privileged 
office seekers who have unlimited funds to spend on expensive advertising, lavish
343 Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taibei, November 9, 2001.
344 Gobel, “Towards a Consolidated Democracy?” 11.
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banquets, fireworks displays and other campaign gimmicks.”345 The 1992 
“Golden Ox TV Ad” initiated the DPP’s campaign against these
politicians, showing the faces of leading KMT figures such as Song Chuyu, coming 
up on a golden ox fruit machine. In place of the KMT’s 1992 slogan of “Reform and 
more reform, confidence in prosperity,” the ad ended
with the rhyming slogan, “Reform and more reform, confidence in golden oxen 
prosperity.”( ^ # f # ^ § f ^ 4 1^ ^ W f s jL0 The issue was not exclusive to the DPP, 
as in 1992 former KMT cabinet ministers Wang Jianxuan (TEIIjIl) and Zhao 
Shaokang openly criticized their party’s nomination of “golden oxen.”346 Although 
there is nothing illegal in wealthy businessmen standing for election, the KMT has 
become embarrassed to nominate “golden oxen” in high profile contests. The term 
golden ox was completely dominated by the two opposition parties and though it 
became less fashionable in late 1990s, it reappeared again in 2000 as the DPP 
denounced the KMT’s Lian Zhan as a “golden ox.”347
From 1995 and 1998 both the NP and DPP expanded this attack to include both 
consortium and local faction backed candidates. For example, in 1995 a NP ad 
asked, “Who let the consortiums, factions and yes men into the Legislative Yuan?”
The ad notes that voting for KMT 
candidates with good images helps elect consortimn or factional candidates on their 
PR list.348 Similarly the DPP’s 1995 Black Gold 2 TV ad (MsfeM 2) cited statistics 
showing 67.77% of KMT nominated candidates had gangster, factional or 
consortimn backgrounds. Once again attacks on both factional and consortium
343 Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 December, 1992, 15.
346 China Times, December 12, 1992, 10.
347 China Times, March 8, 2000, 2.
348 Lianhebao, November 25 ,1995 , 41.
120
backed candidates have been dominated by the opposition parties, though perhaps 
due to the fact the DPP has its own party factions and growing links with certain 
consortiums, it has been less vocal on the sub-issue than the NP. In contrast, the 
KMT has been largely silent and has not attempted to publicly deny or justify its 
high nomination rate for such candidates.
4.5.2b)Li Denghui and Corruption
Although the NP and DPP joined together to attack KMT corruption, the way the 
two opposition parties dealt with the Li Denghui link to corruption has been veiy 
different. Politicians from the NP and NMKMT often blame Li Denghui for 
Taiwan’s rising corruption problems. A comment by the KMT’s Wu Dunyi reflects 
the depth of feeling against Li in some quarters, “Of all the political figures I’ve met, 
he’s the most fascist, the most corrupt, the lowest character, and uses the most 
sinister methods.”349 In repeated campaigns NP propaganda used the corruption 
issue to attack Li Denghui. For instance, in 1995 a NP ad had the slogan “What does 
Li Denghui have to fear from a hung parliament?” 0
The ad promised that if there were a hung parliament the way the land specification 
for Li’s mountain villa was altered would be investigated.350 A number of NP ads 
linked Li Denghui to the former South Korean president Rho Taewoo, who had been 
imprisoned for corruption. One such 1995 NP ad demanding the authorities “Catch 
Taiwan’s Rho Taewoo This line of NP attacks was
continued in 1998. For example, an ad claimed that under Li Taiwan has become an 
“island of greed and an island of gambling” ( i= r i£ ^ ||,  liqflL^II).352
349 Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.
350 Lianhebao, November 30, 1995, 20.
351 China Times, November 29, 1995, 5.
352 Lianhebao, November 30, 1998, 17.
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In contrast the DPP attempted to distinguish between Li and the corrupt KMT. For 
example, in 1993 a DPP ad showed the picture of a spider on the KMT badge made 
up of the character “jit” (corruption) and the slogan, “Behind Li Denghui is a 
corrupt party.” Similarly in 1994 a Chen Dingnan
ad claimed “Li Denghui knows that the KMT is completely corrupt and he must rely 
on the opposition to hit corruption, that is why since becoming president Li Denghui 
has asked Chen Dingnan to join the cabinet twice, as he has the best record of 
tackling corruption in the country.” ( ^ S | l
4.5.2c) Xingpiao Case(M®^):
The Xingpiao scandal was one of the most fascinating episodes in Taiwan’s 
electoral history, with the KMT making serious corruption allegations about Song 
Chuyu’s behaviour while he had been a high level party leader. This was the only 
occasion of a corruption sub-issue being initiated by the KMT and largely accounts 
for the KMT’s uncharacteristically high corruption emphasis in 2000. The scandal 
first emerged in December 1999 when a KMT legislator revealed the existence of 
mysterious deposit accounts that had been managed by Song’s sister in law. These 
accounts had been KMT funds when Song was KMT Secretary General in the early 
1990s. As more revelations were made and the amounts cited increased, Song 
changed his explanations on a number of occasions, claiming first that the money 
was used to look after the Chiang family, and later to help a variety of politicians’
353 Lianhebao, November 22, 1993, 13.
354 Lianhebao, November 24, 1994, 12.
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campaigns, including DPP candidates.
In February 2000 with Lian Zhan still behind in the polls, the KMT continued to use 
the Xingpiao case to attack Song. This reached a climax when the party funded two
355anonymous two full-page ads. The most controversial ad claimed Song’s press 
conference explanations deserved an acting award and had the headline: “Money, 
Lies, Xingpiao case. The Oscar Golden Song award has been announced. 
Congratulations! After costing one billion dollars and taking nine years filming, 
there are ten major awards for the Xingpiao case.” ! J l
SHWtiiBffl! The
ad showed a cartoon of Song receiving an acting award and photos of Song at press 
conferences giving contradictory explanations. It also listed the awards in the style 
of the Oscars, with best film going to “Money, Lies and Xingpiao case” and best 
actor to Song Chuyu!356 Voters were also warned that this is an X Rated film! (PRfjtO 
M). This ad clearly struck a raw nerve as Song asked his lawyer to sue the KMT’s 
Lian Zhan for breaking the election law and slander due to an ad titled “The Oscar 
Golden Song Awards”( | |^ ^ ^ : ^ § l s ) . 357
Prior to December 1999 Song Chuyu had maintained a relatively clean image and 
was in all but name the NP’s presidential candidate. However, the Xingpiao 
revelations damaged Song’s support rates and meant he was unable to continue the 
NP’s legacy of political corruption attacks. By the end of the campaign he was the 
candidate most associated with the phrase to “Aqian” (A £§ meaning to embezzle
355 It is ironic that in 1994 Song Chuyu funded many anonymous ads to attack his DPP rival Chen 
Dingnan for corruption but in 2000 he him self became the victim of this practice.
356 Ziyoushibao, February 3, 2000,16.
3:>7 China Times, February 19, 2000, 4,
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money) and of the three main candidates said the least on the issue. However, it was 
no coincidence that once Li Denghui left the KMT, the party quietly dropped all 
charges against Song in an effort to create the environment for a “Pan-Blue 
Alliance.” This KMT corruption sub-issue was formally ended when in March 2003 
Lian Zhan announced that, “As far as the KMT is concerned, the Xingpiao case is 
over.”358
4.5.3 “Wliite-Grey-Black Corruption”
4.5.3a) Vote Buying:
Although vote-buying allegations are made in all Taiwanese elections, it is very 
difficult to get firm data on the effectiveness of vote buying. There is a perception 
that it is less effective than before. As former KMT Secretary General Xu Shuide 
commented, “Before vote buying worked. Scarves or other things. Now hundreds of 
dollars, people don’t care.”359 Case studies conducted in the 1990s have shown 
mixed results with vote buying efficiency ranging from 30% in Chu Yun-han’s 
study360 to 66.6% in Wang Jinshou’s (EEsfelS) research.361 In addition, most agree 
there is a major difference in perceptions of vote buying in rural and urban areas.
Vote buying only became a central election issue in the early 1990s. The regular 
pattern has been that the DPP uses vote buying accusation to discredit the KMT, 
while the KMT is either silent on the issue or denies it buys votes. For instance, at a 
1992 press conference the DPP announced the KMT’s market rates for buying votes
358 http://news.yam.eom/cna/politics/news/200303/200303060123.html
359 Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001
360 Cited in Wang, “The Making and Operation o f a Kuomintang Candidate’s Vote Buying 
Machine,” 32.
361 Ibid, 32.
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in the various constituencies362 and altered its three antis slogan to “Anti Vote 
Buying, Anti Vote rigging, Anti Vote Spoiling.”363 (H M ®
Likewise, a DPP newspaper ad quoted KMT’s Guo Jinsheng as saying,
“KMT candidates will buy votes. If the KMT does not buy votes, the turnout will 
not be so
ilE).364
In the subsequent elections the DPP continued to reinforce the image of KMT vote 
buying. For example, a 1993 DPP ad, which was repeated on the front page of the 
Lianhebao for seven days, consisted of just one slogan, “The KMT has a past record 
of vote buying and vote rigging. Yesterday it was crooked, today it is vote buying 
and in the future it will be
In 1994 the most controversial anti
vote buying DPP ad had the slogan “A pig’s heart 500 dollars, how much for a 
human heart?” A ?) According to the ad, “The
DPP campaigns 365 days a year, but the KMT only campaigns for two weeks. 
Fourteen days before the vote the KMT begins to madly buy votes everywhere.”(JV;
m m 365 14 a ,
Similarly a full-page Chen 
Dingnan ad outlined the KMT’s long history of vote buying in Taiwan, and called 
on voters to “reject the KMT that has used money to enslave to Taiwanese 
people.”(llHII}M3 ifj A  A: A ®  A  AM-! )367 In response to such
362 China Tunes, December 13, 1992, 3.
363 China Times, December 16, 1992, 4.
364 Ziyoitshibao, December 18, 1992, 28.
365 Lianhebao, November 21-26, 1993, 1.
366 Ziyoushibao, November 28, 1994, 1.
367 China Tunes, November 28, 1994, 12.
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ads KMT Propaganda Chief Jian Hansheng took the often-repeated line of
denying KMT vote buying and accusing the DPP of using such attacks as a 
smokescreen to buy votes itself.368
In 1995 the NP joined the DPP in its vote buying attacks, though the style of their 
ads differed greatly. At the time the KMT Minister for Justice Ma Yingjiu had 
grown in popularity with pledges to “kick vote buying out of Taiwan.”369 However, 
with the vast majority of those indicted from the KMT and high-level resistance 
within his party, Ma’s efforts only further discredited the KMT. The NP attempted to 
link themselves in voters’ minds with Ma’s anti corruption efforts with the ad slogan, 
“Many thanks, the NP sends its best wishes to Ma Yingjiu” (i& H Sljl,
in which the NP thanked Ma for cracking down on vote buying.370 In 
contrast the DPP poked fun at the KMT with the slogan “Raise your hand if you 
believe the KMT will deal with vote buying” 
noting that nearly all vote buying cases involve KMT candidates.371
In the elections of 1996-1998 there were less references to vote buying, as the image 
of KMT vote buying had been fixed in the public imagination. However, in 1998 the 
DPP “Aqiao and Apao Black Gold TV ad” continued the
tradition of satirizing KMT vote buying. The two comedy characters do a mock 
interview with a gangster KMT legislator, who is veiy sensitive to questions related 
to corruption and vote buying. The presidential election of 2000 again allowed the 
DPP to use the vote-buying question to attack the KMT. At a rally in Penghu Chen
36S China Times, November 29, 1994, 5.
359 China Times, November 22, 1995, 4.
370 China Times, November 30, 1995, 5.
371 Ziyoushibao, December 1, 1995, 1.
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Shuibian told his audience that “It’s close to the voting day and the KMT has 
already begun its money attacks, trying to exchange cash for votes. Take the money 
but vote as you wished. For the dignity of the Taiwanese people vote Chen Shuibian, 
otheiwise if an embezzler (A f§|) or golden ox became president it would be an 
international joke.” In the past it was normal practice for the KMT to mobilize 
civil servants to attend KMT rallies, offering the incentives of “travel expenses” (lj:i  
M ft). However, by 2000 the climate had changed. The KMT was discredited by 
allegations of pressurizing and paying civil servants to join KMT rallies.373 In the 
first post turnover election of 2001 the DPP continued to see profit to be gained 
from the vote buying issue. DPP legislator Tang Jinquan reflected this
sentiment when he stated, “We can use our position as the ruling party to hit at 
political corruption. So we hope that Chen Dingnan can make a contribution to 
catching vote buying.”374
After ten years of DPP anti-vote buying attacks, the sub-issue is still exclusively 
associated with the KMT. As the DPP’s Chen Zhongxin noted, “It is possible that 
some people in the KMT don’t buy votes, but if you say the KMT doesn’t buy votes 
few will believe you. The common image is that the KMT buys votes.”375 
Moreover, DPP attacks have also widened the scope of what is seen as vote buying, 
reduced the efficiency of vote buying and contributed to making this formally 
tolerated practice into “black corruption,”
4.5.3b) Municipal Executive (ME) Corruption
372 China Times, March 8, 2000, 2.
373 China Tunes, March 11, 2000, 3.
374 Tang Jinquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 24, 2001.
375 Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
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Local executives with their considerable power over issuing construction contracts 
and various business licenses were long a key player in the KMT-local faction 
patron client relationship, therefore allegations of ME corruption has been the 
mainstay of Taiwanese local election campaigns. In addition to accusing their 
opponents of corruption, candidates also often explain their experience or plans for 
rooting out corruption. However, since the DPP has held ME positions since the 
1980s it also has had to face corruption allegations. As a result ME corruption has 
been the most contested of the sub-issues in this chapter.
In the first ME elections of the decade in 1993 the DPP placed a number of ads 
accusing the KMT of involvement in land speculation. For instance, a DPP 
newspaper ad showed the picture of a monopoly board and the slogan, “The DPP 
loves Taiwan, while the KMT loves land speculation.”
±tkf£) This ad had a table comparing the anti corruption work of DPP ME with the 
KMT ME record of land speculation.376 In response, the KMT Propaganda Chief 
Zhu Jiying it) claimed that the DPP was trying to slander the ruling party and 
government in order to divert attention from its own poor image, citing the example 
of a DPP ME under suspicion of land speculation.377 While the KMT was silent on 
corruption in its official ads, it went on the offensive against DPP incumbent ME. 
For example, a KMT ad asked how DPP Taibei County ME You Qing ) has 
become the richest ME in Taiwan and also claimed to expose a case of You Qing’s 
assistant using the anti nuclear movement for land speculation.378 However, You 
Qing responded with an ad outlining KMT Cai Shengbang’s (i|J]|^|3) long 
relationship with the San Chong Gang (H IIM ), with a picture of Cai as a puppet,
376 China Times, November 23, 1993, 13.
377 China Times, November 5, 1993, 2.
378 Ziyoushibao, November 24, 1993, 16.
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holding a bottle of Sanchong brand milk and having his strings pulled by a
i * * 379salivating gangster.
In 1994 the KMT made corruption its central means of attacking a DPP candidate 
for the first and only time in the 1990s. KMT Provincial Governor Song Chuyu 
regularly accused the DPP’s Chen Dingnan of hiring drug dealers and land
3RDspeculators as campaigners. Song put out a series of ads attacking Chen for
corruption during his two terms as Yilan County ME. For example, one
Song ad described Chen is described as being “number one at land speculation” 0S/ 
iikft&H—) and depicted him in a judge’s clothes with the character 
(speculation) on his gown, an image repeated in numerous Song ads throughout the
3ft 1 *campaign. Other ads give details of four serious corruption cases allegedly 
occurring while Chen was ME; the slogan here is “Cultivating Corruption Expert 
Series.”
The KMT’s 1994 accusations of corruption meant that apart from attacking the 
KMT the DPP had to defend itself. For example, Chen Dingnan accused Song of 
breaking the election law in his land speculation accusations.383 Moreover DPP ads 
reminded voters of the KMT’s past false accusations. One such ad outlined how in 
the previous year ten days before the Pingdong (Wipl) ME election the KMT’s Wu 
Zeyuan began distributing leaflets accusing Su Zhenchang of
involvement in land speculation, which lead to Su’s narrow defeat. Later it was 
found that the land speculation was actually conducted by KMT politicians and the
379 Lianhebao, November 24, 1993, 1.
3S0 China Times, November 30, 1994, 4.
381 Ziyoushibao, November 18, 1994, 1.
382 Ziyoushibao, November 29, 1994,18.
383 China Times, November 10, 1994, 6.
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court ruled that Wu had deliberately spread false rumours and gave him an
* 384 •eight-month sentence. In addition, much attention was given to outlining Chen’s 
record of fighting corruption while Yilan ME. For example, a Chen Dingnan ad 
showed a picture of Chen and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, with the slogan 
“Choosing Chen Dingnan equals Lee Kuan Yew becoming Provincial 
G o v e r n o r , n o t i n g  how Chen had followed Li 
Kuan Yew’s model of sweeping away corruption and special privileges.385
In the next ME election of 1997 both parties emphasised corruption, however, 
serious scandals involving KMT ME in Pingdong and Zhanghua put it in an 
embarrassing position that was exploited by the DPP. In the DPP’s “Prison TV ad” 
to the sound of clinking chains and keys the camera went through dark 
prison gates, listing the corruption cases of KMT politicians sentenced or under 
investigation. The ad ended with the slogan, “For each vote for the KMT we may 
have another corrupt ME” : rjLM)
With two of the most serious corruption cases being in Pingdong, it was felt in the 
county KMT HQ that the repeated broadcast of this ad had a major impact on the 
party’s fortunes in 1997.386 In the “Spokesman TV Ad” a KMT
spokesman tries to explain away KMT corruption cases, but with clips of KMT 
members being arrested and hearing Wu Zeyuan is Pingdong campaign manager 
and Ruan Gangmeng was still being nominated in Zhanghua County, the spokesman 
collapsed and was carried off on a stretcher.
In response to DPP corruption accusations a KMT 1997 ad had the following
38,1 Ziyoushibao, November 11, 1994, 1.
385 China Times, November 23, 1994, 1,
386 Interview by author, at KMT Pingdong party office, August 24, 2001.
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question and answer: “Darling, who has turned the DPP black? In fact it is the DPP 
which has slandered itself.” M:
Ilf i  3 )  This ad outlined how DPP damaged its reputation with
members’ involvement in drug dealing, criminal cases, violence and corruption. For 
example, it claimed that under You Qing the Taibei County Government had had the 
most officials charged with corruption of all counties and cities over the last three 
years.387 In Gaoxiong County the KMT also took the offensive against the 
incumbent DPP ME. An anonymous ad compared DPP ME’s wife Zheng Guilian 
(ftftlf III) to Taiwan’s most infamous criminals of the day with the headline, “Gao 
Tianmin shot himself, Chen Jinxing has surrendered, where can Red Envelope Lian 
escape?”( i « ^ S E @ P ,
In the 2000 presidential election the KMT tried to respond to the DPP’s 
anti-corruption attacks by raising certain DPP ME corruption cases. Once again the 
KMT sought the help of Lin Ruitu (^Irflfil) to smear their opponents, accusing 
Chen Shuibian of being involved in corruption over a lottery scandal while Taibei 
mayor.389 However, the sub-issue clearly still favoured the DPP as over the 1990s it 
had built up a reservoir of KMT ME corruption cases, and Chen Shuibian had by far 
the cleanest image among the serious candidates.
In 2001 the DPP was the national ruling party and defending twelve ME posts, 
making it much more likely that it would face corruption charges. However, the 
DPP acted fast to counter such accusations. For instance, when Tainan City DPP 
ME was involved in a corruption case, the DPP was quick to abandon him and
387 Ziyoushibao, November 11, 1997, 7.
388 China Times, November 27, 1997, 5.
389 Ziyoushibao, March 7, 2000, 9.
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nominate an alternative candidate. Therefore it was not surprising that such KMT 
attacks did not prove to be significant issues.
4.5.3c) Central Government Contract Corruption
Since the KMT was the ruling party throughout the 1990s it has been accused of 
involvement in large-scale construction contract corruption in many elections. This 
sub-issue first became salient in 1992. For example, in a 1992 DPP TV ad comedian 
Kuling CS^r) attacked the corruption associated with the Taibei metro project and 
the Six Year Development Plan. In 1993 the DPP continued this theme, using 
animals to symbolize KMT corruption. One had the picture of a bat with blood 
dripping from its teeth and the slogan "1993 The KMT’s Ten Big Corruption 
Cases,” including the Taibei metro.390 A series of ads exposed
embezzlement by high-level KMT government officials, with the KMT represented 
by an octopus grabbing cash, golf courses and buildings,391 and as a rat stashing 
gold under the ground. ~ The NP also joined the fray, and in a 1993 TV debate its 
founding member Zhao Shaokang offered this sound bite, “If voters can accept the 
current state of contract corruption, then they should vote KMT and in the future 
would have no right to complain.”393
The salience of the Taibei metro scandal reached its peak in 1994. The DPP had a 
series of ads with pictures of derailed or burnt out Taibei metro cars with the slogan, 
"A derailed metro, a corrupt metro.” In Taiwan’s fust
live televised candidate debate both the DPP’s Chen Shuibian and the NP’s Zhao
390 Ziyoushibao, November 10, 1993, 17.
391 China Tunes, November 15, 1993, 13.
392 China Times, November 19, 1993, 13.
393 China Tunes, November 2, 1993, 3.
394 Lianhebao, November 22, 1994, 1.
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Shaokang were scathing in their criticisms over the project’s corruption. KMT 
Huang Dazhou’s feeble response was “As to which previous mayor caused
the present problems, I am not at liberty to say, you think about it yourself.”
In 2000 Chen Shuibian said less than Lian Zhan on how to deal with corruption, but 
since Lian had made so many election promises Chen had ample ammunition to 
attack his failed anti-corruption pledges. A typical example was a full-page DPP ad 
with the picture of a guava, which in Taiwan symbolizes an empty promise. It 
claimed, “Lian Zhan has sworn eight times to sweep away corruption, but during his 
time as premier there were 55 major corruption cases, which accounted for up to 
NT$14.2 billion in procurement corruption.”^ ^ ^ ^ .  8 B. n-^
55 142 ff) .395
As the KMT was the ruling party until 2000, it is not surprising that the DPP and NP 
dominated accusations of corruption over government construction contracts. 
However, in the first two elections under DPP rule it has yet to face similar 
accusations.
4.5.3d) Party Assets
The KMT’s party assets were long an accepted component of the KMT party state, 
and it was not until the 1990s election campaigns that the legitimacy of its vast 
business empire was challenged. The DPP first gave this question attention in 1992, 
when a full page DPP ad showed a cheerful looking Chiang Kai-shek on a NT$1000 
note and asked, “Is the KMT a political party or a consortium?”
39:1 Ziyoushibao, February 16, 2000, 11.
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UPbilll?)396 The two years that the DPP made KMT assets central campaign issues 
were 1995 and 2000. At a press conference on November 4, 1995, the DPP’s Huang 
Huangxiong amiounced the formation of the “All Peoples’ Alliance for the Return 
of Party A s s e t s , c l a i m i n g  that KMT assets amounted to 
NT$150 billion.397 Four days later Huang and DPP Chairman Shi Mingde led a 
protest outside the Legislative Yuan demanding the KMT reveal its true assets, 
freeze its assets, explain the seven suspicious land acquisition cases and return the 
illegally seized assets to the people.398 The DPP followed this up with the Party 
Asset TV ad (Jpliltli) and two newspaper ads giving details of the seven cases and 
attacking the way KMT used its ruling status to increase its property and wealth.399 
However, though the DPP described the party assets as illegal in 1995, this was still 
disputed by the KMT, which insisted that all its assets were obtained legally.400
By 2000 the political climate had changed, as the DPP had won the argument on the 
need to end party involvement in profit making enteiprises. At the 1996 NDC the 
KMT first promised to reform its assets,401 and at a rally on 2 January, 2000 Lian 
Zhan went further by promising to “end political parties’ involvement in profit 
making business, place KMT assets in a trust and eradicate black gold.”402 However, 
Lian’s inability to match words with deeds allowed a DPP newspaper ad to ask “Mr 
Lian Zhan, please pay attention, there are only seven days left before you fail to 
deliver on your promise of placing the party assets in a trust.”
396 Ziyoushibao, November 28, 1992, 6.
397 China Times, November 5, 1995, 2.
398 China Times, November 9, 1995,42.
399 Ziyoushibao, November 13, 1995, 12.
400 China Times, November 5, 1995, 2.
401 Chao and Myers, “Promoting Effective Democracy, Chinese Style,” 669-682.
402 www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/01/02/0000018073
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V ^c!)403 A DPP TV ad also mocked Lian’s assets pledges. 
First it showed Lian making his assets promise with KMT assets chief Liu Taiying 
at his side, then it showed Liu at a press conference making totally 
contradictory statements, opposing putting KMT assets in a trust DPP legislator Lin 
Zhuoshui (WitzR) compared Lian’s actions to the saying “When the butcher lays 
down his knife he immediately becomes a Buddha. ’5(53TFHr71 
According to Lin, “The KMT has done something bad, that is party assets. If it 
properly handled the party assets it would be praised and if it did not settle the 
matter probably nothing would happen, as people are used to the KMT’s assets. The 
problem is that for months he (Lian) said time after time that the party assets had to 
be handled, but nothing was actually done. I think he was foolish. It was like getting 
on stage everyday and saying look how bad the KMT is, then coming off the stage. I 
cannot understand why someone would do this.”404
In 2001 the Control Yuan carried out a thorough investigation of KMT assets and 
has called for Taiwan to follow the “East German model” of nationalizing the 
former authoritarian party’s assets.405 Now that the DPP has become the ruling 
party it is still continuing to raise the issue of party assets at election time. For 
instance, in the run up to the December 2002 mayoral elections the Executive Yuan 
drew up a Political Party Law which would ban political parties from operating or 
owning any profit making businesses. However, once again the KMT has expressed 
its opposition 406
403 Lianhebao, March 11, 2000, 1.
404 Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taibei, September 24, 2001.
405 Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taibei, November 9, 2001.
406 See www.taipeitimes.corn/news/2Q02/09/10/0000167486
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The party assets sub-issue is an example of how fast norms have changed in the 
1990s, what was still accepted as perfectly legitimate until the mid 1990s has 
become “black corruption” today. However, the sub-issue reveals the constraints 
that the KMT faces when trying to change, as even though Lian has pledged to end 
involvement in profit making business, he has been unable to fulfil this promise, as 
it is uncertain if the party can survive without them.
4.5.4 Grey-Black Corruption 
4.5.4a) Black Gold/Gangster Politics:
The term “black gold” refers to the involvement of gangsters in politics, but it has 
also come to be used as a general term to describe political corruption. The scale of 
mafia political influence is strongest in rural counties, such as Pingdong and Yunlin 
(ll'MO- For instance Zhao Yongmao estimates 40% of Yunlin’s county
councillors have organized crime backgrounds.407 It was not until the early 1990s 
that their representatives began to seek election to the national legislature, one 
estimate for the proportion of “black gold” legislators is 20%.408 According to 
Christian Goebel by gaining office these figures could, “whitewash themselves and 
protect their brothers,” particularly infamous was the election of Luo Fuzhu 
lij), leader of the Tiandaomeng gang to convener of the legislature’s
Judicial Committee.409
The DPP has consistently given heavy emphasis to this issue since 1995, when a 
series of scandals gave the DPP ample scope to accuse the KMT of gangster links. 
In “Black Gold” TV ad 1 1) a mother told how her son was killed by KMT
‘107 Zhao (jS1^K3<;) Change and Characteristics o f  Taiwan s  Local Politics, 284.
'10S Goebel, “Towards a Consolidated Democracy?” 8.
409 Ibid.
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Pingdong County Assembly Speaker Zheng Taiji(|$;fc pf), then it showed her 
crying over her dead son, and the picture of the KMT murderer. In “Black Gold” TV 
ad 2 2) DPP Legislator Cai Shiyuan telks of how powerful
gangster politicians have become, and how he was kidnapped and beaten by a 
gangster KMT legislator. The conclusion shows a bullet-ridden car in Pingdong and 
the message is that the only way to defeat “black gold” is by voting. The ads created 
quite a sensation, with the Central Election Commission 
demanding alterations to both ads but the DPP refusing.410
Two years later in 1997 the DPP continued this offensive focusing on corruption 
charges against KMT Pingdong ME and the Zheng Taiji’s life sentence for murder. 
Therefore when President Li came to Pingdong to support the KMT’s ME candidate, 
DPP ME candidate Su Jiaquan demanded Li apologize to the county for 
recommending such bad people four years ago, as this had resulted in Pingdong 
becoming the “county of black gold collusion and gangster rule.”411
In 1998 the DPP was again focused on the “black gold” theme. For instance, a 
full-page DPP ad used a formula style reminiscent of KMT attacks on the DPP’s 
Taiwan independence policy, “With a full load of black gold, how can it lead? The 
KMT is the aircraft carrier of social and economic instability. Stability=KMT 
monopoly=black gold=corruption=disastei~financial crisis=incapable government.”
However with Ma Yingjiu as its 
candidate the KMT tried to hit back with its only TV ad in the 1990s that focused on
410 China Times, November 19, 1995,4,
411 China Tunes, November 4, 1997, 4.
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corruption. The ad showed images of Ma making speeches while Minister of Justice 
and newspaper cuttings on anti corruption measures and quoted a member of public 
saying, “All the gangsters that ought to be caught have been caught or have fled.”
In the 2000 presidential campaign the most consistent DPP corruption theme was 
the link between both Lian Zhan and Song Chuyu with a number of allegedly “black 
gold” politicians and the idea that only a change in ruling parties could defeat 
“black gold.” In one DPP TV ad inspired by the US film “Men in Black,” the KMT 
was represented by gangsters, who rob a bank then press a button to make people 
forget. In the campaign Chen Shuibian gave far more attention to the “black gold” 
than the other candidates. Chen’s quote from the first TV debate echoes the DPP’s 
tone since the mid 1990s: “According to surveys about 70% of the people think that 
under KMT rule the “black gold” question is getting worse. From grassroots 
financial institutions to big public construction projects, from the insider trading on 
the stock exchange to corruption in military purchase cases the KMT has relied on a 
system of corruption that reaches all levels of our country. Since the end of martial 
law the KMT has relied on gangsters and money politics to maintain its power. So 
hoping for the KMT to tackle “black gold” is like dying charcoal white, it is 
impossible. Only if Abian is elected can the danger of “black gold” be dealt 
with.”412
The infamous figures that came under DPP attack for being KMT gangster 
politicians were Wu Zeyuan, the former KMT Pingdong ME, Luo Fuzhu, the 
independent legislator from Taibei County, and Yan Qingbiao (MiWtM), the County 
Council Assembly speaker in Taizhong County. Late in the campaign the DPP used
412 China Times, February 21, 2000, 2.
138
large full page ads to attack KMT gangster links, with pictures of Luo, and Wu, the 
slogan was “With people like them supporting Lian Zhan, how can the KMT not be
forced out of office?”(3 i{-feff^fl5M ?if^X SJf;M ^J^nIJ^;;FTM !) 413 While
on the eve of the election a full-page DPP ad showed the contrasting pictures of 
Chen with Academia Sinica President and Nobel prizewinner Li Yuanzhe 
Lian with Wu and Luo, and Song with Yan, and simply asked, “Who are you going 
to trust Taiwan’s future with?” E ci A ?)4'4
In fact in 2000 Lian Zhan made a number of proposals to tackle gangster politics. 
Lian’s anti corruption pledges were compiled into the TV ad “Lian Zhan’s 
Proposals,,( ^ l ^ |fI^ J?]r.5M). However it is doubtful how convincing this was to 
Taiwanese voters, as when Lian declared “all out war on Black Gold” 
elIPcX at his side his wife is seen looking bored and picking her nose.
The accusation that the KMT has nominated gangster-linked politicians has 
repeatedly damaged the KMT in elections. However, it was not until its disastrous 
defeat in 2000 that it took serious measures to avoid nominating candidates with 
corrupt reputations. In 2001 the KMT tried more radical nomination reforms aimed 
at improving the party’s image. The drafter of the new regulations, Ding Shouzhong 
CPW1), summed up then* key principles, “Anyone that has been convicted of a 
criminal offence or breaking the election and recall law, even if they have only been 
through the first dial, cannot be nominated.”415 This meant that a number of 
infamous and long serving KMT politicians either did not stand or stood as 
independents.
413 Ziyoushibao, March 9, 2000, 16.
414 Ziyoushibao, March 15, 2000, 16.
413 Ding Shouzhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 27, 2001.
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Although it was no longer so easy for the DPP to use the issue to attack the KMT 
after it became the ruling party, it still saw value in the issue. According to 
sociologist Wang Fuchang, “The new ruling party wants to cut the links between the 
KMT and ‘black gold.’ The reorganization of local financial organizations and 
investigation into bank’s political over lending. This is one matter that the new 
government has made the most effort.”416 In addition, in 2001 the DPP again 
targeted Luo Fuzhu, who though independent had maintained close relations with 
the KMT. By putting Luo on trial as a hooligan, the DPP again was trying to gain 
anti black gold kudos.
In section 4.5 I showed how issue ownership is also evident at the sub-issues level, 
with the KMT tending to steer clear of terms negatively associated with it, such as 
“black gold”, party assets, vote buying, and golden oxen. Through the campaigning 
efforts of the DPP and NP the scope of corruption sub-issues have broadened 
significantly and the pace that norms on corruption have changed has been rapid.
4.6 Explanations for Party Change
In this section I show explain the issue emphasis trends in terms of inner party 
politics, electoral competition, incumbency versus opposition, electoral systems and 
ideology. I show how electoral factors have been the key determinant governing the 
NP and DPP’s attention to political corruption. Both have consistently raised the 
issue to expand their support bases and to create a more level electoral playing field. 
In contrast the KMT’s dependence on party assets, corrupt local factions and vote 
buying has constrained it from removing its corrupt image or seriously tackling
416 Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Tatbei, October 26,2001.
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corruption.
4.6.1 Inner Party Politics
The corruption issue has been as divisive for the KMT as national identity. Factional 
struggle exists in all parties, but this factor has been especially significant in 
determining the KMT’s handling of the corruption issue.
The issue has been employed as a weapon in the bitter inner party struggle between 
the pro Li Denghui, mainly BSR MKMT and the largely WSR NMKMT. The 
NMKMT supported the Martial Law system of institutionalised corruption, but 
inherited Chiang Ching-kuo’s suspicion of both big business and local factions. This 
view is reflected in former Premier Hao Bocun’s comments, “Gradually
the KMT became reliant on the local factions to win elections, rather than vice versa. 
This made the KMT sink into degradation, as it came under the control of factional 
money politics. If you didn’t nominate them, they would leave the party and stop 
the KMT from winning.”417 In contrast, Li Denghui was prepared to ally with local 
factions and business groups to strengthen his position in the KMT.
Political corruption first became a major electoral issue in the build up to the 1992 
legislative elections. As NMKMT’s Hao Bocun explained, “In the one year between 
the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan election (1991-1992), Li Denghui was 
leading the KMT to money politics and rich people. I was opposed to this.”418 Li 
and Hao clashed openly over candidate nomination, as Hao recalled, “Li Denghui 
and I had a serious conflict over the nomination of the Legislative Yuan candidates.
417 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
418 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
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He was nominating mafia (MSI) or money politics ( ^ H )  candidates, I didn’t 
approve of this.”419 In the campaign many candidates of rival KMT factions 
concentrated on attacking their own party leaders rather than the DPP. However, in 
early 1993 Hao resigned, leaving Li Denghui in a dominant position in the KMT. In 
view of Li’s reliance on big business and local factions to tip the balance against the 
NMKMT, it is not surprising that Li Denghui showed limited interest in tackling 
corruption while KMT chairman. Li showed his ambivalence to the question in a 
recent interview, “At election time people go on about corruption, I think it is a 
minor question that can be solved.”420
The KMT’s closer links with local factions and conglomerates were a key factor in 
the decision to form the NP. The NP attacks on KMT corruption and the attempt to 
link this issue to Li Denghui were a continuation of the power struggle between the 
KMT’s mainstream and NMKMT factions. Although politicians such as Zhao 
Shaokang had thrown away their KMT membership cards, they continued in their 
struggle to influence the direction of the KMT but as a faction outside the party. 
Similarly, the Xingpiao case was also an extension of this struggle. The reason it 
was emphasized by the KMT in 2000 was the inner party rivalry between Li 
Denghui and Song Chuyu. Li only chose to make the Xingpiao case an electoral 
issue in a last ditch attempt to stop Song winning the presidential election and save 
his protege Lian Zhan. The depth of animosity between former allies is clear from 
Li Denghui’s claim that once Song had left, the KMT was free of corruption. 
Therefore, in March 2000 he stated that “now all the rotten, corrupt and smelly have
1,20 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
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left, o n ce  the w ater is  c lear the dirty f ish  cannot stay.”421
Li’s business/factional alliance proved effective in marginalizing the NMKMT 
faction. However, this victory came at a high price, as in the words of Chen 
Mingtong, “once elected, representatives associated with local factions relentlessly 
pursued pork barrel politics.”422 When the KMT did conduct anti corruption drives, 
the vast majority of cases were KMT members, bringing further blame and also 
leading to inner party turmoil, as those KMT members caught in the net complained 
of selective investigation and betrayal of their party. Moreover, by 1995, the KMT 
had only a small majority in the legislature, making it even more reliant on the local 
factions. According to political scientist Lu Yali (SfSLfj), “As the KMT’s hold on 
power becomes more tenuous, corruption becomes worse... Since the party needs 
the local factions more and more, it has to tolerate their dirty tricks.”423 Although 
factional politicians would probably not switch over to the DPP, the KMT could not 
afford to lose the party whip over any more legislators. The above problems left the 
KMT vulnerable to the corruption attacks and tied the KMT’s hands from tackling 
corruption or improving its corrupt image.
Candidate nomination has been a central feature of KMT inner party factional 
struggle and the party has suffered from repeated opposition attacks over the rising 
numbers of factional, gangster and business linked candidates and their behaviour 
after getting elected. As KMT support levels have declined and many politicians 
have defected, it has become increasingly reliant on factional or business candidates
421 China Times, March 13, 2000, 2.
422 Chen, “Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan’s Democratization,” 188.
423 Far Eastern Economic Review, November 16, 1995, 31.
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that in spite of bad reputations have high re-election rates424 and ample campaign 
funds. The party has found it very hard to reform its nomination system to avoid 
selecting candidates with corrupt reputations. As former KMT Secretary General,
Xu Shuide recalled, “We wanted to show people that the KMT could challenge 
“Black Gold” and hold a clean election. So we didn’t nominate candidates with bad 
images (in 1995).”425 However, this rule was only applied to new candidates and 
incumbents were excluded. As Xu admitted, “This was not a complete method,”426 
In contrast the DPP has been more sensitive to such accusations. For instance, in 
2001 it swiftly abandoned the DPP Tainan City ME when he became embroiled in a 
corruption scandal in favour of a popular independent legislator.
Clearly the shift in power towards the new KMT leader Lian Zhan and the NMKMT 
since 2000 has altered the party’s attitude towards corruption. During the 2000 
campaign Lian did make promises to tackle KMT corruption, and since the KMT 
was defeated, the KMT has passed its most stringent anti “black gold” nomination 
regulations. However, the degree of change should not be exaggerated. For instance, 
though the KMT’s 2000 nomination regulations appear more comprehensive, the 
fact that it nominated incumbent Yunlin ME Zhang Rongwei despite his
corrupt image reveals the constraints of reform.427 Similarly, though the party has 
made numerous promises to end party involvement in business, so far this has been 
an empty promise. Unlike the NP and DPP, the KMT lacks a unifying ideology; the 
one thing that has kept the party together is its wealth. Political scientist Chen
424 For example in 1991’s National Assembly election 97.47 o f KMT factional candidates were 
elected compared to 80.77 for non-factional candidates. See Chen, “Local Factions and Elections in 
Taiwan’s Democratization,” Table 7.3.
425 Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
426 Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
427 Liu Yizhou, interview by author, Taibei, October 30, 2001.
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Wenjun noted the danger of this in 1995, “Basically political corruption
has no positions or ideals, it is a matter of interests, it can change its allegiance at 
any time and this leads to the instability of the KMT regime.”42S Although party 
assets have become discredited and made the transition towards becoming “black 
corruption,” the KMT’s dependence on the party assets to supply the campaign 
funds to outspend other parties have constrained its ability to reform this problem.
Although political corruption has not been internally divisive for either the DPP or 
the NP, the issue has received more attention when election orientated factions and 
leaders have been in control, and has been downplayed when ideologically 
orientated factions have had the upper hand. Indeed the political corruption issue 
was initiated by the DPP in the early 1990s under the leadership of Xu Xinliang and 
Shi Mingde as they attempted to alter the DPP’s party image. Subsequent DPP 
leaders have continued this emphasis, even after becoming the ruling party. 
Although the DPP focused on political corruption in most elections, an exception 
was the 1996 presidential election, when according to a former KMT Party 
Propaganda Chief the DPP’s candidate showed “No interest” in the corruption 
issue.429 Similarly, under the leadership of party moderates, the NP gave much 
attention to corruption until 1998. However, the rise of Chinese nationalists such as 
Xie Qida led to corruption been dropped. As John Hsieh commented, “When it was 
first formed, the NP did try to downplay the national identity issue by stressing 
instead the clean government theme. But clearly it did not succeed. Indeed, it has 
been gradually “forced” to turn back to the national identity issue.”430
428 Chino Times, December 4, 1995, 4.
429 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
430 Hsieh, “Whither KMT?” 941, note 22.
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4.6.2 Electoral Competition 
4.6.2a) Public Opinion
It is uncertain whether the opposition’s political corruption emphasis was a response 
to public disgust over rising conniption or if the salience of the issue was created by 
party propaganda. However, since the mid 1990s political conniption was die most 
salient issues which the DPP could consistently beat the KMT and gain the support 
of the majority of the electorate, therefore opposition parties would have been 
foolish not to exploit anti-corruption sentiments. There has been a considerable 
widening of the sub-issues that both the public and elite view as constituting grey 
and black corraption. Such changes in public opinion have forced the KMT to alter 
its position on vote buying; nominating candidates with corrupt images and even 
offering to end party assets. However, the way the parties use their available survey 
data in planning campaigns appears to be different. Advertising expert Fu Hekang 
argues that while the KMT pays more attention to broad support rates, 
“The DPP’s election themes have always been based on the results of opinion 
surveys.”431 This has meant that according to Wang Fengquan, “The DPP is more 
successful at catching the issue of the moment, which was “black gold” this year (in 
2000).”432
4.6.2b) Mobilising or Chasing?
The link between political corruption attacks and social cleavages are not as obvious 
as either social welfare or national identity. It is the most cross cutting of the three 
issues, as the NP and DPP were at opposite poles of the national identity spectrum, 
but they managed to join together in attacking corraption to appeal to core groups
431 Fu Hekang, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001.
432 Wang Fengquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, April 14, 2000.
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and n ew  supporters.
On the political corruption issue the most significant sociological factor has been 
differences in urban/rural support levels and perception of corruption. In Taiwan 
there is a very different perception of corruption in the country and the city; 
according to political scientist Wu Chongli, “I found that the definition of vote 
buying in the cities and country is quite different. In the cities, people think that I 
give you money and you vote for me, but in the country we are friends, you give me 
the money and I help you out.”433 The divisive nature of the political conniption 
issue for the KMT is linked to the party’s support base. While the mainly 
urban-based WSR NMKMT supporters stressed clean government, the largely rural 
based BSR MKMT supporters held ambiguous attitudes to the issue. However, as 
the KMT has lost support in urban constituencies, its dependence on rural based 
voters and politicians has been increasing. For instance, in the 1997 ME elections 
the KMT was defeated in virtually all heavily urbanised counties and only won in 
agricultural counties. Therefore attacking corruption risked alienating rural 
supporters caught up in anti-corruption crackdowns and would have little appeal to 
rural voters.
In contrast both the DPP and NP began as largely urban-based parties, thus it made 
sense to focus on corruption, an issue city dwellers were more concerned about.
Anti corruption attacks were also appealing to core DPP and NP supporters. For the 
DPP any excuse to attack the KMT are pleasing to anti KMT BSR, while for the NP 
those who hate Li Denghui and blame him for all the ills of Taiwan were pleased. 
Former DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong explained that, “We cannot deny that the
433 Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.
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NP was the one that initiated some key issues. Why did we have the political 
corruption issue? It was aimed at attacking Li Denghui.”434
According to John Hsieh, the KMT’s most serious weakness is its “black gold” 
image, which “hurts the party particularly among the young, urban and 
better-educated voters.”435 Therefore like social welfare, political corruption was 
part of both opposition parties’ plan to find new issues to expand beyond their 
original national identity orientated support constituencies.
4.6.2c) Electoral Environment
By the early 1990s the electoral environment facing the political parties was very 
different from the late 1980s, this had a major impact on their treatment of the 
corruption issue. As in Spain and France, the newly liberalized media played a 
critical role in placing political corruption on Taiwan’s political agenda and opening 
up what Pujas and Rhodes term “coalitions of silence” on corruption.436 Taiwan’s 
media became so saturated with KMT corruption scandals, that even senior KMT 
figures admitted the scale of the problem. As former KMT Gaoxiong mayor Wu 
Dunyi stated, “In the past the KMT really did have a “black gold” question, I 
completely agree with this criticism. This is the area I am most ashamed of the KMT, 
our compromises and links with “black gold”, it was very serious.”437 By the early 
1990s the scale and at times openness of political corruption had reached such a 
state that the DPP and NP would have been foolhardy not to exploit the issue. 
Moreover, since the issue had been jointly initiated by the DPP and NMKMT,
434 Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taibei, November 9, 2001.
435 Hsieh, “Whither the KMT?” 10.
436 Pujas and Rhodes, “Party Finance and Political Scandal,” 753.
437 Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.
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neither was prepared to concede ownership of this popular issue, thus both groups 
consistently competed for the anti corraption vote.
The changing nature of the KMT also offered new opportunities for the NP to 
appeal to disgruntled KMT supporters unhappy about rising corruption levels. For 
instance, a 1994 NP ad noted, “We want to support party (KMT) candidates, but 
cannot recognize golden oxen, black oxen or water buffalo as comrades. ”($AI
Similarly as the NP 
weakened the KMT attempted to use the Xingpiao case to win back former 
supporters that had lost confidence in Song. For instance, one KMT ad showed a 
picture of a Song supporter in deep thought, asking “But if you think it’s alright to 
Aqian (A I I  embezzle) and to lie, can you accept it when your child says, ‘Adults 
can all Aqian and lie, why can’t A i H I  AT1A
In 2000 Li Denghui’s departure from the KMT party centre again altered the 
political environment radically. As a result of the desire to create a united front to 
the “Pan Blue Alliance” in the ran up to the 2004 presidential election, KMT party 
chair Lian Zhan dropped all the Xingpiao case charges against Song Chuyu and 
even offered a mild apology.
4.6.2d) Election results
Reactions to election results have been critical to the way Taiwan’s parties have 
dealt with the political corraption issue. Although proving whether an issue has been
438 Lianhebao, November 26, 1994, 8.
439 China Times, March 12, 2000, 1.
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decisive in election victory is a futile operation, media and politicians often view 
elections as being won or lost on certain issues. A former KMT propaganda Chief 
reflected the view that election defeat forced the KMT to change, stating, “Before 
we looked at election defeats, and saw that the KMT had to recover from defeat. We 
had to get rid of political corruption and become a democratic party.”440 The critical 
election defeats that were turning points for the political corruption issue were 1991 
for the DPP, 2000 for the KMT and 1998 for the NP, while the success of anti 
corruption attacks in 1992 set a precedent that the opposition parties followed 
throughout the decade.
Political corruption is perhaps the only significant issue upon which the DPP has 
consistently beaten the KMT and the KMT has been unable to steal. According to 
Shelley Rigger, “It (KMT) failed because it did not back up its rhetoric with action, 
and its credibility suffered.”441 The comments of two influential DPP legislators 
reflect the effectiveness of the issue: Shen Fuxiong stated, “The black gold issue, it 
works!”442 While Zhang Junhong stated, “Black gold has benefits and no cons.”443 
The issue has put the KMT into what Tien Hong-mao describes as “a no win 
situation. Failure to prosecute guilty parties would further the KMT’s image as a 
corrupt political machine. Successful prosecution, however, which may involve 
most city and county councils, could severely shake the KMT’s local electoral 
foundation.”444 The KMT’s corrupt image has stuck in the public consciousness, as 
the KMT’s former Propaganda Chief admitted, “It’s the KMT’s greatest burden, and
4110 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
441 Rigger, D PP 2000, 9-10.
442 Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taibei, September 19, 2001.
443 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
444 Tien, “Elections and Taiwan’s Democratic Development,” 15.
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it can’t get rid of it.”445 Therefore, as predicted by saliency theory, it is in the 
KMT’s interests to steer clear of the corraption issue and instead to stress favourable 
items such as its government ability, economic growth or stability.
While most DPP and NP candidates have maintained relatively clean reputations the 
reverse is true of the KMT’s. Even where KMT candidates personally have clean 
images, they have often been dragged down by the corrupt image of their party or 
infamous fellow partisans. For instance, a party official at the KMT Pingdong office 
lamented how in 1997, “Zeng (Yongquan had a clean image, (but) he was
tainted by the cases of Wu Zeyuan and the Pingdong County Council Speaker.”446 
One of the few KMT figures immune to these attacks is Ma Yingjiu. As Chen Xiulin 
wrote in the China Times, “This (1998 election result) shows that when 
Ma Yingjiu represents the KMT reform faction, with his reputation for cracking 
down on vote buying as Minister for Justice, he camiot be tainted with the KMT’s
, , 4 4 7corrupt image.
After 1991’s National Assembly setback most DPP leaders agreed that there was a 
danger of over reliance on Taiwan independence and that in order to mould a new 
party image the party needed to expand its issue emphasis into questions such as 
political corraption and social welfare. The DPP’s move away from ideological 
identity appeals in favour of corruption attacks shows parallels to the way many 
European parties have replaced left right disputes with corruption accusations.448 
For the DPP 1992 was an attempt to make a new start in terms of election strategy,
445 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
446 Interviews by author at KMT Pingdong party office, August 24, 2001.
447 Chirm Times, December 6, 1998, 3.
448 See Heywood, “Political Corruption, Democracy and Governance in Spain.”
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as the DPP’s Propaganda Chief Chen Fangming recalled, “I just suggested that the 
party has to emphasize more on how to get rid of corruption and military 
interference in politics.”449 The success that the DPP had by stressing KMT 
corruption in 1992 set a precedent for employing the issue in subsequent contests. In 
fact, even after coming to power the DPP sees votes to be won with anti corruption 
appeals. For instance, in 2001 the timing of DPP’s prosecution of the KMT linked 
gangster legislator Luo Fuzhu was according to political scientist Wu Yushan “also 
related to the election.” 450
Although corruption was partly attributed for earlier KMT setbacks, the KMT’s 
turning point was its disastrous defeat in 2000. According to the KMT Legislator 
Ding Shouzhong, the KMT had succeeded in public policies such as NHI and 
education, but Taiwan's people had thrown it out of office, “as they wanted change, 
as the KMT had done badly on “black gold.’”451 One aspect of this attempt to shape 
a new cleaner image meant that the KMT did not nominate candidates that had been 
used by the DPP to accuse it of being corrupt such as Guo Tingcai and Wu Zeyuan. 
Song Chuyu’s PFP party has shown a similar attitude to Yan Qingbiao. Yan had 
been a strong supporter of Song in the 2000 election, but the DPP had used this 
support to label the Song camp as corrupt. As a result after the election the PFP 
opposed him joining the party and when he was arrested for attempted murder and 
corruption Song only offered limited support 452
The decline in NP attention to the issue after its defeat in 1998 reflects a sense that
449 Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
450 Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taibei, October 24, 2001.
451 Ding Shouzhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 27, 2001.
452 See wwvv.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20010301/20010301p7.html
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the issue had served a purpose but could not guarantee either continued growth in 
support or strong party identification. As early as 1995 the NP’s Yang Taishun 
Hi) warned of the dangers, stating, “If the NP is unable to use the newly elected 
office to create grassroots organization and an image of party service, it is doubtful 
that the party will still be able to win votes with the appeal of highly educated 
candidates and anti money politics.”453 Three years later, following its 1998 defeat 
the NP’s Zhou Yangshan concluded, “The NP should not stress clean government. I 
think that it seems Taiwan’s voters do not want to see a truly clean party.... The NP 
must face this reality. Apart from the big cities of Taibei, Gaoxiong and Taizhong, if 
the NP puts too much stress on clean government it is likely to be completely 
rejected elsewhere.”454 Therefore, following the NP’s peak in political corraption 
emphasis in 1998 the party never again gave it the same focus.
4.6.3 Incumbency versus Opposition
It is far harder for a ruling party to avoid accusations of corruption and thus more 
likely that opposition parties will make corruption attacks in campaigns. The KMT 
lost control of most local ME positions in 1997 and the national government in 2000. 
Therefore the question to be asked is has party turnover affected the stress of 
political corruption? The DPP’s case is similar to the Popular Party after coming to 
power in Spain on an anti corruption platform, in both cases though corruption 
allegations still crop up their frequency and intensity appear reduced after the party 
turnover.455
There is a consensus in Taiwan that the issue will no longer have the same effects as
453 China Times, December 3, 1995, 11.
454 China Times, December 7, 1995, 16.
455 Heywood, “Political Corruption, Democracy and Governance in Spain.”
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in the 1990s. As the DPP’s Shen Fuxiong conceded that, “If you continue to stress 
that (anti corraption), people still realize that it’s an issue, but people will come 
back and say you’ve been in position for more than one year, how come you didn’t 
eradicate that?”456
However, the 2001 campaign showed more signs of continuity rather than change. 
Firstly, despite the party turnover and the KMT’s anti corruption reforms, it did not 
make corruption its central election theme. Secondly, the DPP was still trying to 
profit from the issue, for example Chen Dingnan's vigorous anti vote buying 
campaign in 2001. Pingdong ME Su Jiaquan explained how the DPP continues to 
use the issue, but that the campaign methods for a electoral challenger differ from 
the incumbent, “If the KMT is in power, we’ll focus on their vote buying and 
political corruption links... but now I’m the ME, I must show my actual 
government achievements, how I’ve attacked corruption, how I ’ve improved 
Pingdong and will continue to in the future.”457 Moreover, the KMT’s 
transformation is far from complete. As former KMT Party Propaganda Chief 
Huang Huizhen noted, “Even in opposition the KMT still has its ‘black
gold’ problems.”458
4.6.4 Institutional Factors
My content analysis of party election propaganda showed that the political 
corruption issue features in elections of all types, both in SMD and MMD. However, 
election systems partly explain the KMT’s emphasis on ME corruption. As while the 
DPP and NP attacked the KMT on almost all the corruption sub-issues in every
456 Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taibei, September 19, 2001.
457 Su Jiaquan, interview by author, Pingdong, August 24, 2001.
458 Huang Huizhen, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
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election, the KMT only attacked in SMD contests and the only sub-issue it regularly 
stressed was ME corruption. In short, as with social welfare, the impact of electoral 
systems is limited.
4.6.5 Ideology
All parties are officially anti corruption, therefore it would be expected the impact 
of ideology on emphasis of this issue would be lower. Unlike on national identity, 
opposition to corruption was not a core component of the DPP’s founding ideology; 
therefore the initial DPP stress on the issue was due to electoral, rather than 
ideological reasons. However, after repeated DPP campaigning on an 
anti-corruption platform, anti corruption has become a core element of DPP party 
ideology, making the issue harder for the party to drop. For the DPP another 
ideological aspect of anti corruption attacks was its link to democratisation, as the 
political environment of vote buying, and the financial imbalance caused by KMT 
party assets weaken Taiwan’s claim to be a true democracy. As former DPP 
legislator Huang Huangxiong noted, “The KMT’s party assets are an obstacle to 
democratisation. ”459
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that party competition on this issue tended to be 
convergent. As though the parties began the decade with contrasting positions on the 
corruption issue, after ten years of electoral debate there is now a greater consensus 
on what constitutes corraption. However, as in the social welfare case, the parties 
remain differentiated, as inner party factors have prevented leapfrogging.
459 China Times, November 5, 1995, 2.
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Since the early 1990s the opposition parties have relentlessly campaigned on an 
anti-corruption platform and progressively expanded the realm of what constitutes 
corruption, pushing sub-issues formally seen as “white corruption” to become 
“grey” or even “black corraption.” Although political analysts describe national 
identity as the most influential issue in Taiwanese politics, my data has revealed 
political conuption to be the most salient issue in the 1990s elections. The political 
corruption has shown a clear pattern of issue ownership with the DPP and NP 
dominating the issue over the whole decade. In contrast, the KMT has endeavoured 
to play down or avoid the issue. Clean government has been a cross cutting cleavage, 
with parties at opposite poles on the national identity spectrum sharing common 
ground on attacking KMT corraption. The survey data shows the Taiwan’s voters 
have responded to the unremitting anti-corruption propaganda, as by the late 1990s 
they increasingly saw the issue as a key distinguishing mark of the main parties’ 
images, viewing the KMT as corrupt and the DPP and NP as attacking corruption.
The key factors determining their treatment of the issue vary among the three parties. 
Internal party politics were the most significant factor for the KMT as the issue 
became internally divisive. The KMT’s reliance on areas that were formerly “white 
conuption,” such as party assets, corrupt local factions and vote buying, has tied its 
hands from tackling conuption or ridding itself of its negative image, as serious anti 
corraption drives would have resulted in a factional backlash and it losing its inbuilt 
electoral advantage. Moreover, both sides in the power struggle between Li Denghui 
and the NMKMT used corraption allegations as a weapon to discredit their 
opponents. In contrast, the NP and DPP, as both stressed the issue to expand beyond 
their core supporters and create a fairer electoral playing field. The parties have 
been responsive to election results. The fact that the political conuption issue
156
actually worked was the reason that both parties persisted with the issue in election 
after election. It was only after the KMT’s 2000 election calamity that it attempted 
to seriously tackle the problem of “black gold” nominations. The 2001 election was 
the first since party turnover at the national level; however, it appeared that there 
was more continuity than change, with the DPP still hying to profit from the issue. 
A former KMT Party Propaganda Chief admitted the DPP’s anti corruption 
propaganda campaign had been, “very successful. From that time (1992) the DPP 
started calling the KMT corrupt. Even until now the KMT is unable to remove this 
label.”460
It is still premature to conclude whether after a decade of corruption being a central 
electoral issue that Taiwan has become a cleaner political entity. However, the case 
study has shown the value of competitive party politics in widening the realm of 
what is seen as corruption, promoting anti-corruption legislation and setting new 
cleaner political norms. Through electoral debate foundations of KMT party state 
such as vote buying, party assets and the corrupt patron client relationship between 
the KMT and local factions have been first challenged and eventually discredited. 
The significance of political conuption should not be underestimated, it was the one 
major issue upon which the DPP could consistently beat the KMT and receive a 
majority of public support. Based on the DPP’s election results in the two years 
when it disregarded political conuption (1991 & 1996), it can be surmised that 
without the issue the DPP would never have gained either local or national power.
460 Former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
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Chapter Five: National Identity
“There are some things that you can do, but cannot say ’
you can be independent, but you cannot say you re independent, and 'there are 
some things that you can say but cannot do The KMT
says it wants to retake the mainland, but i f  you tell the KMT not to say this i t’ll lose 
much o f its legitimacy. ”461
5,1.1 Introduction
In the past two decades national identity issues have risen in salience in both 
democracies and authoritarian states. After the break-up of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, politicians in new democracies were often successful at exploiting 
formerly latent ethnic nationalism. In older democracies the fading of traditional 
left-right divisions has prompted politicians to seek new issues to mobilise support. 
This has led to the rise of right wing nationalist and anti immigrant parties, such as 
the List Pirn Fortuyn in the Netherlands. In addition, nationalist separatist groups 
have grown in electoral strength, particularly in Scotland and Quebec. In China the 
CCP has also increasingly sought legitimacy as the representative of Chinese 
nationalism. Similarly, most political scientists working on Taiwan would agree 
with John Hsieh and Emerson Niou’s assertion that national identity “is the most 
controversial and divisive issue” in Taiwanese politics.462 In Taiwan national 
identity issues rather than a socio-economic cleavage separate parties. When 
analysts talk of a left and right in Taiwan, the left wing means independence from 
China and Taiwanese identity, and the right wing means unification with China and 
Chinese identity.
1,61 Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taipei, October 23, 2001.
‘,62 Hsieh and Niou, “Salient Issues in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics,” 4.
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In this chapter I show how in response to election results and moderate public 
opinion, election orientated leaders have moved their parties away from highly 
polarized positions on the national identity issue, towards more centrist positions. 
However, the parties have not converged and leapfrogging has been the exception. 
As party movement has been severely constrained by both party ideology and inner 
party factional balance. The development of this issue shows a clear pattern of issue 
ownership, with the parties consistently talking past each other and the public 
consistently able to distinguish between the parties. As in the other case studies the 
KMT does make some attempts at issue stealing, however, most failed and issue 
ownership remained intact. In short, though the electoral forces have made the 
parties less polarized, ideology has ensured they remain differentiated.
The development of this issue shows multi-party elections are capable of resolving 
conflicts. The case challenges Dankwart Rustow’s proposition that a prerequisite for 
democratic transition is an initial consensus on national identity issues.463 Taiwan 
began democratic elections with parties holding diametrically opposed views on 
national issues. It was only through democratic debate during elections over the 
1990s that Taiwan’s parties moved towards more moderate and inclusive positions. 
Time and again, Taiwan’s moderate electorate has rejected radical positions. As a 
result, by the late 1990s the parties have reached at least tacit understandings on 
most national identity questions.
5.1.2 National Identity Issues in Taiwan
Although not always the most visible in election propaganda, identity issues are
463 Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy,” 350-2.
159
present below the surface and generate the greatest passion at election time in 
Taiwan. As DPP presidential candidate Peng Mingmin (gfrfyHWO noted, “Election 
speeches do not systematically outline policy agendas. If you did the voters would 
not be interested. In election speeches you have to talk about what people want to 
hear (i.e. national identity).”464 The power of national identity is linked to its central 
place in the core ideology of all major political parties in Taiwan and it has become 
entwined with many other political issues. The contrasting historical memories and 
myths of the two main ethnic groups in Taiwan have produced two contradictory 
ideologies on the crucial national identity questions of who are the people and what 
are the boundaries of the state. The orthodox KMT view is that the people of Taiwan 
are Chinese, that Taiwan is a part of China, that the ROC government is the only 
legitimate government of all China, and that Taiwan and Mainland China should be 
reunified in the future. In contrast, the DPP position is that Taiwanese people though 
mainly ethnically Chinese, have the right to self-determination, and that Taiwan and 
China are two separate sovereign countries. As in the case of political conuption, 
the evolution of accepted norms 011 national identity has been especially rapid since 
democratic elections began. Opinions on identity voiced by the ROC president and 
viewed as mainstream in the late 1990s would have resulted in execution in the 
1950s and a lengthy prison sentence as late as the early 1990s.
National identity in Taiwan is a complex and multi layered issue; therefore it is 
necessary to find a simplified framework of analysis. Previous studies have focused 
on the two most contested areas of national identity: (1) Taiwan’s relationship with 
China, which essentially is a dispute over whether Taiwan should move towards 
unification with the mainland, maintain the status quo, 01* strive for formal political
464 Peng Mingmin, interview by author, Taibei, October 31, 2001.
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independence (also known as the “TongDu” question) and (2) The question 
of Chinese versus Taiwanese self-identification.465 Therefore this study tracks the 
parties’ movement on these two broad national identity sub-issues spectrums. I 
outline these two spectrums and the main terms that come under these categories in 
electoral propaganda on Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The far left of the TongDu spectrum 
incorporates calls for immediate political independence, such as the declaration of a 
Republic of Taiwan, an area I tenn “Pure Taiwan Independence.” At the centre left 
is the area I call “Diluted Taiwan Independence,” which incorporates Taiwanese 
self-determination. At the centre is the status quo. The centre right is defined as 
“Taiwan Independence: Negative” and includes calls to protect the ROC and attacks 
on Taiwan independence, while at the far right are calls for immediate unification, 
such as the PRC’s proposal of “One Country Two Systems.” The Taiwanese versus 
Chinese spectrum is veiy similar. Exclusive Taiwanese nationalist appeals are at the 
far left, a more inclusive Taiwanese identity at the centre left, dual identity at the 
centre, ROC Chinese identity at the centre left, and “Pure Chinese Nationalism” at 
the far right465
5.1.3 Chapter Overview
Following this brief introduction, section 5.2 discusses the development of national 
identity issues in Taiwan before 1991. Section 5.3 offers a picture of the broad 
trends in national identity over the 1991-2001 decade. Looking at whether identity
465 The Mainland Affairs Council has sponsored national surveys on these two questions since the 
early 1990s. See www.mac.gov.tw ; Academic works focussing on these two questions include Lin, 
“The Evolution o f National Identity Issues in Taiwan,” 123-143; Chu and Lin, “The Construction o f 
Taiwanese Identity and Cross Strait Relations.”
466 I have built upon previous research by Liu Tsung-wei, who distinguished between the two issue 
opposites o f  “Taiwan independence: positive” versus “Taiwan independence: negative, and 
“Taiwanese nationalism” versus “Chinese Nationalism.” Liu actually retains the original MRG title 
o f “National Way o f Life: Positive” for 601, but since 601T is referring to “Taiwanese Nationalism” 
it makes sense to alter 601 to “Chinese Nationalism.” For details see Liu, “Ideology, Strategy and 
Party Change in Taiwan from 1989-1998,” Table 1.
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issues are salient, if they are owned, if there is any change in ownership and if the 
parties are convening or diverging. I show the principal trends in public opinion on 
the two main national identity dimensions and if the public sees the parties as 
having changed on these issues. In addition, I review the politicians’ view of party 
change over this period. Section 5.4 reviews development of the two main national 
identity sub-issues in elections between 1991 and 2001, showing how election 
orientated leadership has tried to move parties towards the centre, but how 
movement has been constrained by ideologically orientated factions. I test whether 
issue ownership applies for individual campaigns and at the level of sub-issues, has 
this sub-issue ownership altered and have the parties changed their actual positions 
over the decade. Next in section 5.5 I evaluate the extent independent variables such 
as inter party competition, inner party politics, and ideology have pushed or 
constrained party movement. Finally, section 5.6 reviews the main conclusions of 
the chapter and the importance of national identity in Taiwanese politics.
5.2 Development of the National Identity Issue before 1991
After the KMT government relocated to Taiwan, the legitimacy of the ROC state 
was rooted on the principle that it was the sole legitimate government of all China. 
Any open challenge to the policy of reunification was dealt with harshly throughout 
the Martial Law era, and as late as 1992 advocating Taiwan independence was 
seditious. Democratic reforms such as full re-election of the WSR dominated 
parliaments or direct election of the president were deemed unacceptable, as these 
would create institutions that only represented Taiwan. Therefore the two issues of 
democratisation and national identity became intimately linked.
Since the basis of KMT authority came from its claim to be the government of all
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China educational and cultural policies were implemented to create a new ROC 
Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. Therefore intensive sinification policies were 
introduced through the media and education curriculum, key components of which 
were the Mandarin language program and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance 
Movement.467 In contrast, the use of local Taiwanese dialects was discouraged and 
Taiwanese opera was treated as second class. Taiwanese were taught that Taiwan 
was part of China and they should identify with the KMT’s version of Chinese 
nationalism. This message was present in countless everyday symbols. For instance, 
all roads were renamed after KMT leaders, places in China and aspects of Chinese 
and KMT philosophy. In short, the position of the KMT and ROC government 
through the “White Terror” years was on the far right of the national identity 
spectrums in Table 5.1 and 5.2.
National identity issues only became an electoral issue in the 1980s, as the issue was 
then intimately entwined with the question of democratisation. Initially, the 
Dangwai opposition was essentially a democratic movement that also demanded 
ethnic justice, and was far from being a Taiwanese nationalist organization. Former 
DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong (M'MWO recalled why the movement initially 
focused on democratisation rather than independence. “As soon as we spoke on that 
subject (independence) we would be arrested.. .we had to focus on democratisation. 
In the schools they taught democracy. The KMT did not oppose this, so no one 
dared to oppose democracy.”468 It was not until the 1983 Legislative Yuan election 
that the Dangwai took a clear stance on the TongDu question, arguing, “Taiwan’s
467 See Winkler, “Cultural Policy on Post-war Taiwan,” 22-46.
468 Huang Huangxiong, interview by author, Taibei, November 9, 2001.
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future should be determined by all of Taiwan’s residents.”469 This concept of 
Taiwanese self-determination was acceptable to all within the early DPP, as it ruled 
out neither future independence nor unification. In its first election in 1986 the DPP 
party platform reaffirmed its stance of Taiwanese self-determination rather than 
independence 470 Moreover, despite pressure from some quarters in the opposition 
movement, Taiwan was not included in the party name, as it was feared this would 
alienate its WSR leaders. In short, the DPP began as a centre left party on national 
identity.
In the DPP’s initial five years changes in its factional balance pushed the party in a 
leftward direction, resulting in the leading WSR and unification advocates splitting 
off from the party. Party founding member Zhu Gaozheng recalled how the 
influence of the Formosa prisoners pushed the party to the left, “The problem was 
that later some old Taiwan independence dissidents were able to blackmail this 
group (the DPP’s founders).”471 As the Foimosa defendants began to be released, 
they were able to control the DPP party chair and secretaiy general positions from 
1988. However, though the Formosa group was more radical than the party founders, 
they also had to contend with the even more radical New Tide Faction. The exodus 
of anti independence figures such as Zhu Gaozheng and Lin Zhengjie weakened 
resistance within the party to its leftward direction. The shift in factional balance 
within the party soon resulted in the party taking more radical positions. In the 1989 
legislative election members of the DPP’s New Nation Alliance 
openly promoted Taiwan independence for the first time.472 This radicalisation
469 Chen, “The DPP's Party Image,” 37.
470 Wang, “One China, One Taiwan,” 171.
471 Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 8, 2001.
472 Wang, “One China, One Taiwan,”! 72.
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culminated in 1991 when the DPP passed the Taiwan Independence Clause (TIC 
which proposed that a ROT be established after being approved by a 
plebiscite and called for a new Taiwan constitution. This position was reached 
through a compromise between the two leading factions, in which New Tide agreed 
to Formosa’s Xu Xinliang becoming party chair in exchange for Formosa accepting 
placing the TIC on the party charter.473 According to the DPP’s Lin Zhuoshui, “The 
DPP went through five, six years to change from being not Taiwan independence to 
being a Taiwan independence party.”474 Therefore by 1991 the DPP was at the far 
left of the TongDu spectrum.
Although the KMT had the image of being inflexible on its national identity 
positions, there were some changes in the final years of Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
presidency and the early Li Denghui period. Firstly, under Chiang Ching-kuo the 
principle of “Unification under the Three Principles of the People” (E l —
replaced the slogan of militarily retaking the mainland. In addition, there was 
considerable Taiwanisation of the central government and parliaments, so that by 
the late 1980s the ethnic imbalance was less discriminate. President Chiang himself 
showed a degree of localisation in his famous public statement that “I am 
Taiwanese.” Although Chiang responded to Deng Xiaoping’s (i$ /j\2p:) proposal of 
“One Country Two Systems” (—'PIpjrM) with the “Three Nos” of “No contact, no 
communication and no compromise,” there were signs of a thaw in relations at the 
unofficial level. A key aspect was the move in 1987 to allow the veterans to visit 
their relatives on the mainland. In the next few years trade across the Taiwan straits 
sky- rocketed. To deal with interactions and act as the government’s advisory
473 For a detailed analysis o f the DPP’s shift towards TIC see Cheng and Hsu, “Issue Structure, the 
DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment.”
474 Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taibei, September 24, 2001.
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agency the Mainland Affairs Council (IHHHr MAC) was set up, with the 
semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation CW§j# )  to handle practical relations. 
This went beyond Chiang’s “Three Nos,” as it allowed semi official negotiations 
between the two sides for the first time. However, movement away from orthodox 
KMT national identity was also seriously constrained by conservatives within the 
party. The party’s commitment to unification was reaffirmed when the National 
Unification Council was set up in 1990 and the Executive Yuan approved
its National Unification Guidelines (NUG in February 1991. These
guidelines have remained KMT and government policy since. They laid out a 
three-stage process for reunification, and insist that before reunification is possible 
the mainland must be democratic, free and equally prosperous.475 In addition, the 
sinocentric state of the education curriculum remained intact. In short, despite 
moderation of some KMT positions, on the eve of the first democratic election in 
1991 the KMT was located between the centre right and far right of the national 
identity spectrums.
5.3 Broad Trends in National Identity Emphasis 1991-2001
In this section I examine broad trends of national identity issue emphasis in 
campaigns over the 1990s. First, I review interview and newspaper ad data to see 
how salient these issues have been in Taiwan. Next I examine the extent parties 
have dominated or neglected national identity issues and if the parties’ positions 
converged or diverged over the decade. Following this I look at broad changes in 
public opinion on these issues. Last I compare these findings with politicians’ views 
of party change on identity issues.
475 For the NUG text see www.president.gov.tw/2 special/unification/tc.html
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5.3.1 How Salient is National Identity in Taiwan?
Table 2.2 shows three indicators of top ten issue salience in Taiwan, these are my 
official party newspaper ads issue top ten, Liu Tsung-wei’s top ten issues for 
Legislative Yuan candidates’ policy proposals in election gazettes, and my elite 
survey. My newspaper content analysis shows national identity has been a central 
issues in electoral propaganda, as both “Taiwan Independence: Positive” and 
“Negative” come in the top ten. In contrast, these issues were absent from Liu’s 
combined top ten. My elite survey provided more support for the proposition that 
national identity is highly salient, with a consensus among politicians of all parties 
that national identity has been the most influential issue in elections. I followed this 
up with the question, “What issues have you and your party stressed most in 
elections over the last decade?” The results are displayed in Table 2.6, showing that 
national identity was the most stressed issue for politicians from all three parties.
5.3.2 Is National Identity an Owned Issue?
The next question is are national identity issues owned by any parties? Multiple data 
sources show a pattern of opposition to Taiwan independence being owned by the 
KMT and NP, and support for Taiwan independence as owned by the DPP. Firstly, 
Table 2.3 shows the main parties’ official ads issue top tens from my newspaper 
content analysis for the whole decade. Taiwan independence issues have come in all 
three parties’ top five. “Taiwan Independence: Negative” came third for the KMT, 
with an average issue mention of 7.6%, and second for the NP with 12.7%. In 
contrast, the DPP had three left wing issues in its top ten, with “Diluted Taiwan 
Independence” coming third with 8%, “Pure Taiwan Independence” came eighth 
with 4.3%, and “Taiwan Nationalism” came ninth with 3%. If these three categories 
are combined it becomes the second most stressed DPP issue of the decade behind
167
only “Political Corruption.” The results for the DPP are similar to Liu Tsung-wei’s 
study of candidates’ policy proposals, as he found “Taiwan Independence: Positive” 
was the third most stressed issue for the DPP, however, unlike my results identity 
categories did not feature in Liu’s top ten of the KMT or NP.476 I compare the 
average issue mentions for the whole decade detailed above with the frequency the 
issue appeared in parties’ annual official newspaper ad issue top tens. These are 
shown in Table 2.4. Again “Taiwan Independence: Positive” has been dominated by 
the DPP and “Taiwan Independence: Negative” shared by the KMT and NP.
“Taiwan Independence: Negative” was in the KMT’s top ten in seven elections, and 
in the NP’s top ten in four out of seven elections, coming first once, in 2000. The 
DPP’s position is also clear with “Diluted Taiwan Independence” coming in its top 
ten in seven out of nine elections, coming first in 1996.
The next question is has there been convergence or leapfrogging on national identity 
issues? Figures 5.1 and 5.2 plot die parties’ newspaper ad issue emphasis on the 
unification versus independence spectrum for total and official ads respectively. The 
figures for Taiwan independence are reached by subtracting the scores for “Taiwan 
Independence: Negative” from “Taiwan Independence: Positive.” Therefore a 
positive score represents support for Taiwan independence, while a negative score 
represents an anti Taiwan independence stance. The figures again offer strong 
support for issue ownership, with “Taiwan Independence: Positive” dominated by 
the DPP, and “Taiwan independence: Negative” shared by the NP and KMT. While 
there has been some overlap between the KMT and NP, neither has leapfrogged the 
DPP. The figures show the parties began highly polarized in 1991 with a 40 point 
gap in the DPP and KMT’s Taiwan independence scores, and a gap of over 20
476 Liu, “The Effects o f  Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan,” Table B.l.
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points was maintained until 1996. Since 1997 there has been a degree of 
convergence as the gap narrowed dramatically when the issue was de-emphasised. 
However, at the end of the decade, though the DPP and KMT are less polarized, the 
figures show they are still differentiated, with a gap of approximately eight 
points.477 Both figures show that the DPP’s most distinctive peaks for “Taiwan 
Independence: Positive” were in 1991 and 1996, while the KMT was most critical 
of Taiwan independence in 1991, 1994 and 1995. The NP swung sharply to the right 
with its peak of attacking independence in 2000. The DPP has not shown a 
consistent trend of moderation on Taiwan independence. Though there was a fall in 
Taiwan independence emphasis after 1991, emphasis actually rose from 1994-1996, 
and moderation seems to begin only in 1997. This finding is similar Liu Tsung-wei’s 
conclusion that DPP legislators’ Taiwan independence emphasis rose from its tenth 
most stressed issue in 1989, to fourth in 1992, reached its peak of second in 1995, 
and only began to decline in 1998 478 My results for the official KMT ads show a 
more consistent pattern over the decade of opposition to Taiwan independence. 
However, in a sign that the KMT was attempting to appeal to DPP voters, it had 
positive Taiwan independence scores in 1992 and 1996.479
5.3.3 Public Opinion and National Identity
In this section public opinion surveys are examined to see the degree to which the 
public has changed its views on national identity issues and if they see the parties as 
having changed. I am interested to see if there is a correlation between the direction 
of party change shown by my propaganda content analysis and public opinion.
477 The differences are 7.65 and 8.65 points for official and total ads respectively.
478 Liu, “The Transition o f  the Democratic Progressive Party-Where is the Evidence?” Table 7.
479 The KMT only has a positive Taiwan independence score for total ads in 1992, but had a positive 
score for both total and official ads in 1996.
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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show a number of significant fiends from public opinion surveys 
on the two main identity issues of unification versus independence and Taiwanese 
versus Chinese identification. On the TongDu question, there has been a shaip fall 
in support for unification, from 55% in 1989 to 15.1% in 2002, a considerable rise 
for the status quo, from 28% in 1990 to over 50% since 1998 and a rise for 
independence, from 4% in 1990 to 19.7% in 2002. Ming Juzheng is correct in his 
analysis of change, stating that, “The whole public opinion distribution has altered 
from skewed to the right to centred on the centre.”480 However, he also points out 
that, “Since moving here it has remained here rather than continuing to the left.”481 
As regards self-identification the direction of change has been similar, however, the 
degree of change has been even greater. First, there has been a huge drop in 
respondents viewing themselves as Chinese, from 52% in 1989 to only 7.9% in 
2002. Second, there has been a large rise in those identifying themselves as 
Taiwanese, from 16% in 1989 to 37.9% in 2002. Third, dual identification as both 
Taiwanese and Chinese has risen from 26% in 1989 to over 50% in 2002. Clearly 
most Taiwanese prefer to take the middle road on these contentious issues, with the 
majority preferring to maintain the status quo and have dual ethnic identity. 
However, a significant difference is that the decline in exclusive Chinese identity 
has been steeper than that of Chinese Unification, while the rise of Taiwanese 
identity has been much greater than that of Taiwanese independence. In addition, 
while Tongdu positions stabilized in 1996, Taiwanese self-identification has 
continued to grow. In short, these surveys show that Taiwan’s public have moved 
from the right to the centre of the TongDu spectrum and from the right of the
480 Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taibei, November 5, 2001.
48! Ibid.
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self-identification spectrum to the centre left.
Next I examine party image surveys to test whether voters see parties as distinct on 
these issues and if the parties are seen to have changed. Firstly, a series of ESC 
surveys asked respondents to place themselves and the main political parties on a 
TongDu spectrum, with 0 the fastest possible independence and 10 unification as 
soon as possible. Figure 5.5 shows that the position of the average voter moved 
from 5.9 in 1994 to the centre (5.0) in 1996 and has remained there since. The KMT 
is seen to have moved towards the centre, from 6 .8  in 1994 to 6.1 in 1996. But 
following the turnover of power it has reached its most rightwing position of 7 .2  
under Lian Zhan in 2001. The DPP is also seen to have followed a fluctuating 
course, moving from 3.0 in 1994 to reach its record left wing position of 2.0 in 1996 
when fronted by Peng Mingmin. It showed a degree of moderation in 2000 
following Chen Shuibian’s election, reaching 3.2, however the party is seen to have 
once again shifted to the left in its first year in office, at 2.6 in 2001. The NP is seen 
to have shifted to the right in 1998 and continued this move towards the pole in 
2001 when it reached 7.6.
Secondly, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show a series of NTU party image surveys. These 
found a stable proportion of mass respondents and elite see the DPP as a party that 
represents BSR and supports Taiwan independence. In contrast, there is more 
change in the KMT’s case with a rise in the respondents seeing it as a party that 
represents both BSR and WSR from 52.9% in 1993 to 63.5% in 1996 and a drastic 
fall in the proportion seeing it as supporting unification from 63.9% in 1993 to only 
33% in 1996. The DPP Survey Research Department carried out the final revealing
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surveys in the late 1990s; these asked why respondents dislike the major parties,482 
The results are shown in Table 4.3. While national identity responses did not feature 
in the replies regarding the KMT, the second most common reason to why 
respondents disliked the DPP was that it advocates Taiwan independence; while for 
the NP it was because it does not identify with Taiwan.483
The above surveys have shown that Taiwan’s voters not only associate national 
identity issues with the main parties, but also have a clear perception of the parties’ 
positions. Moreover the voters’ perception of party position and change corresponds 
closely to the developments shown in my advertising data. Though Taiwan’s parties 
are seen to have changed, the change is not too radical. Parties are still seen as 
distinct and there is still a wide gap between the average voter and all Taiwan’s 
parties.
5.3.4 Politicians’ View of Change
Next I look at the extent politicians themselves see their parties as having changed 
and if their perceptions of change fall in line with those in my advertising statistics, 
and public opinion.
Almost all DPP respondents agree that the party de-emphasised Taiwan 
independence in favour of other issues. For instance, according to legislator Chen 
Qimai, the DPP “changed from a fundamentalist (Taiwan independence) party to a 
centre left and pragmatic party.”484 There are different views on the degree the DPP 
has moderated, with the reformist side of the party arguing the party has gone
482 DPP Survey Research Department, “The l l Ul National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image,” 5.
483 Ibid.
4S4 Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.
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through a significant transition, and those from the New Tide Faction playing down 
change. However, the idea that the DPP has just made an adjustment rather than a 
complete abandonment of Taiwan independence cropped up repeatedly in many 
DPP interviews. For example, former DPP legislator Li Qingxiong argues,
“The DPP has not given up One China One Taiwan; it’s just repackaged it.
Originally it was one China one Taiwan and now it’s two Chinas.” 485 While DPP 
Tainan Mayor Xu Tiancai stated, “I don’t think it’s a change; it’s a modification not 
change. Nothing has changed, just something modified.” 486 Similarly, legislator Yan 
Jinfti remarked that it has been the DPP’s spin not substance that has
changed, noting that, “They (our Taiwan independence ideals) have not changed.
We have been looking for the right way to propagandise our ideals that can be more
487acceptable to the people.”
At the same time, some in the DPP feel moderation has not gone far enough. For 
example, DPP legislator Shen Fuxiong explained, “In a spectrum where 0 equals 
independence and 100 equals unification, at this point the DPP only embraces 0-32.
I think if the DPP continues to do this, then there is no chance of becoming the 
majority party in the foreseeable future. I think that the DPP should invest from 
10-45. And gradually, invisibly or skilfully the party should give up, surrender or 
give to someone else the 0-10 group. I think for any party, or politician, if you 
stretch your arm you cannot embrace from 0-50. That’s too ambitious, not practical 
and people don’t believe you. So I say we should leam from Tony Blair and give up 
the 0-10 sector and invest in the 11-45.” 488
4S5 Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.
486 Xu Tiancai, interview by author, Tainan, August 25, 2001.
487 Yan Jinfu, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
488 Shen Fuxiong, interview by author, Taibei, September 19, 2001.
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There is more disagreement within the KMT over the degree of change both during 
the Li Denghui and post Li eras. Those that split away to form the NP argue that the 
KMT had strayed from its Chinese nationalist roots to an unacceptable degree. Most 
politicians remaining in the KMT agree that Li Denghui gave the party a more 
localised image and shifted emphasis away from traditional party issues. According 
to KMT advertising expert Fu Hekang, “Before 1994 the KMT’s position was 
clearer, it was anti Taiwan independence, so they were always attacking people as 
being pro independence. But after 1994 they began to use the language of 
localisation and betraying Taiwan and became less direct in their censure of 
opponents, talking of loving Taiwan.”489 However, many also feel that the party had 
not actually forsaken positions set in the early 1990’s such as NUG and the One 
China principle. Legislator Mu Minzhu explains the change as limited to
presentation, “We’ve not changed on national identity or cross strait relations. We 
may have had different methods.” 490 It was much more common to hear KMT 
politicians explaining consistency in their national identity positions. For instance, 
according to former Gaoxiong Mayor Wu Dunyi, “The KMT’s position on national 
status has always been the most conservative and steady,” 491 A common argument 
was that while the KMT maintained its consistency it has been Li Denghui that has 
actually changed. For instance, according to KMT legislator Pan Weigang (MlflU), 
“I actually think the KMT’s direction is the same as in the Li Denghui era, that our 
government had taken. Now we base our policies on the NUG and the 1992 
consensus of One China different inteipretations. So there has not been a great
489 Fu Hekang interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001
490 Mu Minzhu interview by author, Taibei, October 2, 2001.
491 Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001.
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change. It was Li Denghui himself that had some change.”492
The public impression that the KMT has swung back to the right since 2000 is also 
reflected in KMT politicians’ views. Some see a return to the KMT’s core values, 
while others see an unwelcome rightward shift. Wei Yong (itUf) falls into the 
former category, stating, “I had a strong conviction that sooner or later the KMT 
would revert to its original path. I was completely convinced that the KMT couldn’t 
completely disown its party position. It was only a matter of time.” 493 Similarly 
Chen Xuesheng sees a return to orthodoxy but also hopes for more change, noting 
“We’ve returned to that (1992) position, and the next step requires internal 
discussions within the KMT.” 494 However, the rightward shift is unpopular with 
those of the old MKMT. For instance, a former KMT Propaganda Chief lamented,
“I do not really identify with the new position on the Tongdu spectrum.” 495
There is a consensus among those remaining in the NP that it has been consistently 
the most ideologically pure party on the right of Taiwanese politics. For instance, 
NP legislator Feng Huxiang (fllM'W) claims the NP has always “opposed Taiwan 
independence and promoted unification.” 495 Most NP politicians accept that there 
has been some change since the late 1990s. For instance, NP Chair Xie Qida noted, 
“For a while the NP seemed to have lost its ideals, it forgot them, but now we’re 
proclaiming our ideals loud and clear.” 497 Similarly, those that have left the party 
also see the party as having changed, but view this change in a more negative
492 Pan Weigang interview by author, Taibei, September 24, 2001.
493 Wei Yong, interview by author, Taibei, November 5, 2001.
494 Chen Xuesheng, interview by author, Taibei, September 11, 2001.
495 Former KMT Party Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
496 Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001,
497 Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.
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light.498 For instance, former NP magazine editor Yang Taishun (#§#JI[M) recalled 
debating the categorisation of the NP, “In the summer of 1995 I could definitely say 
that the NP was not a unification party. Of course now if you say the NP is a 
unification party, I cannot disagree.” 499
The above comments by politicians of all three parties show a number of significant 
trends. Firstly, the majority of politicians see their parties as having gone through a 
degree of position and emphasis change on national identity issues, however most 
agree the change has been limited. Moreover, the politicians’ view on the direction 
and degree of change closely follows the patterns shown in my quantitative 
advertising analysis and the perceptions of party change among the general public 
found in suivey data.
5.4 National Identity Sub-issues
Section 5.4 reviews development of the two main national identity sub-issues of 
Taiwan independence versus unification and Taiwanese identity versus Chinese 
identity in elections between 1991 and 2001. The main parties have all shown a 
degree of change in response to Taiwan’s moderate electorate as election orientated 
leadership has tried to move parties towards the centre; however, change has also 
been constrained by party ideology and the strength of ideologically orientated 
factions. I test whether issue ownership applies for individual campaigns and at the 
level of sub-issues, has this sub-issue ownership altered and have the parties 
changed their actual positions over the decade.
498 Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001; Yao Liming letter, December 14 
2002 .
499 Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001.
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5.4.1 Taiwan Independence Versus Unification
In this section I plot the parties movement on the TongDu spectrum shown in Table 
5.1. For all parties there has been a degree of change and reduced polarization, but 
this has been within ideologically constrained limits and issue ownership remained 
intact by the end of the decade. I show how the DPP has moved from the far left 
position of an ROT to its original centre left TongDu position calling for Taiwanese 
self-determination. However, even after coming to central office, the party appears 
unable to shift any further towards the centre. Similarly, though the KMT under Li 
Denghui moved from the right-wing NUG towards the TongDu centre, and even 
briefly to the centre left when he proposed the “Special State to State Relationship,” 
since 2000 it has reverted to its centre right stance of the early 1990s. The NP was 
founded at about the same right wing position as the KMT held in 1991. During the 
mid 1990s the party tiled to de-emphasise TongDu in favour of social issues, and 
briefly attempted to take a central position in 1998. However, it swung back to the 
centre right in the late 1990s, and after 2000 it reached a position even further to the 
right than the KMT.
1991 National Assembly Election
On the eve of Taiwan’s the first full democratic elections Taiwan’s parties were at 
their most polarized state on the most salient political issue of the day. The DPP’s 
calls for a ROT and new Taiwan constitution placed it on the far left of the TongDu 
spectrum. In response the KMT promoted the NUG, stressed stability and warned of 
the dangers Taiwan independence would bring, locating itself between the far and 
centre right. The wide gaps between the parties shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also 
reflect the gulf in TongDu positions in party propaganda. This polarization and clear 
issue ownership was also revealed in both parties’ top tens, where the radical “Pure
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Taiwan Independence” came first in the DPP’s official ads top ten, while the more 
moderate sub-issue of “Diluted Taiwan Independence” came only ninth.500 In 
contrast, for the KMT “Taiwan Independence: Negative,” came third in official 
ads.501
The DPP’s 1991 campaign was remarkable in that both the party centre and 
candidates of all factions stressed “Pure Taiwan Independence.” The DPP party 
headquarters issued a number of full-page article style ads on why it advocated a
502ROT. Moreover, for the first and last time, the DPP party centre was even 
prepared to make Taiwan independence demands on its TV ads. For instance, the on 
screen slogan “Let us establish a sovereign, independent Republic (of Taiwan) . ” 503 
The cross- factional emphasis on Taiwan independence is evident from the figure 
that 77.4% of the DPP candidates in my sample of newspaper ads in 1991 included 
references to “Pure Taiwan Independence.” A few examples of DPP ads give a 
flavour of the DPP’s far left campaign. Many DPP candidates gave themselves 
independence related titles. For example, Lin Zhuoshui (#$§7fc) was the “Engineer 
of the Taiwan Nation”(^ ^ |i |X |M ® ) . 504 Lin Zhuoshui’s ad promoted a charity 
video titled “ROT defeats the ROC” while a Wu
Mingyang ad called on voters to write to the ROT Post-box (o '
f i t®  with views on why Taiwan must, will and can become independent.506 
Another important aspect of the DPP’s “Pure Taiwan independence” appeal was its 
call for a new Taiwan constitution. Therefore the newspaper ads of almost all DPP
500 See Table 2.8.
501 See Table 2.7.
502 Ziyoushibao, December 11, 1991, 2.
503 Due to the Central Election Commission’s (CEC) stricter censorship, the DPP was forced to black 
out the characters “Taiwan” from this slogan.
504 Ziyoushibao, November 20, 1991, 5.
505 Ziyoushibao, Decemberl4, 1991, 1.
506 Ziyoushibao, December 11, 1991, 1.
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candidates earned the title, “Constitution Drafting National Assembly Candidate”
(fum a^ M A ).507
Only a minority of DPP candidates took a softer tone. The alternative method was to 
campaign on those sub-issues I term “Diluted Taiwan independence,” such as 
opposition to unification, or calls to rejoin the UN. Such appeals are much more 
acceptable to Taiwanese voters. For example, Wang Xuefeng’s (ZEUll#) slogan was 
“Are you willing to see the PRC’s flag flying over Taiwan?”
nmmmmn50*
In 1991 the KMT did attempt to promote its vision of long-term unification under 
the NUG. For instance, a KMT newspaper ad optimistically argued, “At the most 
favourable time the NUG would allow us to unify the mainland’s resources, labour
andmarket.”({licM^i^l^^MAAA^U6<7B#jl,fGAI^^Arli.^A,ff:f^,M
ill A ) 509 However, as former Premier Hao Bocun recalled, “That election our 
(KMT) main theme was opposition to Taiwan independence.” 510 This was achieved 
using the terror approach, warning how Taiwan independence would bring 
instability and war. A total of five KMT TV ads attacked the DPP’s proposals, with 
slogans such as, “Independence will just incite others,” reinforcing this message 
with images the Tiananmen massacre, and the PRC invading India and Vietnam.
The KMT’s “Eternal Opposition Party” TV ad offers other reasons against 
independence; the KMT’s Wang Zhixiong argued that the link between
Taiwan and the mainland is like an umbilical cord and so he opposes Taiwan
507 Ziyoushibao, November 20, 1991, 1.
508 Ziyoushibao, November 23, 1991, 4.
509 Ziyoushibao, November 25, 1991, 1.
510 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
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independence, while Taibei City Councillor Chen Xuesheng (PljC^Pi?) cited the 
cases of Northern Ireland and Quebec to show how independence movements have 
led to recessions. The KMT was also poles apart from the DPP on the question of 
the constitution and UN application. The KMT’s “Constitutional Revision” TV ad 
explained that the constitution only required minor revisions and that the 
DPP’s proposal for a fresh constitution would bring about recession, instability and 
even CCP invasion! Similarly, the KMT officially opposed applying to rejoin the 
UN, as Foreign Minister Qian Fu argued this would increase Taiwan’s
security problems by angering Beijing.511
1992 Legislative Yuan election
1992 saw a radical shift in the TongDu patterns as both leading parties were going 
through a major transition. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the parties were less polarized 
and that issue ownership was more contested than the previous year. The DPP 
repackaged Taiwan independence into a more diluted fonn and also de-emphasised 
the issue in favour of domestic questions. The term “Republic of Taiwan” vanished 
from its ads and “Pure Taiwan Independence” fell from the DPP’s official ad top ten, 
to be replaced by the more moderate “Diluted Taiwan Independence,” which came 
second. According to DPP party chair Xu Xinliang, “I succeeded in changing the 
campaign themes into a different tone, not the basic, not fundamentalism.”513 
However, the KMT’s total and official ad scores are markedly different, reflecting 
the intense factional divisions within the party on national identity. In total ads the 
KMT score was actually supportive of Taiwan independence, while the party centre 
was silent on the issue in official ads. Clearly, the KMT was making its first attempt
511 Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1, 1991, 35.
312 See Table 2.8.
513 Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
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to gain votes from the left of the Taiwanese political spectrum.
The DPP’s softer approach involved slogans such as “want sovereignty” ( H i ®  
and anti unification appeals. For instance, the TV ad “Because of us” stated one of 
the DPP’s three main goals for the future was “Rebuilding Sovereignty”
The anti unification message was seen in ad slogans such as, “One China is 
Taiwan’s nightmare” and Zhou Huiying’s (J13
I K )  ad slogan “The KMT’s One China is,” - ■ bel ow
which an ROC flag is shown being covered up by a PRC flag.515 Although 1992 is 
the start of the DPP’s transformation, the degree of moderation should not be 
exaggerated. Taiwan independence was still its second most stressed issue and a 
small minority of DPP candidates continued their Pure Taiwan independence stance, 
such as Chen Wanzhen’s (|^$g]|L) slogan “Terminate the ROC” ( ^ I p ^ '^ j ^ I i j ) . 516
The change in tone of KMT ads was apparent from the dropping of references to 
NUG and the way official KMT propaganda steered clear of the issue. However, 
KMT factions did not did not have this inhibition and spent more energy attacking 
inner party rivals’ TongDu positions than the DPP. The New KMT Alliance accused 
the KMT’s Wisdom Club (Jflipltlr) of Taiwan independence. For instance, the New 
KMT Alliance’s Li Qinghua ( ^ H ^ )  had the slogan “The Protector of the ROC, Li 
Qinghua” in which Li demanded punishment for those
in the party supporting the “One China, One Taiwan” (— position.517 In 
contrast, the Wisdom Club took a Taiwan First position close to the
514 China Times, December 7, 1992, 21.
515 Ziyoushibao, November 22, 1992, 1.
516 Ziyoushibao, December 7, 1992, 6.
517 Lianhebao, November 28, 1992, 1.
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DPP on the centre left. The Wisdom Club also tried to show itself as being between 
the two extremes of the DPP and New KMT alliance. For instance an ad stated that 
“The Wisdom Club’s Wu Zi: Taiwan First, the New (KMT) Alliance’s Zhao 
Shaokang: unification first and the New Tide (DPP) Lu Xiuyi:Taiwan 
independence” tJlt'flBfc, SriS £ji , ffSSMKj
1993 Municipal Executive Elections
Taiwan independence was not a central election issue in 1993; however, the year 
was critical in the KMT’s move towards the centre. Although the KMT continued to 
use the terror tactic of attacking the DPP for supporting Taiwan independence, the 
KMT spoke less about “one china,” or the NUG, and in their place began to trumpet 
the ROC on Taiwan’s diplomatic achievements. An example of the KMT’s shift to 
the left was its U Turn on the UN issue. Although the KMT had opposed UN 
application in 1991, by 1993 it showed the issue was just too popular to ignore and 
began to actively apply to re-enter. However, unlike the KMT’s success over NHI, 
the repeated failure to even get the Taiwan application on the UN agenda meant the 
KMT was unable to gain much credit from stealing the issue.
1994 Provincial Governor and City Mayor Elections
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show independence was again a central question in 1994 and the 
Taiwan independence gap between the two main parties had widened. Unlike in 
1992 the issue was no longer divisive for the KMT, thus its ads consistently attacked 
Taiwan independence, with “Taiwan Independence: Negative” coming third in its
518 Ziyoushibao, December 12, 1992, 1.
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official ads top ten.519 However, in a new trend the KMT also attacked the right by 
accusing the NP of promoting rapid unification The DPP party headquarters
attempted to de-emphasize Taiwan independence, with “Diluted Taiwan 
Independence” only coming eighth in its official ads top ten.520 In the NP’s first 
significant election, its candidate focused on making anti Taiwan independence 
attacks against both the KMT and DPP.
The DPP party centre and Provincial Governor candidate took anti unification 
TongDu positions similar to 1992. For example, a Chen Dingnan ad had the slogan 
“If Song Chuyu is elected the CCP will let off fire crackers” l;l:l
arguing that Song is the CCP’s first choice as he would pave the way for 
unification under the “One Country, Two Systems” (—‘HMrM) -521 Similarly an 
official DPP ad earned the slogan “Taiwan has only the one way street of refusing 
unification” (la M R  W W t M  )•522 However, Chen Dingnan’s talk of 
“changing the colour of the sky” gave him a more left wing image as the
term was widely associated with independence. In contrast, in the Taibei mayoral 
race Chen Shuibian tried to avoid the TongDu in favour of domestic issues, as Chen 
stated “declaring Taiwan independence or not is not the power of a mayor.” 523
The KMT gave great attention to this sub-issue to attack both the DPP and NP.
Many KMT ads used the terror message, warning if the DPP won, the ROC would 
be in mortal danger. For example, according to a KMT ad, “Now certain parties are 
using the election period to propagate the traitorous Taiwan independence views and
519 See Table 2.7.
520 See Table 2.8.
521 Lianheboo, November 28, 1994, 1.
522 Lianheboo, December 1, 1994, 8.
523 Zhongyangribao, December 13, 1994, 2.
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wantonly making the rebellious demand for a change in the colour of the sky. They 
plan to use democratic methods to steal ruling power. We must expose their plot and 
totally denounce it.”
FA
^ ia l 'f *!).524 Secondly, the KMT ads set a trend for the rest of the decade by 
attacking the NP and the DPP as extremists, with the KMT the moderate one in the 
middle. For example, a KMT ad’s slogan was “Refuse the Taiwan independence, 
violent and drug selling DPP, refuse the power seeking, profit seeking and rapid 
unification NP”
Lastly, since the NP was such a threat in Taibei, the KMT also give particular 
attention to attacking it directly as an ally of the CCP. For instance, one ad noted the 
close similarity between NP and CCP rhetoric, and concluded, “The NP shouts 
loudly protect the ROC, actually it is forcing Taiwan to be annexed by the CCP.”
While the DPP was tiying to play down the independence issue in Taibei, the NP’s 
Zhao Shaokang exploited it to attack both the right and left. The DPP’s Chen 
Fangming recalled that, “On the one hand he (Zhao) reduced the KMT as the 
illegitimate party, as he is legitimate, and on the other he can attack Taiwan 
independence because he is the genuine KMT. So this kind of strategy is a two way 
attack.” “ In the televised debate Zhao began by dramatically predicting that,
Lionhebao, November 21, 1994, 15.
525 Lionhebao, November 11, 1994, 32. Drug selling refers to a case in which a DPP official in 
Pingdong was convicted o f drug selling, and as DPP legislator Yan Jinfu commented, “the term 
Taiwan independence was vilified by them (KMT) as in Chinese “independence” (® ) has the same 
sound as “poison/drugs” ( ^ ) ,  so people were afraid o f Taiwan independence.” Yan Jinfu, interview 
by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
526 Lionhebao, December 2, 1994, 50.
527 Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
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“Taiwan is going to be destroyed! Destroyed in the Nazi/Fascist hands of the DPP,” 
and later he challenged Chen Shuibian, “I shout Tong live the ROC,’ do you dare to 
shout Tong live the ROC, long live the ROC, long live the ROC!” In fact in the 
debate Zhao even accused KMT Chairman Li Denghui of having a “Taiwan 
independence Timetable.”
1995 Legislative Yuan Election
In the light of the PRC military exercises, national identity issues remained salient 
in 1995. The KMT continued to attack the DPP’s independence policy and added 
the NP to its terror equation. In contrast the DPP took a softer approach, with the 
slogan of “Give Taiwan a Chance” —fill til tlr)- The NP attacked both the
DPP’s Taiwan independence and KMT’s “secret independence” (Bp®). From 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 it appears that while the issue is less visible in total ads as 
Legislative Yuan candidates were more concerned with social issues, all three 
parties’ official ads gave it heavy attention and the parties remained wide apart. 
Similarly ownership is clear in the parties’ official ads top ten, “Diluted Taiwan 
Independence” was second for the DPP,528 while “Taiwan Independence: Negative” 
was second for the KMT.529
The DPP was seen to be further moderating after chairman Shi Mingde’s 1995 
statement in the US that “If the DPP becomes the ruling party, we will not need to, 
nor will we, declare independence.. .because Taiwan has already been independent 
for half a century.” 530 This new interpretation meant a declaration of independence 
was no longer necessary, as the status quo was already equivalent to independence.
528 See Table 2.8.
529 See Table 2.7.
530 Lianhebao, September 15, 1995, 2.
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As in previous campaigns the DPP focus was again on attacking unification and 
trying to link the KMT’s policies to the PRC. For instance, a DPP ad asked, “Does 
the KMT stand on Taiwan’s side or that of the PRC?” (Ml
?H? )531 DPP TV ads tried to justify its anti unification 
stance by giving examples of negative consequences of unification, showing images 
of the Tiananmen incident and Hong Kong. The TV ad “The Jewel of the East” 
A A A fti)  quoted “Li Denghui repeatedly states that ‘Taiwan is part of China,’, 
step by step Li Denghui’s policy will Hong Kongize Taiwan. Taiwan is not willing 
to become a second Hong Kong.” While Mangliu TV ad (ffM II), asked why 
should Taiwan lose everything for the sake of unification and ended with the slogan 
“Does Taiwan want to become a province of the PRC?”
f t —# ? ).
The KMT maintained a similar balance between attacking the DPP for Taiwan 
independence and the NP for rapid unification. For instance, a number of KMT ads 
used the terror appeals, with the slogan “Giving the DPP a chance is giving Taiwan 
independence a chance, even more it is giving the CCP a chance to militarily attack 
Taiwan”
f t # ) . 532 In addition, the NP was added to the terror equation. For instance, the ad 
slogan “Supporting the NP=supporting the DPP=supporting Taiwan
independence.”(^ ^ ffM =A ^ S i i ^ = A ^ n ^ ) .533
The other way the KMT appealed to voters on the left was trumpeting its diplomatic 
achievements. Although President Li’s trip to Cornell University was condemned in
531 Ziyoushibao, November 30, 1995, 12.
532 China Times, November 30, 1995, 1.
533 China Times, November 30, 1995, 13.
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the PRC as promoting Taiwan independence, it was extremely popular in Taiwan. 
The KMT attempted to take advantage of this sentiment with numerous ads in 1995 
and 1996. In one 1995 TV ad Li’s diplomatic achievements were described as 
“Mission Impossible” while the 1996 “Exceptional Person TV
Ad” ( ^ ^ A ^ J S O  was disguised as a news report, showing clips of Li’s diplomatic 
successes, especially Cornell, and shaking hands with world leaders such as 
Thatcher and Gorbachev.
With the DPP and KMT attacking it as a rapid unification and WSR party, the NP 
was forced to refute these accusations by shifting its emphasis to other issues, and 
toning down anti independence rhetoric. For instance, a full-page election manifesto 
newspaper ad explained, “The NP advocates seeking both sides of the strait to 
accept a federal system” and “Although we
agree with unification, it is certainly not rapid unification.” f A f f i I t  A M —', 
This centrist approach paid dividends, as Figure 5.5 shows in 
the mid 1990s the NP was seen as being located at around the same position as the 
KMT on the centre right. However, it still needed to appeal to its core voters by 
attacking Taiwan independence. For instance, the NP ad slogan “There is no way 
that we will let Taiwan independence succeed” (A M  lll'a  written across a
picture of a pro independence demonstration.535 However, in its early years the NP 
was not an extreme unificationist party. According to the NP’s Yang Taishun, though 
“we talked of protecting the ROC. When we joined the NP, we hadn’t seen it as 
based on unification, as protecting the ROC and unification are two separate
534 Lianhebao, November 18, 1995, 32.
535 China Times, November 28, 1995, 5.
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matters.”536
1996 Presidential election
The PRC’s missile tests off the Taiwan coast were a warning to Taiwan’s voters not 
to elect unacceptable pro independence candidates. As a result, in 1996, as in 1991 
national identity and cross-straits issues submerged other matters. While DPP 
candidate Peng Mingmin’s Taiwan independence positions were moving the party to 
the far left, the KMT’s style was quite different from previous years as rather than 
strong anti independence terror appeals, it took the centre left approach of stressing 
Taiwan’s diplomatic achievements and attacking the KMT defectors Lin and Hao as 
PRC spokesmen. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the gap between the KMT and DPP had 
reached its widest point since 1991, with the DPP reaching its highest official 
Taiwan independence score of 37.9. The key difference with 1991 was that “Diluted 
Taiwan Independence” replaced “Pure Taiwan Independence” as its dominant 
national identity sub-issue, coming first in its official top tens, while “Pure Taiwan 
Independence” came third.537 The KMT’s leftward swing is clear, as this is the only 
year in which it reached positive Taiwan Independence scores in both its total and 
official ads. In fact, “Diluted Taiwan Independence” came third in the KMT official 
ad top ten,538 The NP showed more consistency, retaining its anti independence 
stance.
1996 was the last DPP Taiwan independence orientated campaign, however, the 
language use was more moderate than 1991. A significant absence was the term the
536 Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001.
537 See Table 2.8.
533 See Table 2.7.
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ROT, as Peng recalled, “I never mentioned the ROT.”539 However, his election 
slogan of “Peace, Dignity, Taiwan President” (f was seen as
being more radical than the DPP party centre’s 1995 slogan “Give Taiwan a 
chance.” Also some of the campaign terminology was reminiscent of 1991. Firstly, 
Peng told voters to not fear war, for instance the slogan “Use a human wall to tell 
the world we want peace, use a human wall to tell China we are not afraid of war”
Also as in
1991 Peng was willing to use the word independence openly. For example, the ad 
slogan “Want independence, oppose unification, love peace.”@ ^ t f  
ZP) 541 Peng’s campaign outlined the drawbacks of unification as the DPP did in 
1995, but also claimed independence could bring benefits. For example, a Peng ad 
stated that, “Unification is surrender, unification will just lead to another 228 
disaster. Only opposing unification can end the civil war between the KMT and CCP. 
By creating country with dignity, Taiwan will become an independent country and 
only then can we develop friendly relations with China” (M— f f ix  1^, JRIh
By 1996 the KMT was a very different party from ten years earlier, as Secretaiy 
General Xu Shuide noted, “By then we didn’t talk of unification.” 543 As in previous 
years the KMT made frequent appeals to its ROC legitimacy, however, the actual 
term used for the national title had begun to change, as the KMT moved towards 
“Diluted Taiwan Independence.” This is apparent from the similarity between the
Peng Mingmin, interview by author, Taibei, October 31, 2001.
540 Ziyoushibao, March 8, 1996, 6.
541 China Times, March 10, 1996, 8.
542 China lim es , March 10, 1996, 8.
543 Xu Shuide, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
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KMT line and Shi Mingde’s 1995 statement. As Li Denghui explained, “Though the 
official name was the ROC, later I began to use the term the ROC on Taiwan and 
later it became Taiwan ROC, to give it a more local flavour. There is no meaning in 
talking of Taiwan independence. There is no need. We have already established 
something new here.” 544 Another difference was that for the first time KMT’s 
attacks against the right actually exceeded those against the DPP, and were 
reminiscent of the KMT’s anti DPP terror ads in the early 1990s. For instance, a 
KMT ad added a word to each component of the Lin Hao election slogan,545 “New 
Leadership=Jiang Zemin, New Order=People’s Liberation Army, New 
Hope=Unified.”( f f f I * = t t i S K , f f ^ f f = » i 5 i : l f , « a = » * I - ) 546 It is also 
significant that the KMT was using the term unification, not rapid unification in a 
negative light. In addition, the KMT took a strong stand against the PRC’s military 
threats, making it sound like the DPP, telling voters not to be intimidated by PRC 
threats. An example was an ad, which urged, “Let us use our votes to show that the 
whole nation is united, let China understand that its threats are not enough to break 
our confidence.” §1 ® ^
IliHflfi '1^7 ill 'Lr) 547 It is also noteworthy that this is the first time
the KMT ads referred to the PRC or the mainland as “China,” echoing the DPP’s 
use. A comment by Yao Jiawen shows the degree that Li Denghui is seen to be 
different from the old KMT, “Li Denghui spoke so strongly that Taiwan is Taiwan, 
the PRC is the PRC. We are the Taiwan ROC or the ROC on Taiwan. So those 
people who support Taiwan independence began to support Li Denghui. ” 548
544 Li Denghui, interview by author, October 17, 2001.
^  The Lin Hao slogan was “New Leadership, New Order, New Hope.”
546 Lianhebao, March 12, 1996, 1.
547 China Tunes, March 10, 1996,1.
548 Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taibei, October 2, 2001.
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In the presidential campaign the missile tests gave the NP the opportunity to blame 
Li Denghui’s gradual independence (®§§) for bringing Taiwan to the brink of war. 
For instance, the NP ad slogan, “Don’t let our children become Taiwan 
independence's cannon fodder ■ The ad went on
to explain, “To balance Li independence and DPP rapid independence, you can only 
rely on the NP.”
Although its vote share was even lower in 1996 than in 1991 many DPP politicians 
do not view this as a DPP campaign. For example, Zhang Junhong stated that, 
“Instead of saying the DPP did badly that year, we could say the DPP did very well, 
because that year the real DPP party chairman was Li Denghui, the actual DPP 
chairman was elected president.” 550 It is possible that if Xu Xinliang had been the 
DPP’s candidate, it would have been made a more convincing case that the DPP had 
transformed from a radical Taiwan independence party into one committed to 
maintaining the status quo. Instead Peng’s campaign helped to reinforce the DPP’s 
radical Taiwan independence party image.
1997 and 1998 Executive elections
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that Taiwan independence was not the dominant issue in 
1997 or 1998. While the DPP avoided the issue, even the KMT’s emphasis was 
lower than previous equivalent elections.
In both years the KMT still played the save the ROC and DPP=Taiwan 
independence=war terror cards. For instance, in 1997 “Taiwan Independence:
549 Lianhebao, March 12, 1996, 9.
550 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
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Negative” reached fourth in the KMT’s official ads top ten.551 While a year later the 
KMT also used Taiwan independence to attack Chen Shuibian, though to a lesser 
extent than in 1994. An example of this was the KMT ad slogan, “The DPP only 
dares to shout about the TIC to Taiwan independence fanatics, when faced with the 
stability loving middle class it puts on the mask of happiness and hope.” o'
pffJlL) . 552 However, once again the KMT also made appeals to the left. Firstly, the 
party had cooperated with the DPP to abolish the Provincial Government following 
the 1996 NDC. This was something the KMT had previously passionately 
opposed.553 The new centre left tone was visible in a comment in a KMT TV ad by 
a superstore manager that “Taiwan has become an international country, ” 554 while a 
newspaper ad praised the KMT’s success in freezing the Provincial Government.555
By 1998 the NP had lost the momentum of its growth stage of 1994-1996. Some in 
the party felt that it needed to reach out to Taiwanese voters by taking a more 
centrist stance on the TongDu issue, and so in February 1998 a group of younger 
reformers led by Yao Liming Hfj) proposed the concept of “One China, Two 
Countries” (~— However, the concept was rejected by the parties’ founders,
such as Li Qinghua who denounced it as a form of Taiwan independence. The defeat 
of the “One China Two Countries” proposal was according to Yang Taishun, “a 
signal at that time that the NP was moving to the right.” 556
551 See Table 2.7.
552 China Times, November 20, 1998, 30.
553 In 1993 the KMT warned that among the dangers o f the DPP winning office was that it would 
“abolish the province.” Lianhebao, November 19, 1993, 1.
554 Note that in the ad he says “international country” in English.
555 China Tunes, December 4, 1998, 38.
556 Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001.
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In the approach to the 2000 presidential election the DPP attempted to convince 
voters of its moderation on the TongDu issue and its ability to handle cross strait 
relations. The first measure was the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future”
As the DPP’s Yan Jianfa (Ijtilllt) noted after the 1998 defeat “we 
began to re-examine the policy lines, one of these was about the “Resolution 
Regarding Taiwan’s Future.” 558 This document formally took the DPP back to its 
original centre left principal of Taiwanese self-determination and also officially 
recognised the ROC for tire first time. Basically this fonnalised Shi Mingde’s 1995 
statement. The second move was Chen Shuibian’s speeches on the New Central 
Way which referred to a vague middle way in the TongDu spectrum.
While the DPP was attempting to move towards the centre, Li Denghui tried to drag 
his party to the centre left. On a German radio interview Li claimed that there is no 
need to declare Taiwan independence as since Taiwan’s 1991 constitutional 
revisions cross strait relations can be defined as a “Special State to State 
Relationship.” These remarks were referred to by Li’s
enemies as the “Two State Theory” (Mlfflra), and viewed as tantamount to Taiwan 
independence. This was seen as the KMT’s most left wing position of the decade on 
the TongDu spectrum. However, Chen Shuibian and most leading KMT figures, 
including KMT presidential candidate Lian Zhan made statements supporting Li’s 
concept. Although independent presidential candidate Song Chuyu attacked it, he 
made a similar proposal of “Quasi State to State Relations.” 560 The event created 
heavy attacks from China and also displeasure in Washington, but was actually
557 See www.dpp.org.tw for details.
55S Yan Jianfa, interview by author, Taibei, October 4, 2001.
539 www.gio.gov.tw/info/99html/0709c.htm
560 www.taiDeitimes.com/ncws/2000/Ql/Q3/orint/00QQ018075
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popular among Taiwanese in surveys.561 The PRC demanded that Taiwan retract the 
“Two State Theory,” and finally in October 1999 Li calmed tensions when he stated 
that the “Special State to State Relationship” came under the NUG.
2000 Presidential Election
The 2000 presidential election was one of the most closely fought contests in 
Taiwan’s history. The KMT’s campaign tone was closer to 1991 than 1996, as it 
concentrated on attacking the left rather than the right. It did this by playing the 
terror card warning that DPP Taiwan independence would bring war, and unlike 
1995-1996 no mention was made of the KMT’s record of pragmatic diplomacy, 
seeming to view these adventures with embarrassment Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show 
KMT’s was considerably more anti Taiwan independence than the previous 
presidential contest. The trend was even more apparent in TV ads, with nine KMT 
TV ads attacking Taiwan Independence. While the KMT was moving to the right, 
the DPP moved towards the centre. The DPP’s Taiwan independence score was also 
much more moderate than four year earlier, with “Diluted Taiwan Independence” 
coming fifth in its official ad top ten.562 The most radical results were for the NP, 
which had a record Taiwan independence score of —74.99 in official ads, reflecting 
its sharp swing to the right.
In response to the KMT’s terror message the DPP tried to show its recent 
moderation on cross strait relations. The classic example was the DPP’s Guantian 
TV ads (TlT E H w h i c h  showed Chen’s relatives, childhood friends and neighbours. 
As the DPP’s Zhang Yishan recalled, “We knew the KMT would play the
561 See www.mac.gov.tw
562 See Table 2.8.
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war or terror card, so we used the 90 second Guantian ad.. .the ad showed that Chen 
Shuibian would protect his people and not take any risks.”563 In addition, the DPP 
mocked the KMT’s constant use of the terror ads, “At the critical moment before 
eveiy election (the KMT) frightens the Taiwanese people, wildly announcing that if 
Chen Shuibian is elected the CCP will attack, this is treating the Taiwanese like 
trying to fool a three year old child”
However, it was also imperative to demonstrate that a DPP government would stand 
up to China. Therefore a number of DPP ads reflected the party’s principle of 
self-determination. For instance, a newspaper ad showed a picture of the Hong 
Kong leader Tung Chee-hwa (3 r l |^ l)  and reminded voters that “We are electing a 
president, not appointing the head of a special administrative zone”
:M)*565 hi feet the text of this ad showed some inheritance from 
previous “Diluted Taiwan Independence” DPP campaigns, “The president is ours, 
the country is also ours, we have worked hard for so many years to be able to decide 
our own president. This is the value of democracy and is Taiwan’s baby. On March 
18, let us all stand up, for our own country, choose our own president!” (MM7I;[il
BW, HicfcSgBSiJ. 13BA A 1=1 □ BfgM:,
H J 3 + A H ,  J t g e W H i t ,
simiBfima.).566
The KMT’s Luo Xingwang described his party’s basic message in 2000 as
563 Zhang Yishan, interview by author, Taibei, October 25, 2001.
564 Ziyoushibao, March 13, 2000, 5.
565 Ziyoushibao, March 17, 2000, 16,
566 Ziyoushibao, March 17, 2000, 16.
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“concentrate on Lian Zhan representing stability and the DPP Taiwan independence
S f\1and war.” Lian Zhan dropped references to the state-to-state theory, instead he 
talked of the NUG, something the KMT had rarely mentioned for years. However 
the most consistent KMT theme of the 2000 campaign was the anti Taiwan 
independence terror card that the KMT last used heavily in 1994. The KMT TV ad 
that received the most attention and TV play was the “Off to War Ad” (ffltEM).
This showed a group of youngsters singing “I’m off to war, I’m off to war, because 
of Abian’s one sentence advocating Taiwan independence, I’m off to war” 
iEiirfiE 0 M 0  J i  — in The narrator explained that “because
of Abian’s one sentence “Long Live Taiwan independence” Taiwan will be engulfed 
in the fires of war and 85% of Taiwan’s 20-29 year olds will immediately go to the 
battlefield” 85%20-29
the ad ended with the youngsters waving goodbye and the slogan 
“Abian shouts Taiwan independence, war starts in the Taiwan Strait”
With the fading of the NP, Song became the KMT’s rival on the right. However, in 
sharp contrast to previous campaigns the KMT drastically reduced its accusations of 
rapid unification. The only exception was when the KMT still tried to portray itself 
as the moderate in between the two extremes. For example a KMT ad showed the 
three candidates’ faces, below Chen were the words “Rapid independence” (^ D ) ,  
under Lian was “no speeding” and under Song was “rapid unification” (H
®Q.568
567 Luo Xingwang, interview by author, Gaoxiong, March 29, 2000.
568 Ziyoushibao, March 16, 2000, 1.
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The NP’s rightward swing continued under their new chairman Li Qinghua with the 
nomination of Li Ao as the NP’s presidential candidate. The NP resembled
the DPP’s 1996 campaign in that it became exclusively centred on TongDu. The 
party placed a series of small slogan ads on opposing Taiwan independence, with 
slogans such as “Concentrate votes to oppose Taiwan independence and the Two 
State Theory” (Hi4  ^H  M Sfra ) 569 Also significant was that while
previous NP’s election manifestoes had talked of a Federal system this
term was dropped in 2000. Instead Li Ao’s manifesto promised to research the 
PRC’s “One Country Two Systems” model, despite the fact the NP was officially 
opposed to the model.570 As Li’s running mate Feng Huxiang explained, “At the 
early stage the NP advocated a Federal System Later we changed.” 571
March 2000-December 2001 Legislative Yuan Election
In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election the DPP has moved towards the 
centre, while KMT and NP have drifted towards the centre right and far right of the 
TongDu spectrum respectively. However, the degree of change for the two major 
parties should not be exaggerated.
The DPP has continued its moderation since 2000. According to Chen Qimai, “Your 
(British) Labour Party spent a long time transitioning before coming to power. We 
(DPP) are transitioning after coming to power.” 572 On being elected president, Chen 
Shuibian tried to reassure voters and the world in his inauguration speech on May 
20. He promised that during his presidency he would not declare independence,
569 China Times, March 17, 2000, 1.
570 Lu Ruizhong, interview by author, Taibei, April 10, 2000.
571 Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
572 Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.
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change the national title, put the state-to-state theory into the constitution, hold a 
referendum on TongDu or abolish the NUG or NUC. These became known as the 
“Five Nos.” 573 In addition, Chen has talked of a possible future One China, One 
China as an issue to discuss, One China under the ROC constitution, the idea of 
future “integration” between the two sides of the straits on a EU model, and the DPP 
party chair stated that unification is a possible option in the future. However, none 
of these ideas have been incorporated into DPP resolutions. The only major 
resolution since coming to power was in 2 0 0 1  when the party decided that the 
“Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” is higher in status than the TIC.574 
Moreover, in a sign that Chen must still please the New Tide and fundamentalists he 
has not gone too far in his friendly gestures to China. For instance, after discussions 
the TIC was not removed and Chen has rejected the KMT’s demand that he accept 
the so-called “92 Consensus” of “One China with different interpretations.” 
Moreover, in 2002 Chen invented a new “Diluted Taiwan Independence” term, 
when he talked of “one country on either side” (of the Taiwan Strait) and stated that 
this could be a key electoral issue in the forthcoming presidential contest.575 Figure
5.5 shows the limits of DPP moderation are clearly perceived by the public who 
actually view the DPP to having moved back towards the left since coming to 
power.
Since losing central power, the KMT has reverted back to its centre right TongDu 
positions of the early 1990s, rediscovering an enthusiasm for the “One China 
principle” and the NUG.576 One of the KMT’s most consistent themes in the post
573 See www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/05/2 1/36952
574 mvw.taiwanheadiiaes.gov.tw/20011024/20011024o 1 .html
575 www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/07/26/200306Q978
576 Moody, “Recovering the Mainland.”
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2000 period has been to blame the cross strait tensions and the recent economic 
recession on the DPP government’s failure to accept the “One China principle.”
Lian Zhan’s most important national identity policy proposal was his Confederacy 
Model which was discussed in the party in early 2001 and again in 2003.
In Taiwan it was viewed as moving the party to the right. As KMT legislator Chen 
Hongji explained, “I opposed it. It will make people think we’re more pro 
unification. If we followed the concept, we’d be attacked and lose localized 
votes.”577 In addition, it also has ceased its anti rapid reunification attacks on both 
the NP and PFP as it seeks to create the environment for Pan-Blue cooperation in 
the 2004 election.
The NP has also continued to move to the far right since 2000 under the leadership 
of Xie Qida. Firstly, the party conducted the first party-to-party negotiations with 
the CCP in 2001, something neither the KMT nor the PFP has yet been prepared to 
do. Xie described the situation of how “The biggest party in China and the smallest 
party in China, the CCP Taiwan office and the NP’s Mainland China office sat down 
together to negotiate. It was really fun!”578 Secondly, in 2001 the NP announced 
their new official policy of “One Country Three Systems.” This is a variation on the 
PRC’s “One Country Two Systems” model that has been applied to Hong Kong. In 
the 2001 election the controversial NP legislator Feng Huxiang went even further 
when his bus poster ads claimed, “One China Two Systems Saves Taiwan!
□ 'if). Indeed given that in 2001 the self designated “Vanguard of the 
Unification Movement,” Feng Huxiang received the most media attention in the NP, 
it is not surprising that the party is seen as increasingly extreme pro rapid
577 Chen Hongji, interview by author, Taibei, September 14, 2001.
578 Xie Qida, interview by author, Taibei, September 7, 2001.
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* n. . 579unification.
In short, my qualitative review of election propaganda on the TongDu sub-issue 
shows a very similar pattern to that of the quantitative content analysis and survey 
data. All show the main parties have moved towards the centre of the spectrum in an 
attempt to claim the middle ground. However, movement is constrained and thus the 
parties have not leapfrogged or converged on the centre. Although there have been 
some attempts at issue sub-issue stealing, by the end of the decade TongDu issue 
ownership remained intact.
5.4.2 Taiwanese Versus Chinese Identity
The sub-issue of Taiwanese versus Chinese identity has also been a regular feature 
of election campaigns and the direction of party change on this issue has been quite 
similar to the TongDu question. For details of this spectrum see Table 5.2.
The KMT began the decade mainly stressing ROC Chinese identity symbols, such 
as the ROC flag, and Chiang Ching-kuo. Therefore placing itself on the right of the 
identity spectrum on Table 5.2. However, since the fall of Hao Bocun in early 1993, 
the KMT flirted with the centre left of the identity spectrum to a greater degree than 
on the TongDu question. It tried to steal the DPP’s popular Taiwanese identity 
appeals. However, the KMT has tried to ensure it projects an inclusive Taiwan 
identity image that would not alienate its WSR supporters. However, the limits to 
change are apparent from the KMT’s swing back to the right as it returned to 
traditional ROC Chinese identity symbols after the fall of Li Denghui.
579 Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
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Although the DPP did not include either Taiwan or China in its party name, it has 
been an exclusively Taiwanese party that completely rejects Chinese identity. The 
DPP’s badge, a map of Taiwan is the ultimate symbol of Taiwanese identity. This 
has been a unifying force for the party, as DPP candidates have been far more likely 
to employ their party badge in ads than their KMT rivals.580 Other symbols of 
Taiwanese identity that have been regular features of the DPP’s campaigns include 
love for Taiwan, loyalty to Taiwan, use of the Minnan dialect, local Taiwanese 
culture, and the tragic appeal, which involves references to historical episodes such 
as the 228 Incident and White Terror The DPP has shown some signs
of change, in that it has tried to drop the tragic appeal since the mid 1990s and also 
it now tends to use Mandarin in the national media. However, even since coming to 
power the DPP has retained its Taiwan centred approach.
As in the case of TongDu, the DPP and KMT began democratic elections in 1991 at 
opposite ends of the Taiwanese versus Chinese identity spectrum on Table 5.2. With 
Hao Bocun in a strong position in both the party and government, the KMT 
candidates were more likely to the official party title of Chinese KMT than in 
subsequent elections. Moreover, KMT ads employed ROC nationalist symbols such 
as Chiang Kai-shek.581 In contrast, the DPP stressed Taiwanese nationalist symbols, 
such as the ROT flag. One DPP candidate even raised his involvement in an 
assassination attempt against Chiang Ching-kuo to appeal for anti Chinese votes.583
In 1992 while the DPP maintained its Taiwan identity appeals from the previous
580 In my content analysis scheme this finding applied to almost every election since 1991.
581 Ziyoushibao, November 25, 1991, 1.
582 Ziyoushibao, December 11, 1991, 5.
583 Ziyoushibao, December 10, 1991, 1.
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year, the issue was highly divisive within the KMT as the pro Hao NMKMT and pro 
Li MKMT used identity symbols in their inner party struggle. The DPP and KMT 
Wisdom Club hied to mobilize anti WSR feelings. In the words of Hao Bocun, “Li 
Denghui manipulated provincial consciousness.”584 Both the MKMT and DPP 
placed ads accusing WSR figures in the KMT of planning to betray Taiwan to China. 
There is little difference between DPP Zhou Huiying’s slogan of “The holy way to 
overthrow the Hao (Bocun) Zhao (Shaokang) Betray Taiwan Consortium” 
M X tn ^ lS f^ II! i£ )585 and the Wisdom Club’s “Down with the KMT’s Betray 
Taiwan Four Traitors” ( f jM il  IZS f^).586 Similarly, the DPP cast doubt on
Hao’s loyalty to Taiwan in its TV ad titled “Hao Bocun’s Sayings” 
which showed him saying, “I love Taiwan, I love the mainland even more” 
flf, The DPP extremists’ attacks were even stronger, such as Zhou
Huiying’s ad showing a cartoon of her with a knife preparing to kill a fat pig with 
Hao’s face.587 Another aspect of the DPP’s campaign was the Taiwanese tragic 
appeals. Three DPP TV ads told stories of how dissidents’ families been persecuted 
during the white terror period.
Like the TongDu case, the turning point in the KMT’s move to the centre left on the 
identity spectrum was Premier Hao Bocun’s resignation in 1993. From this point the 
KMT increasingly gained a more localised image and competed with the DPP over 
Taiwan identity. This change was apparent when in May 1994 Li Denghui gave an 
interview to the Japanese writer Shiba Ryotaro in which he claimed
584 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
585 Ziyoushibao, November 22, 1992, 1.
586 Ziyoushibao, November 29, 1992, 1.
587 Ziyoushibao, December 5, 1992, 5. Since the 1940s pigs had been a term of abuse against WSR.
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the KMT had been an “alien regime” This interview created a stir
both in China and in Taiwan. According to Hao Bocun, “He completely betrayed the 
KMT, he was taking the DPP line.”589 While in 1992 the DPP and the KMT’s 
Wisdom Club Faction had dominated appeals to Taiwan identity, in 1993 the KMT 
party centre joined the fray. There was little to distinguish both main parties’ love 
for Taiwan in their official slogans. The DPP’s was “Anti Money Politics, Clean 
Government, Love Taiwan, Want Social Welfare, Good Government into the Next 
Century” IJ,!jlEiSmi£ ),590 while the KMT’s was
‘Taiwan First, Love our Country” ('a W®7fc,S!PMlHiD-591
The KMT’s shift towards a more Taiwanese image meant that the newly formed 
“Chinese New Party” inherited the KMT’s ROC Chinese nationalist messages. This 
was apparent from the high proportion of Chinese nationalist references in its first 
election in 1993592 and the party’s choice of yellow for its flag, a colour that 
according to the NP’s Lu Ruizhong (Jllfrfiiffi) “is a symbol of China.”593
In the four elections from 1994 to 1998 both the DPP and KMT moved in a 
meandering fashion towards the centre left or inclusive Taiwanese identity position 
on the Table 5.2 spectrum. The DPP’s identity shift began in 1994 with Chen 
Shuibian’s Taibei mayoral campaign, which tried to avoid ethnic mobilization. In 
fact, his slogan of “Happiness, Hope, Chen Shuibian” M , |?Sf> zKfl) was a
rejection of the old tragic appeals such as 228. As Zhang Yishan recalled, “In the
588 For a full transcript o f  the interview see Lei (If Gj§) Do Main landers Still Have a Future? 75-92. 
I have used Stephane Corcuff’s translation o f this book title, Corcuff, Memories o f  the Future, 101.
589 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
590 Ziyoushibao, October 29, 1993, 7.
591 Point made by Zhu Xiaoci, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
592 See Table 2.9.
593 Lu Ruizhong, interview by author, Taibei, April 10, 2000.
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past the DPP had stressed the tragedy of the Taiwanese and
activities tended to have a tragic atmosphere In 1994 the tone was
completely different, with the slogan happiness and hope.”594
However, the DPP party centre and Provincial Governor candidate Chen Dingnan 
preferred a more traditional Taiwanese ethnic appeal. Facing a WSR candidate and 
an electorate that is over 90% BSR, it was believed that the message Taiwanese 
should vote for Taiwanese, not a WSR, would be effective. For instance, a Chen 
Dingnan ad outlined the importance of the election with its slogan “This is the first 
time Taiwanese have the chance to change history, choosing the Provincial 
Governor, of course Taiwanese must support Taiwanese.” (o '
S t i f f s ,  iltilnSI, Other ads attacked the hypocrisy
of KMT candidates, claiming, “They just love Taiwan for votes. At election time 
they do not dare say they are Chinese, but show how much they love Taiwan.” (j^
AW- ;)lP#i!iy,f ! i l  BjlAllllA,
I^SIAfif)-596 The DPP also opened up a new vein in the sub-issue by attacking the 
KMT and Song for oppressing Taiwanese culture while head of the Government 
Information Office. A Chen Dingnan ad asked, “Who suppressed Wen Xia and 
Hong Yifeng?” This attacked Song for imposing restrictions
on the broadcasting of Taiwanese music and so raining the careers of Taiwanese
597singers. Another DPP ad focusing on linguistic issues showed the picture of an 
infant crying with the slogan “Ten Dollar Fine for Speaking Taiwanese” (p jA ln ta  
A M ), bringing back memories of fines for speaking Taiwanese.598
594 Zhang Yishan, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
595 Ziyoushibao, November 26, 1994, 32.
596 Ziyoushibao, December 1, 1994, 13.
597 Lianhebao, November 27, 1994, 21.
59S China Times, November 30, 1994, 12.
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In 1994 the KMT also ran quite distinct campaigns, appealing to the centre left in 
the ProvincialGovernment race and centre right in Taibei. In the former campaign, it 
did not need to worry about defection of the WSR, as the NP lacked a serious 
candidate. Therefore Song’s ads did not stress ROC nationalist symbols; instead, 
they needed to show Song’s Taiwanese credentials. This was achieved by Li 
Denghui’s vigorous campaigning for Song, and also Song had learned enough 
Taiwanese to make parts of his speeches in this language. Song was also able to 
refute the DPP’s attacks on his anti Taiwanese attitude with the fact that the most 
popular Taiwanese entertainer Zhu Geliang actually actively campaigned
for Song. KMT ads also attacked the NP in a tone similar to the 1992 Wisdom Club, 
For instance, an ad called the NP claim to be able to delay a CCP military attack by 
making five phone calls “Five Phone calls sell out Taiwan”(_ri"MHfS3! nn) ■5"
In Taibei the KMT faced both strong DPP and NP candidates, but also a much larger 
WSR population. This meant that it was essential for the KMT to show its ROC 
nationalist credentials, thus in many of the Huang Dazhou ads the ROC flag 
featured prominently. For instance, a half page ad showed a picture of Huang 
Dazhou, the ROC and KMT flags, with the dramatic slogan “This is a battle for 
survival” (Mi l : — -6°° In addition, Huang’s ads specifically attacked 
Chen Shuibian’s patriotism; by showing a picture Chen’s controversial 1989 ad with 
the slogan “Would this kind a man raise the ROC flag?”
lillll W l? ) 601 The KMT was also trying to place itself as the moderate option at
599 Ziyoushibao, November 10, 1994, 13.
600 China Times, November 19, 1994, 41.
601 Lianhebao, November 22, 1994, 18. This 1989 Chen Shuibian ad earned the slogan, “Long Live 
Taiwan Independence.”
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the centre right. For instance, a KMT ad carried the slogan “We are all Taiwanese, 
even more we are Chinese” ®  fF ff llln W A , M il  A HI A ). This ad went on to 
attack the DPP for stirring up ethnic tensions and shouting “Chinese pigs go back”
(4>Bff‘SlfllS).602
In 1995 the DPP’s new propaganda chief, Chen Wenqian tried to give the DPP a 
more inclusive image. The DPP’s party centre projected a theme of reconciliation 
between parties and ethnic groups in the face of the CCP’s threats. This shift was 
symbolized in the famous coffee meeting between the NP and DPP leaders in 
1995603 and the DPP’s election ad slogan “Time of reconciliation, towards a united 
government” •f t ,  MHJAffMMAfl)- The text of a DPP ad explained
that “Only through democratic procedures, and learning mutual tolerance, can 
Taiwan’s 21 million create the consensus of being in the same boat, and together 
face the Chinese challenge” Mi®!--
HJA—IiMp, MHTO$® ).604
However, the message of reconciliation was probably not totally convincing as 
some DPP candidates such as Chen Sansi (i^HJS) did try to mobilize anti WSR 
sentiments in Gaoxiong County.605
In 1995’s legislative election the KMT came under pressure from the NP thus it had 
to appeal to its traditional supporters. Therefore it released a series of TV ads 
focusing on the life stories of WSR veterans and their contribution to Taiwan. In 
addition, for the last time, Li Denghui was portrayed as the inheritor of the KMT
Lianltebao, December 1, 1994, 1.
wvvw.nevv7.com.t\v/weeklv/old/490articleQ32.html603
604 Lianhebao, November 28, 1995, 12.
605 China Times, November 24, 1995, 1.
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mantle by showing him below pictures of Sun Yat-sen and the two Chiang 
presidents.606
In 1996’s presidential election the DPP turned its back on the party headquarters’ 
reconciliation slogans. For example, a Peng ad called on voters to “Wake Up 
Taiwanese. Save Taiwanese, Support Peng Mingmin.” W A,
Peng’s badge was a whale in the shape of Taiwan; this also 
symbolized Taiwan’s maritime culture as opposed to the conservative continental 
China. Similarly a Peng ad carried the slogan, “Protest against the brutal China, 
fight for the civilized Taiwan.” (AlASeSt!4* R f t lS , fS A T O * )n iff l2?)608 
Peng’s campaign also returned to the tragic appeals that Xu Xinliang and Shi 
Mingde had been trying to move the party away from. As the DPP’s Zhang Zhihong 
(51A A ) explained, “In 1995 the DPP hied to use the new style image, but this was 
reversed with the 1996 Peng Mingmin campaign.”609 For instance, a Peng ad 
argued that the blame for the 228 incident lies with the KMT, and Li Denghui is a 
continuation of such rule.610
By 1996 the KMT’s Taiwan identity tone reached its most centre left position to 
date. In TV ads the ROC and Taiwan were used interchangeably. Moreover, many 
Li Denghui ads used maps of Taiwan, for instance one TV ad showed many sticks 
coming together in the shape of Taiwan.611 Although the ROC flag again featured 
prominently, there were none of the old style appeals such as Sun Yat-sen or to
605 China Times, November 24, 1995, 1.
607 Ziyoushibao, March 9, 1996, 11.
608 Lianhebao, March 12, 1996, 1.
609 Zhang Zhihong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, March 30, 2000.
610 Ziyoushibao, March 1, 1996, 1.
611 China Times, March 12, 1996, 20.
207
veterans, these were surrendered to the NP. In one KMT ad the language used was 
also similar to the DPP, “Every one of our votes may influence whether in the future 
we will continue to be our own masters or again become the fat meat in the mouths 
of alien rulers”
A , l i ) A A  □  A M E B J )-612 Moreover the KMT’s new Taiwan
first views were shown in an ad quoting Li Denghui as saying “If we can not 
succeed in Taiwan, what can we say of cherishing the Mainland?” (A tb A A  A'Pf
M n ^ M iA ^ ? ) 613
In the mid 1990s the NP stance was close to the traditional KMT identity approach, 
with much ROC flag waving and use of ROC nationalist symbols. In addition, the 
NP spared no efforts attacking the symbol of Taiwanese identity, Li Denghui and his 
unorthodox national identity views. For instance, one ad questioned Li’s loyalty to 
the ROC by citing his comments that the KMT was an “alien regime”614 and in one 
1994 ad NP leader Wang Jianxuan accused Li of transforming the Chinese
KMT into the Taiwan KMT H!.KE).61S
Identity issues once again appeared in the 1998 elections for Taibei city mayor, as in 
1996 time the KMT took a more centre left position. The DPP once again gained a 
extremist far left identity image when the DPP’s Chen Shuibian’s team briefly 
accused die KMT’s Ma Yingjiu of being in a “Betray Taiwan Consortium” (Jpf’n lf l  
HH). However, the most significant identity issue of 1998 was Li Denghui’s 
promotion of the inclusive “New Taiwanese” (iPTtpPIA) concept. Back in 1992 the
612 China lim es , March 10, 1996, 1.
6,3 China Times, March 18, 1996, 1.
614 Lianhebao, November 24, 1994, 5.
615 Lianhebao, November 26, 1994, 8.
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“New Taiwanese” had been a DPP slogan for ethnic harmony, however, Li was able 
to successfully steal the sub-issue.616 At an election rally Li Denghui asked in 
Taiwanese, “Ma Yingjiu, where do you come from?” Ma replied, “I am a New 
Taiwanese, who grew up drinking Taiwan water and eating Taiwan rice, a ti*ue 
Taipeiman bom in Wanhua District.”617 Li Denghui defined New Taiwanese in the 
following terms, “No matter if you came 400 or 500 years ago, or 40 or 50 years 
ago from the mainland, or if an aboriginal, we are all Taiwanese, so long as we all 
work hard for Taiwan and the ROC, then we are New Taiwanese” (A  fmlil 0,5.15'
M a'M ,  s fe ^ f f ’n ^ A ) - 618 The inclusiveness of the
New Taiwanese concept was highly popular among all ethnic groups and according 
to advertising expert Zheng Zilong (H|5 §  |H) it had a considerable effect on the 
result (Ma’s victory).619
Identity was once again a key tool in the 2000 election. The KMT made its strongest 
use of ROC Chinese identity appeals since the early 1990s, but also mixed these 
with Taiwanese appeals. The DPP returned to inclusive Taiwanese identity appeals. 
Both the DPP and KMT were critical of Song’s patriotism, highlighting the fact that 
most of Song and Zhang’s families were US citizens, to imply that they would not 
be loyal to Taiwan. An example of this was a KMT TV ad that began with Song and 
Zhang standing to the ROC national flag and anthem, then the music changed to 
become the US anthem and pictures of Song’s five US houses were shown. 
However, the DPP also used this theme of patriotism to attack both Song and Lian.
616 China Times, December 17, 1992, 21.
617 Quoted from Corcuff, M emories o f  the Future, 187. Corcuff correctly points out that Ma was 
actually born in Henan and not Taipei. Note I have altered the romanisation to pinyin,
618 Lianhebao, December 3, 1998, 5.
619 Zheng Zilong, interview by author, Taibei, April 11, 2000.
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For instance, the ad showing Chen Shuibian’s son in military uniform stated, “Lian 
Zhan’s two children and son in law did not serve in the army, Song Chuyu and 
Zhang Zhaoxiong’s sons are all Americans and also don’t need to serve in the army. 
No president is willing to send their people into war, all of Abian’s family are in 
Taiwan, moreover next year his only son is going to serve in the army. So he’s the 
president that least hopes and is most unwilling for Taiwan to go to war.” (jllllTOM
M i l © 620 However, the ad that was seen as the most successful in 2000 reflected 
Chen Shuibian’s Taiwanese roots, that was the Guan Tian Ad that showed the small 
town where he had grown up, his neighbours, relatives and people that had known 
him as a child.
Although Lian Zhan was born in Xian, he is officially Taiwanese, and like Chen 
Shuibian calls Tainan his hometown. However, despite his ability to make speeches 
in Taiwanese, Lian struggles to portray a Taiwanese image in the same way as Li 
Denghui. To compensate the KMT placed a number of ads to raise Lian’s Taiwanese 
credentials. For instance, one KMT ad earned the slogan “Who loves Taiwan more 
than I?” (ic A iS I^ A  ERfAh!) ■ The ad explained how much Lian and his ancestors 
had contributed to Taiwan and how Lian loves Taiwan the most.621 As in previous 
campaigns the KMT tried to place itself in the middle compared to the two 
extremist parties. For instance, a KMT ad showed the three faces of the main 
candidates, below Chen’s were the words “sorrowful Taiwan” (AiaMO, below
620 China Times, March 6, 2000, 7.
621 Ziyoushibao, March 9, 2000, 11. Note this slogan itself uses a Taiwanese linguistic structure.
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Song was “depreciate Taiwan” ( ^ a 1 i f )  and under Lian was “love Taiwan” ( U p f  
« ) . 622
While since 1995 the KMT had largely disowned the old KMT symbols of the two 
Chiangs and Sun Yat-sen, in 2000 as election day approached the KMT campaign 
once more tried to employ these to attract traditional KMT supporters and stop them 
defecting to the Song camp. The most significant such ad was a letter from Madame 
Chiang imploring voters to support Lian.623 Lian also made heavy use of the ROC 
national flag and other ROC national symbols. For instance, the one of the KMT’s 
most widely broadcast TV ads showed a group of youngsters singing the national 
anthem as the national flag was raised and ended with the slogan “Let this beautiful 
flag welcome the blue sky of the next century.” The DPP’s Lin Zhuoshui noted the 
KMT “began to stress old KMT style symbols. An example of this tone was the (TV) 
ad singing the national anthem. Only old WSR thought it was right.”624
Since the KMT’s disastrous defeat in 2000 it has continued and even accelerated 
trends of identity emphasis present in that campaign. The KMT has increased its use 
of old ROC Chinese nationalist symbols, with TV ads and wall posters featuring 
Chiang Ching-kuo and Sun Yat-sen in the run up to the 2001 election. Li Denghui 
summed up the degree the KMT had changed stating, “To use a bad sounding 
description, it has once again the image of the alien regime.”625
The NP’s Chinese nationalist appeals have also become even stronger since 2000,
622 Ziyoushibao, February 26, 2000, 1.
623 China Tunes, March 15, 2000, 1.
624 Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taibei, September 24, 2001.
625 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
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especially since Xie Qida became party chair. An example of this was the NP’s 
election rally of 23 September 2001 at the Gaoxiong Culture Centre, which was 
almost all patriotic Chinese nationalist songs such as the Victoiy Song and
China must be strong —/E ^ ) .626 Condemning the symbol of Taiwanese
identity, Li Denghui, has been a favourite theme for all three parties of the right 
since 2000. As Li explained, “Before Lian Zhan didn’t dare to go to the veterans 
villages in election campaigns like last year (2000), but now he’s always going there 
shouting ‘I oppose Li Dengui, come back, come back!”627 However, the NP’s anti 
Li attacks have been the strongest, for instance Feng Huxiang called himself the 
“Anti Li (DH) vanguard” (Bl^ t^ ^ ) - 628 Feng’s accusations became so outrageous 
that there was a joke going around political circles in 2001 that, “If the glass of 
water on this table were to fall over, Feng Huxiang would blame Li Denghui.”529 
However, there has been a price for such attacks, according to Wu Chongli, “Later I 
think they (NP) were too strongly affected by Li Denghui, so when Li Denghui did 
anything they began to attack and criticize. The result of this was that everyone felt 
they were moving further and further to the right.”630
Since coming to power, the DPP has been quieter on Taiwanese identity appeals 
than in the past, and the exclusive Taiwanese message has been taken over by the 
TSU. An example of this was a proposal in 2002 that future Taiwan presidents must 
have been bom in Taiwan,631 as such a move would disqualify all of Chen 
Shuibian’s potential opponents Lian Zhan, Song Chuyu and Ma Yingjiu, all of
626 I was able to observe the NP chair planning this rally at her campaign headquarters.
627 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
628 Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
629 Huang Xiuduan, interview by author, Taibei, October 31, 2001.
630 Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.
631 www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20020307/2Q020307pl.html
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whom were bom on the mainland. Even the DPP was unable to support this far left 
proposal. However, in both the 2001 and 2002 elections the DPP has also had to 
return to many of its old ethnic mobilization appeals. For instance in 2002 DPP TV 
ads again referred to tragic appeals, such as “White Terror.” Similarly, by asking Li 
Denghui to speak for their candidates at election rallies, the DPP are employing one 
of the main symbols of Taiwanese identity. Another sign of consistency has been 
accusations that the Pan Blue camp is disloyal to Taiwan. The DPP made such 
accusations in 2001 following the release of a US research report that KMT 
delegations to China had been urging Beijing to attack and refuse to negotiate with 
the DPP administration.632
On the Taiwanese versus Chinese identity issue the parties have also become less 
polarised, moving towards more inclusive Taiwanese identity appeals. Although 
under Li Denghui, the KMT did successfully steal Taiwanese identity from the DPP 
in the mid 1990s, since Lian Zhan’s rise to power there has been a return to its 
centre right identity position. Similarly, change in the DPP has also been constrained, 
as though it has reduced use of the tragic Taiwanese appeals, it still has not appealed 
to those with dual identities and still remains essentially a Taiwan identity orientated 
party. Therefore by 2001 issue ownership remained intact with the DPP owning 
Taiwan identity and the Pan Blue parties dominating ROC Chinese identity.
5.5 Explanations for party change
In this section I evaluate the principle explanatory variables that have promoted 
both party change and inertia. I show how electoral factors have tended to have a 
convergent impact, as orientated party leaders have hied to drag their parties
632 \wYw.taipeitimes.com/chnews/2001/Q9/l/prmt/0000101023
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towards more moderate national identity positions. Their motivation has been to 
respond to election results and moderate public opinion, and the desire to expand 
their parties’ support base. All the parties have been affected by the threats from the 
PRC; however, this Chinese pressure has had its main impact via public opinion. 
Parties are constrained from being too extreme on either pole, as they will be 
rejected as either defeatist or reckless. Therefore CCP threats have been 
counterproductive, as they encourage convergence towards the centre left. However, 
I also show that the parties retain a state of moderate differentiation, as movement 
has been heavily constrained by party ideology and the strength of ideologically 
conseivative factions. At times in order to preserve ideological purity and party 
unity, Taiwan’s parties have been prepared to stick to electorally unpopular 
positions.
5.5.1 Inner-party Politics
The inner party struggle for power between election orientated and ideological 
factions and leaders has been a critical determinant of party policy on national 
identity, with the former pushing for popular centrist policies and latter demanding 
adherence to ideological orthodoxy. The comments of former DPP Chairman Yao 
Jiawen regarding his party are actually applicable to all three parties. “If the DPP is 
controlled by people from the election faction they’re interested in talking
about elections. If people like me (reform faction control it we’ll be more
concerned with political reform, political issues.” He laments that throughout the 
1990s the leaders have all been from election factions.633
With its tradition of authoritarian leadership it is not surprising that leadership
633 Yao Jiawen, interview by author, Taibei, October 2, 2001.
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change has had the greatest impact on the KMT’s policy direction. In 1991 the 
KMT’s right wing position was directly related to the fact conservative Premier Hao 
Bocun was at the height of his power. As Hao recalled, “I controlled the executive 
resources and the propaganda mechanism, it was very easy for the anti-Taiwan 
independence message to reach down to the grassroots.”634 However, Hao’s 
resignation in early 1993 altered the balance of power within the KMT. According 
to Hao “I had left the government in 1993. So that 1993 was turning point.”635 
Moreover, the departure of the New KMT Alliance politicians to form the NP 
further weakened resistance to KMT movement towards the centre. Therefore the 
triumph of the populist Li Denghui and the MKMT altered the party’s issue 
emphasis. As the political scientist Xu Yongming points out, “Li Denghui moved 
the KMT from its original position on the right to the centre.”636 In my interviews 
14 out of 22 KMT respondents saw Li Denghui’s leadership as the key factor in its 
move to the centre left on the national identity spectrum. For example, KMT 
legislator Ding Shouzhong felt the shift was “100% Li Denghui.”637
Similarly, there is a consensus among politicians that the ideologically more 
orthodox Lian Zhan and the NMKMT’s rise to power in 2000 has led to a return to 
many centre right positions from the early 1990s, such as the NUG. Li’s departure 
from the KMT seriously weakened the localised KMT and its ability to resist Lian’s 
new policy direction. In addition, as Lian attempted to stamp his own authority on 
the party, politicians that had fallen out with Li saw the chance of a return to power 
via Lian. Former KMT Propaganda Chief Huang Huizhen explained change in
634 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
635 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
636 Xu Yongming, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.
637 Ding Shouzhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 27, 2001,
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KMT in these temis, “A group of the KMT’s leadership level’s ideology is close to 
the NP type. They have taken control over explaining the KMT’s ideological power. 
They have some distance from localisation.”638 Similarly, Li Denghui explained the 
rightward shift saying, “These people have come back to make trouble. Lian Zhan 
has been caught by this group.”639 Of course the degree leadership change brought 
the convergence of the NP and KMT since 2000 is seen in a more positive light by 
those on the right. As NP Chair Xie Qida explained, “It was like in Snow White, 
where the father married a stepmother (Li), and the stepmother kicks out Snow 
White. We (NP) were like Snow White, We had been kicked out. But after the 
stepmother had been kicked out we could have a good relationship with the 
family.”640
A DPP chairman has far less power than the KMT’s; therefore change in the DPP 
has tended to be more consensual, resulting from factional compromises and open 
policy debates. Although DPP leaders cannot easily alter fundamental policies they 
can change the campaign emphasis and party image. Indeed 12 out of 29 DPP 
respondents cited leadership as a key factor in the party’s moderation. The leaders 
that are viewed as playing the greatest role in transforming the DPP are Xu Xinliang, 
Shi Mingde and Chen Shuibian. As Xu Xinliang explained, “Shi Mingde and I tried 
to transform the DPP’s image, since 1991 we fried to transform the party. The 
policies, the campaign issues and concerns.”641 A key figure in this transition was 
the Propaganda Chief under Xu and Shi, Chen Wenqian. Chen Fangming evaluated 
her role in these terms, “I think that she (Chen Wenqian) is the one that succeeded in
638 Huang Huizhen, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
639 Li Denghui, interview by author, October 17, 2001.
640 X ie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.
641 Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taibei, October 28, 2001.
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transforming the party image, but she is also the one that destroyed the party image 
as well. Because for a lot of fundamentalists, no matter how we change the strategy, 
we still keep in line with the independence principle, but when she took over she 
didn’t care about these policies and images. She just wanted to transform the DPP 
into a middle class party, this middle class party in the context of a normal 
democratic society would be fine, but we still needed the support of the 
fundamentalist and grassroots supporters, especially in southern Taiwan. Her 
propaganda is far away from this basic line.”642
In the late 1990s and since coming to power the DPP has continued its cautious 
moderation. As Chen Qimai noted, “Those Taiwan independence leaders are all 
presidential advisors, but they have no real influence...there are very few 
fundamentalists left in the Legislative Yuan or party headquarters, only one or two 
people like Lin Zhuoshui, that are stuck in a cold war way of thinking. The decision 
makers in the party headquarters and Legislative Yuan now are very pragmatic.”643
The NP’s election orientated leaders initially were able to broaden its appeal in the 
mid 1990s, but the shift in factional power in favour of extremist WSR party 
activists and Chinese nationalist leadership drove the party sharply to the right. The 
party’s exclusive identity message was critical in their failure to expand beyond 
Taibei. In the mid 1990s Zhu Gaozheng had encouraged the party switch to a more 
inclusive tone to expand into BSR areas, but according to Zhu this was resisted as 
“It’s a WSR party,” and among the WSR elite provincial prejudice “was very
642 Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
643 Chen Qimai, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 20, 2001.
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serious.”644 The shift to the right can be dated from the defeat of the “One China, 
Two Countries” proposal and the electoral setback of 1998. Since then the party has 
been led by a string of extremist Chinese nationalists, such as Xie Qida. As the NP’s 
support base declined in the late 1990s it became increasingly reliant on its 
extremist supporters. As Yang Taishun explained, “As its (NP) zealots are all those 
veterans, or WSR. I think that this group may only make up 40% or 50% of the NP 
voter structure, but for a political figure, no one dares to give up this group, even 
though they are not the majority. As a result everyone compromises with them.”645 
In addition, since 1998 many of the reform faction of the NP have left the party, for 
example Yao Liming, paving the way for Chinese nationalists to dominate the party, 
move to the right, and destroy the party electorally.
National identity issues have not only been used to fight elections, but also groups 
in all three parties have employed these identity issues as a tool to delegitimize their 
inner party opponents. Firstly, the national identity disputes within the KMT in 1992 
were fuelled by the open power struggle between the pro Li Denghui Wisdom Club 
and pro Hao New KMT Alliance. This was also the driving force in the KMT’s 
policy swing to abolish the Provincial Government in late 1996. In this case Li 
Denghui allied his faction of the KMT with the DPP to freeze the Provincial 
Government and thus destroy the power base of his inner party rival, the Provincial 
Governor, Song Chuyu. In the words of former Gaoxiong Mayor Wu Dunyi, “If the 
KMT was the Ming Dynasty, then Li Denghui would be Wu Sangui he’s
bringing in the DPP into the palace to defeat Hao Bocun, Li Huan and now
^  Zhu Gaozheng, interview by author, Gaoxiong, October 9, 2001.
645 Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001.
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Song Chuyu. To defeat all his enemies.”646 Similarly, politicians on the right of the 
NP used strong attacks against the “One China Two Countries” proposal to appeal to 
conservative party activists and gain power in the party. As Yao Liming recalled 
“The party founder Zhao Shaokang was looking for a chance to return to the NP, so 
he did this by using a mass meeting to attack “One China Two Countries.”647
In both the DPP and KMT factional balance has also ensured that the dominant 
leader or faction cannot move the party too far. In 1999 the NMKMT was able to 
block the “Special State to State Relationship” from becoming government or party 
policy. Moreover, since 2000 though Lian and the old NMKMT dominate the KMT, 
there are still factional checks on their power. This is apparent from the localised 
faction’s success in temporarily shelving Lian Zhan’s Confederacy System proposal 
in 2001. A Former KMT Propaganda Chief described inner party opposition to 
Lian’s unificationist style, “Many people oppose this, especially those horn the 
central and southern regions and the localised faction.”648
The factional balance within the DPP has meant that though the Taiwan 
independence policy position moderated, Chen could not go too far for fear of a 
factional backlash. It is often better to please party faithful and keep unity than risk 
wider electoral appeals with uncertain results and likely factional strife. Since the 
DPP has the highest degree of inner party democracy, any change to the party 
charter requires a majority vote. Therefore since most party’s members support 
Taiwan independence movement towards the centre is constrained. Xu Xinliang
646 Wu Dunyi, interview by author, Nantou, October 8, 2001. Wu Sangui was a Ming Dynasty 
general that betrayed China by allying with the Manchus and allowing them through the strategic 
Shan Haiguan Pass.
647 Yao Liming letter, December 14, 2002.
648 Interview with former KMT Propaganda Chief, October 19, 2001.
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recalled the difficulty of reforming the party in the early 1990s, “Of course you 
know the DPP’s hard core supporters are fundamentalists, so they didn’t think there 
was anything wrong with that campaign (1991), so it was difficult to bring this into 
party discussion among the party elite, but I intentionally did and stressed that 
we’ve got to learn a lesson from this and I was chairman and led the party. But you 
know that that effort, my efforts were always been challenged by the DPP’s rank 
and file, our hard core supporters, the fundamentalists you could say.”649 However, 
there appears to be a factional consensus that though the TIC should not be removed, 
it also must not be raised again at election time,
5.5.2 Electoral Competition
The first full national elections were an experiment in what voters were willing to 
accept on the national identity spectrum. With so many of Taiwan’s election 
campaigns centred on identity questions inter-party competition has been a major 
factor on party movement on national identity.
5.5.2a) Public Opinion
On the TongDu question the average voter has moved from the centre right to the 
centre and on identification as Taiwanese or Chinese from the centre right to centre 
left. Therefore if parties’ positions are guided purely by public opinion they should 
support maintaining the status quo and promote a dual national identity but with 
more stress on Taiwan. According to political scientist Ming Juzheng, as the public 
opinion moved to the centre, “then the parties have begun to change, they shifted 
accordingly.”650 Similarly, Li Denghui claimed the key factor pushing the
649 Xu Xinliang, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
650 Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taibei, November 5, 2001.
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localisation of the KMT was, “local public opinion.”651 The rise of Taiwanese 
identity has been far greater than support for Taiwan Independence, while die fall in 
support for unification and Chinese identity has been comparable. This partly 
explains why at election time parties try to show their love for Taiwan, but tend to 
avoid exclusive Chinese identity, “Pure Taiwan Independence” or unification. For 
instance, Li Denghui’s promotion of the “New Taiwanese” concept was so widely 
supported by the public and politicians from all parties. Although future Chinese 
unification is an integral part of Pan Blue parties’ ideology, the term was hardly ever 
used positively in their election propaganda.652 As the KMT’s Zhang Ronggong (jjjl 
explained, “We know that Taiwan’s public is afraid of unification.”653 Public 
opinion has even had an effect on the NP. According to sociologist Qu Haiyuan ( f l  
“If you look at their (NP) policies carefully, if it’s not Taiwan independence, 
then I don’t know what Taiwan independence is. There’s no great difference from 
the DPP. They are basically advocating Taiwan independence. In their hearts they 
support unification, but their policies are the same as Taiwan independence, as they 
know unification will not be accepted in Taiwan.”654
Throughout the 1990s the DPP has been veiy sensitive to the changes in issue 
salience when planning election strategy. Although the DPP has been more willing 
to raise independence than the KMT unification, other than 1991 and 1996 it has 
steered clear of “Pure Taiwan Independence.” The DPP’s Tian Xin noted the 
influence of Taiwan’s moderate public opinion on the party line, “If our people were 
like the Palestinians or Israelis, with agreement that whatever it takes we’ll protect
651 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
652 A rare exception was a NP ad demanding that Song Chuyu make clear his position on unification 
in August 2001. Point made by Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.
653 Zhang Ronggong, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
654 Qu Haiyuan, interview by author, Taibei, October 25, 2001.
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ourselves, you want to exterminate us, but there’s no way we will, we’ll fight, we’re 
ready for it. If Taiwan’s people were like this then the DPP’s position would not 
have changed. We’d have the peoples’ support. But if the people are satisfied with 
die present economic development and are unwilling to do anything to destroy the 
status quo, then we know we do not need to go that far yet. In this situation the DPP 
must take a more pragmatic position, a more flexible position.”655 Similarly, the 
party also dropped the old tragic appeals, because as Wang Fengquan pointed out 
“By the mid 1990s fewer people were interested in the 228 01* white terror 
appeals.”656
However, it must be stressed that the parties have not converged at the centre. ESC 
data in Figure 5.5 show diough the direction of party movement corresponded with 
public opinion in the 1990s, there is a wide gap between all parties and the average 
voter. Moreover, since 2000 it appears though the average voter has remained at the 
centre, all four parties are viewed as moving away from the centre. In addition, 
public opinion cannot account for why the Pan Blue parties stress Chinese identity 
symbols so much in die post 2000 period when Chinese identity has continued to 
slide. Also since those with dual identity outnumber those with Taiwanese identity, 
we would expect the DPP to make broader identity appeals, but on the contrary it 
has consistently refused to use the term “zhongguoren” (A SIA ), making “huaren” 
0j£A) the limit. Thus, diough public opinion encourages convergence, ideology 
maintains some degree of differentiation.
5.5.2b) Mobilising Versus Chasing
655 Tian Xin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
655 Wang Fengquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, April 14, 2000.
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The contrast in voter support base at the onset of democratic elections in Taiwan has 
had a major impact on policy positioning as parties face the dilemma of mobilising 
existing supporters and chasing new ones.
In the early 1990s the KMT still had a. huge following, gaining over 70% of the 
votes in 1991, limiting its scope to expand, it has been more of a struggle to keep its 
disparate supporters together against the appeal of competing parties on the left and 
right. The mixed ethnic support base of the KMT partly explains why it has 
preferred to take a middle position of attacking both Taiwan independence and rapid 
unification, and promoting both Taiwanese and Chinese identity. Since the majority 
of its supporters are BSR it made increasing Taiwan identity appeals from 1993. 
Although WSR are a minority of KMT supporters, they are seen as the party’s 
traditional iron voters, therefore in eveiy election the KMT did make 
disproportionate direct appeals to them. For instance, the former KMT legislator 
Wang Tianjing explained, “To people from Mainland China, it’s (opposing
Taiwan independence) veiy important and I’m a WSR, and so I want to get my 
people’s votes. Most of them, maybe 99% are against the Taiwan independence 
movement.”657
Appealing to new supporters has been most significant for the DPR In 1990 its party 
identification was still only 7.8%, but by 2002 it had risen to 33%.658 In my 
interviews 17 out of 29 DPP respondents saw the need to expand its voter base as a 
critical factor in the DPP’s change on national identity. The DPP’s Yang Qiuxing ($§ 
reflects these sentiments, “I think the most important factor was elections; to
657 Wang Tianjing, interview by author, Taibei, October 16, 2001.
658 See Figure 2.3.
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win elections you need to get the support of the majority. So the DPP has moved 
from a movement party to an election party.”659
One of the most common themes in interviews with DPP politicians was the sense 
that in order to expand its voter support base the party needed to tone down radical 
Taiwan independence and de-emphasise the issue in favour of domestic issues. This 
interpretation is seen in the comments of two DPP politicians. Firstly, Yan Jinfu 
noted that by 1991, “the DPP discovered that these issues (national identity) were 
appealing to the lower classes, workers. The middle class in Taiwan felt that Taiwan 
independence was not favourable to them. If we wanted to expand our vote base we 
could not solely rely on the lower classes, so we had to raise industrial policies and 
how to coexist peacefully with the CCP.. .The goal was to please the middle class, 
we had to compete with the KMT for middle class votes.”660 While Pingdong 
Mayor Su Jiaquan argued, “If the DPP had kept the same election methods, I think 
the DPP’s vote share would still be restricted to those voters close to the DPP. It 
couldn’t make a breakthrough in its vote share.”661
In addition, just as the British Labour party moved to remove its Clause 4 on 
Nationalisation, the DPP has diluted its Taiwan independence emphasis and 
moderated positions in its bid to convince voters of its government ability. In fact, 
the desire to show the DPP’s governing ability was cited by ten out of 29 DPP 
respondents as a key factor in their parties’ shift to the centre. By the early 1990s the 
DPP began talking about having a timetable for becoming the ruling party, and 
following its 1997’s election victory it was already running the county governments
659 Yang Qiuxing, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 24, 2001.
660 Yan Jinfu, interview by author, Taibei, September 28, 2001.
661 Su Jiaquan, interview by author, Pingdong, August 24, 2001.
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for the vast majority of Taiwan’s population. You Qing summed up the effect “As it 
gained more ME posts it became aware that in terms of policies and politics, people 
need more than just cross straits issues and diplomacy, people most stress their 
quality of life.”662
Since the early 1990s the DPP has expanded its support base in almost all 
sociological groups except WSR, therefore it is not surprising that it has not 
experimented with appeals to Chinese identity or even dual identity.
Like the DPP, the NP initially used nationalist appeals to attract core voters, but 
soon toned down national identity emphasis and used broader issue appeals to 
expand its voter base. According to Yang Taishun, “When the NP began it called for 
protecting the ROC, choosing an even more right wing position on the spectrum to 
attract core supporters. In my view this was just an instrumental move. In fact at the 
same time the NP had the slogan ‘the spokesman for the ordinary city resident’ (/J\ 
to say T’m a middle class party.”663 This dual approach enabled the 
NP to expand its vote share rapidly between 1994 and 1996. Although the NP has a 
mixed support base, its leadership and activists have been overwhelmingly WSR; 
therefore of the three parties the NP’s core support base has had the greatest impact 
on its policy direction. For instance, Yao Liming argues, “Most of the NP’s 
leadership were just active in Taibei with its many WSR, therefore the ‘right wing 
route’ had mass backing.”664 In addition, from 1998 the NP appeared to abandon 
chasing new voters and concentrate on its core voters. According to Yao Liming, 
“As the NP’s total vote share declined, the parties’ candidates were fighting for a
662 You Qing, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
663 Yang Taishun, interview by author, Taibei, November 1, 2001
664 Yao Liming letter, December14, 2002.
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limited number of votes, and thus they became more and more radical.”665
5.5.2c) Election Results
Although general elections are not fought on single issues, the KMT and NP 
propaganda often described elections as plebiscites between Taiwan independence 
and the ROC or between war and peace.666 According to Wang Fuchang, “If we 
look at the question of whether they (election results) have an impact on the next 
policy direction of political parties, then I think they do have an impact.”667 
However, the key determinant of the impact of the election result is its interpretation, 
as Wang explained “In fact the internal power struggle inside the DPP has made use 
of these interpretations, saying this election defeat means that this policy line has 
been rejected.”668
The victory in the 1991 National Assembly election convinced the KMT it had 
found a formula for winning elections.669 Therefore it has employed protect the 
ROC and the DPP=Taiwan independence=war terror message as relentlessly as the 
DPP stressed political corruption throughout the 1990s. Later these attacks were 
combined with anti rapid unification attacks against the NP, which also were seen as 
effective in marginalizing the NP.670 The DPP’s Zhang Junhong also notes the 
electoral benefits the anti independence attacks brought the KMT, “The KMT is not 
afraid of Taiwan independence; the KMT used Taiwan independence to divide the 
DPP, as not everyone in the DPP supports strong Taiwan independence. They used
666 See China Times, March 16, 2000, 10.
667 Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taibei, October 26, 2001.
668 Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taibei, October 26, 2001.
669 Hao Bocun and other KMT figures make this point.
670 Point made by former KMT Propaganda Chief, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
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Taiwan independence to intimidate the Taiwanese people, they used Taiwan 
independence to threaten WSR so they can unite with the KMT, and they used 
Taiwan independence to intimidate the CCP to deal with it. We can say that Taiwan 
independence was the KMT’s perfect tonic!”671
As in the case of political corruption, the KMT has altered its position in response to 
electoral defeat in 2000. The first lesson the KMT has leamt is the old terror 
message is no longer effective. For instance, former KMT Propaganda Chief Huang 
Huizhen described the 2000 “Off to War” TV ad, as being “counterproductive,”672 
by sending voters away from the KMT, to either Song or the DPP. Moreover the 
central message that once the DPP comes to power it will declare the ROT and 
incite the PRC to invade has not come true. As the KMT’s Zhu Xiaoci remarked, 
“We are not going to focus our attacks on Taiwan independence, as now they are the 
governing party they do not dare to shout Taiwan independence. Now the DPP shout 
ROC with us. If you attack them now as Taiwan independence it won’t be effective 
enough.”673 The second lesson was the KMT needed to move to the centre-right. In 
2000 though the KMT did attack the left more than the right, it hoped to still give 
the impression of being at the centre. However, it was felt that this contradictory 
tone lost the KMT votes on both sides; as a result the post 2000 KMT stopped trying 
to be a catchall party- As political scientist Xu Yongming explained, “The centre 
should be the best place to stay, but it can also be the most unstable place. In 2000 
Lian Zhan aimed to be at the centre, but it turned out that the centre was deserted 
(by voters) in 2000. So post 2000 Lian has moved to the centre right and this has
671 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
672 Huang Huizhen, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
673 Zhu Xiaoci, interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
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forced the NP even further to the right.”674
The impact of election results appears to be even greater on the DPP. While a 
number of elections are seen to have been lost on Taiwan independence, as Zhang 
Junhong points out “Where there were elections victories (for the DPP) it wasn’t 
because of Taiwan independence.”675 In fact ten out of 29 DPP respondents cited 
election setbacks as being critical in the party’s moderation, and the defeats blamed 
tended to be 1991, 1996 and to a lesser extent 1994 and 1998. Li Qingxiong reflects 
this view, “The changes in the DPP have come from internal decisions, in order to 
improve its election performance. It’s self adjustment, as it saw that radical Taiwan 
independence would not work.”676
After steadily increasing its vote share in previous elections the disastrous defeat in 
1991 was a turning point for the DPP. Most academics and DPP politicians would 
agree with political scientist Liu Yizhou’s (MUJU) point that “The DPP’s ROT 
stance did damage the party in 1991, as the KMT was able to link the TIC with 
chaos and war, and the national security question.”677 Even the DPP’s Chen 
Zhongxin recalled, “At the time I was in the DPP Headquarters, we later realised 
that the strategy was wrong... .from the 1991 election it was very clear that Taiwan 
independence was electoral poison Comparing the degree the DPP
dropped “Pure Taiwan Independence” in 1992 can show the effect that 1991 had on 
the party.
674 Xu Yongming, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001,
675 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001
676 Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.
677 Liu Yizhou, interview by author, Taibei, October 30, 2001.
678 Chen Zhongxin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
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The DPP’s response to the 1996 defeat was similar to 1991, with Taiwan 
independence again blamed. According to political scientist Wu Chongli the result 
“showed them that they (DPP) couldn’t go on like this, so they began to revise their 
line and they moved towards the centre on many issues.”679 Another lesson the DPP 
had learned from 1996 was that when the KMT used the Taiwan independence 
terror card the best response was not direct calls for Taiwan independence, but the 
softer approach that the DPP used in 2000.
In the aftermath of its 1998 defeat some in the DPP blamed the “Betray Taiwan 
Consortium” accusation, which according to Tian Xin “polarised the state of the 
election.”680 As a result in 2000 Zhang Junhong noted how Chen Shuibian “was too 
scared this time to use nationalism.” Zhang recalls that in 2000 he proposed to the 
Election Strategy Committee that “we have to fight the CCP, everyone was terrified, 
and no one was willing to use my method.”681 Also the idea of revising or removing 
the TIC was raised, as Taiwan independence was made a scapegoat for the poor 
performance in 1998. Although the TIC survived this debate intact, the DPP did 
move try to reach out to central voters and remove its radical Taiwan independence 
image in preparation for the 2000 presidential contest. A key move was the 1999 
“Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future,” which Li Qingxiong explained, “was to 
help Chen get elected president. Without that he could not have been elected.”682
The de-emphasis and repackaging of Taiwan independence are seen to have 
succeeded in subsequent elections, particularly in 1992, 1994 in Taibei and in 2000.
679 Wu Chongli, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.
680 Tian Xin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2001.
6S1 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
682 Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.
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In fact a number of politicians compare Chen Shuibian’s success in Taibei with the 
failure of the more fundamentalist approach of Chen Dingnan in 1994. The 
sociologist Qu Haiyuan explains how the DPP has learnt from defeats, “If they 
(DPP) took that stance they would not only be defeated in the presidential elections 
but also other elections too. So that is why Shi Mingde said Taiwan is already 
independent, it’s a very clever explanation, as you don’t need to change anything.
So as long as we do not unify, we’re independent.”683 Clearly it was felt that the 
“Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” had also convinced voters of the DPP’s 
moderation in 2000. The political scientist Sheng Xingyuan explained the DPP 
moved to the centre “as respondents are concentrated at the centre; otherwise the 
party (DPP) would have remained a missionaiy party. For example, they have 
upgraded the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” (in 2001), this was for 
electoral benefit.”684
The convergent effects of elections in Taiwan were even visible in the campaigns of 
former KMT Provincial Governor Song Chuyu. Clearly Song leamt from the failure 
of the NP that a broad inclusive identity was essential to gain widespread support 
beyond the WSR heartland of Taibei. Therefore, Song selected a BSR as his running 
mate, spoke Taiwanese, Hakka, Mandarin and Aboriginal in his election speeches 
and chose the inclusive title of “New Taiwanese Service Team”(§r^^A JM $£!II) 
for his campaign.
Electoral results have had less impact on the NP’s national identity stance. Unlike 
the DPP’s response to 1991, the series of disastrous election defeats since 1997 have
683 • • »Qu Haiyuan, interview by author, Taibei, October 25, 2001.
684 Sheng Xingyuan, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
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not led to a serious policy re-evaluation, instead the NP has continued to drift 
towards the far right pole. Although NP defectors and academics blamed the party’s 
decline on its shift to the right, its current leaders dispute this view. For instance, the 
party chairman Yu Muming stated, “The NP’s problems do not lie in these
demands.”685
5.5,2d) Electoral Environment
Parties do not exist in isolation but react to the competitive environment around 
them. Although the pan Blue and Pan Green parties have not leapfrogged or 
converged, they have also not been static. Parties have reacted to moves from other 
parties, as most parties prefer to be distinct from their competitors.
With Taiwan’s moderate electorate concentrated at the centre, it has been in 
Taiwan’s parties’ interests to paint themselves as the moderate centre and the others 
as extremist rapid unification, independence or minority parties. As KMT legislator 
Huang Defu explained, “Often in Taiwan’s elections at the final stage the
campaign centres on a single issue. The KMT fried to make this anti unification and 
anti independence. The goal is to put opponents into extreme categories. This has 
resulted in the decline of the NP and failure of the TIP.”686 There is also much to 
Zhan Junhong’s analysis of how the Taiwan independence issue has allowed the 
KMT to control the centre ground, “What the ruling party needed was a radical 
adversary. As without a radical adversary in the Li Denghui era, it (KMT) wouldn’t 
have been able to play such a prominent role, it’s moderate role. The DPP’s greatest 
help for Li Denghui was playing the role of a radical Taiwan independence party as
6S5 Yu Muming, interview by author, Taibei, October 5, 2001.
5S6 Huang Defu, interview by author, Taibei, September 12, 2001.
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this made the CCP view Li Denghui as the lesser of two evils.”687
As the party at the centre of national identity politics the KMT has been affected by 
moves from its competitors on the right and the left. Cheng Tun-jen and Hsu 
Yong-ming argue that the DPP New Tide’s success in passing the TIC was the root 
of the 1992-3 power struggle in the KMT. In Xu’s words, “By putting the issue on 
the agenda the KMT candidates were forced to take a stand (on the TongDu 
issue).”688 This was particularly the case in 1992 and they claimed that this 
ultimately led to the splitting off of the NP from the KMT.689 The subsequent 
arrival on the scene of the NP also prompted the KMT to differentiate itself using 
Taiwanese identity appeals. As the KMT’s Zhu Xiaoci explained, “The NP 
promoted rapid unification, so we opposed independence and rapid unification, so 
that the KMT remained at the centre of the spectrum.. .the (KMT’s) stress on 
nativisation was in response to the formation of the NP.”690
In addition, there is a pattern that when the KMT is under threat from the right, it 
swings back to a more right wing position. This was clear in the KMT’s reversion to 
old ROC symbols in the 2000 presidential campaign. As former chairman Li 
Denghui explained, “Song Chuyu also stood for election, Lian Zhan felt he was in 
danger of losing and perhaps he began to appeal to those of the old KMT. The first 
problem was when he invited Chen Lu an to help, the second was Madame Chiang’s 
letter. He used all kinds of methods to appeal to the WSR old ruling class.”691 
Similarly, since losing power the KMT has also stressed ROC nationalism in its
687 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
688 Xu Yongming, interview by author, Jiayi, November 12, 2001.
689 Cheng and Hsu, “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment.”
690 Zhu Xiaoci interview by author, Taibei, October 11, 2001.
691 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
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fight for dominance on the right of Taiwanese politics with the PFP. According to 
the KMT’s Lin Yuxiang “There is an overlap of KMT and PFP supporters
and the PFP is declining in support,” therefore, “this year the KMT has a new policy, 
we’ve arranged all the leading KMT figures to go to the martyrs shrine at Yuanshan 
(MlU) to pay respects. It’s a clear move to attract those voters between the KMT 
and PFP.”692
Recently, the KMT has also been put in a dilemma by the DPP’s move to the centre 
since becoming the ruling party. Wu Yushan explained that, “If the KMT stays at the 
centre, it will sound like it is echoing the present government’s positions. So the 
KMT moved to the right.”693 According to political scientist Ming Juzheng the 
KMT’s post 2000 shift to the right is a rational positioning as, “They have 
calculated that if they can rebuild the party they can be sure of exceeding 55%, 
maybe even 65%, that is a comfortable majority, so there is no need to move to the 
left. It’s best to stay at the centre right.”694
Both the DPP and NP reacted to moves by KMT. Firstly, the KMT’s localisation 
under Li Denghui and adoption of Taiwan identity appeals made it much harder for 
the DPP to mobilise on ethnic issues and its accusation that the KMT was a WSR 
regime became unconvincing. In the case of the NP, the KMT’s move towards the 
centre from 1993 left space for the NP on the right. However, the post 2000 KMT 
move to the right and rise of the PFP has meant there is no room at the centre right, 
pushing the NP further to the right. According to Wang Fuchang, “The market has 
forced them to do this (move to the right). There has to be someone playing the
692 Lin Yuxiang, interview by author, Taibei, October 4, 2001.
693 Wu Yushan, interview by author, Taibei, October 24, 2001.
694 Ming Juzheng, interview by author, Taibei, November 5, 2001.
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extreme right role. As the KMT are trying to regain NP seats, so the NP must 
strengthen its TongDu position.”695
5.5.3 External Influence
Taiwan’s political parties have been very sensitive to the international environment 
when making party policy, and the two main sources of external influence have 
been the US and the PRC. While the US affects parties directly, the PRC does so 
directly, and indirectly via elections. The words of Li Qingxiong reflect the degree 
the international environment has become unfavourable for Taiwan independence, 
“Before we thought Taiwan independence could be achieved, we thought the US 
and Japan would support Taiwan, the CCP would be defeated and Taiwan would be 
independent. That was ten years ago, now things have changed.”696
China’s impact on parties’ policies has increased since the 1996 missile crisis. 
Parties have been more concerned about whether policies will be acceptable to 
Beijing. According to the KMT’s Lin Yuxiang, “I see the KMT as responding to 
both internal and external factors in our China policy. But the biggest influence is 
China.”697 The PRC’s impact since 1996 can be seen by the way the DPP has 
moderated its Taiwan independence rhetoric. As Qu Haiyuan has noted, “Look how 
unfriendly the CCP was to Li Denghui. If you have a strong Taiwan independence 
position, he (Chen Shuibian) knows that he wouldn’t be able to rule. So he 
continuously shows how friendly he is to China and that he’s not calling for Taiwan 
independence, that he will not declare Taiwan independence in his term.”698
695 Wang Fuchang, interview by author, Taibei, October 26, 2001.
696 Li Qingxiong, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 14, 2001.
697 Lin Yuxiang, interview by author, Taibei, April 11, 2000.
698 Qu Haiyuan, interview by author, Taibei, October 25, 2001.
234
However, CCP impact is strongest indirectly via public opinion. The CCP threats 
against Taiwan discourage parties from taking extreme left 01* centre right positions, 
which will be rejected by voters as either reckless or defeatist Instead, parties are 
forced into centre left or “Diluted Taiwan independence” positions. As the DPP’s 
Tianxin explained, “If we do not consider foreign factors, China does not exist, we 
can imagine what would happen, the DPP might have stayed where it was in 1991, 
remain at the position of the TIC. If we imagine China completely gave up Taiwan, 
and had no views on Taiwan, I’m sure that very quickly Taiwan would draft a new 
constitution, have a new national title and the DPP’s advocacy would become 
accepted and mainstream.”699 PRC pressure has backfired repeatedly, as in 1996 
and 2000 the candidates on the PRC’s blacklist won the presidential election. When 
the PRC takes a tough line against Taiwan’s parties or politicians, parties must 
respond strongly against the PRC, otherwise they will face a voter backlash. Both in 
1996 and 2000 Taiwanese politicians were able to manipulate these PRC attacks to 
theft advantage by employing ethnic nationalism. Zhang Junhong has a perceptive 
way of interpreting how parties should employ national identity appeals, “If the 
CCP does not get involved, and you use Taiwan independence to attack it, people 
will be scared and you’ll be given up. But if the CCP attacks and you do not attack 
back, then you’ll lose, people will think that you have no guts, you are a coward. 
The key point is will the CCP get involved, if the CCP does not get involved, then 
you must not use nationalism. If the CCP attacks and you do not use nationalism, 
then you’ll be seen as a coward.”700
699 Tian Xin, interview by author, Taibei, October 23, 2000.
700 Zhang Junhong, interview by author, Taibei, September 26, 2001.
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5.5.4 Institutional Factors
Although the Legislative Yuan’s use of MMD election system gives room for 
extremist candidates, the predominance of SMD elections for both president and 
ME contests ensures that overall Taiwan’s election system tends to encourage 
moderate national identity positions. For instance, DPP Pingdong ME Su Jiaquan 
stated that, “I think that radical issues, either on the left or on the right, I mean 
ideological issues have fixed supporters, but they’re not suitable for ME 
campaigns.”701 We can also see the centrifugal efleet of SMD in NP Chairwoman 
Xie Qida’s complaints on Song Chuyu’s vague national identity position, “Some say 
Song Chuyu is fine, he can do this job, but Song Chuyu has a problem, Song Chuyu 
wants to be president, so to be president he can’t just rely on Pan Blue votes, he 
wants to get middle, even Taiwan independence votes. So on this point he can’t be 
clear on China policy, he dares not state his position, he takes the middle line 
always.”702
5.5.5 Ideology
National identity is central to the ideology of all three Taiwanese parties; therefore 
ideology has had a greater impact on the national identity platform change than the 
other two cases. While ideology has a unifying power among the party faithful, it 
also has been an electoral liability that reforming party chairs wish to remove or 
sweep under the carpet. In this case while inter party competition has encouraged 
convergence; ideology has established limits on convergence. The strength of party 
ideology has constrained parties from removing unpopular policy positions such as 
Chinese unification or “Pure Taiwan Independence” and discouraged movement
701 Su Jiaquan, interview by author, Pingdong, August 24, 2001.
702 Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.
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towards the centre.
The KMT and NP’s guiding ideology can be summarized, as a belief that the ROC 
is the sole legitimate government of China; its duty is to promote Chinese 
unification, nationalism, and culture. The document that is the KMT’s official 
guideline is the NUG.703 Until die early 1990s it was essential for anyone wanting 
to gain high positions in the central government, military or civil service to be a 
KMT party member. This meant many joined the party through career motivations 
and thus many Taiwanese KMT politicians had little conviction in KMT ideology. 
As Hao Bocun lamented, “Li Denghui could offer them official posts, so with the 
attraction of political office, people didn’t insist on their political ideals.”704 Hao 
named Lian Zhan as one such individual, noting that, “In the past Lian Zhan knew 
that Li Denghui was wrong, but he didn’t dare to say anything.”705 Li Denghui 
attempted to create a new counter ideology for the KMT that involved popular 
inclusive Taiwanese identity appeals and a form of “Diluted Taiwan Independence.” 
This line of thinking is evident in Li’s explanation of the reforms to abolish the 
Provincial Government, “The PRC talks of the ROC as being a province, but now 
we are no longer a province. Isn’t that right? This is very important. A change in the 
political system.”706
However, even when Li was at the height of his power the KMT’s movement to the 
centre left was constrained by the strength of party ideology. Moreover, Li’s 
alternative localisation ideology has not taken root in the party, as the old KMT
703 Though officially the NP called for the abolition o f  the NUG throughout the 1990s, in an 
interview the party’s most extreme candidate Feng Huxiang actually stated he approved o f the NUG.
704 Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
705 »Hao Bocun, interview by author, Taibei, November 7, 2001.
706 Li Denghui, interview by author, Taibei, October 17, 2001.
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ideology has made a comeback since Li resigned. As a result the party has returned 
to ideological orthodoxy by reverting to many positions from the early 1990s such 
as NUG. Therefore the power of ideology is evident from the KMT’s promotion of 
unification and Chinese identity, both of which survey data show are increasingly 
unpopular among Taiwanese voters.
Since the KMT’s localisation and diluting of ROC Chinese nationalism were key 
factors pushing the New KMT Alliance to form the NP, national identity has been 
the core ideological issue for the NP. The NP has shown itself even less flexible than 
the DPP on national identity matters. From my interviews with NP politicians 
reoccurring themes were Chinese nationalism and attacking Li Denghui. This is 
apparent from the comments of NP Chairwoman Xie Qida, “As soon as he (Li) had 
power he began to persecute the WSR and eradicate WSR power. We realized what 
he was doing. Taiwan is clearly China’s territory, he wanted to desinify Taiwan and 
remove Chinese thinking from Taiwan. We could see what he was doing, so we 
decided to form the NP. The NP is protecting the ROC, protecting Chinese 
culture.”707 Therefore although the NP did initially attempt to broaden its appeals, 
these ceased after 1998. Like the KMT, the NP has attached itself to two concepts 
declining in popularity, unification and Chinese identity, contributing to the party’s 
decline. When reformers did propose a more centrist position of the “One China, 
Two Countries” concept in 1998 it was immediately denounced as a form of Taiwan 
independence. The seriousness of the crime in making this proposal is apparent 
from Lu Ruizhong’s comment that those reformers “have apologised.”708
707 Xie Qida, interview by author, Gaoxiong, September 7, 2001.
708 Lu Ruizhong, interview by author, Taibei, April 10, 2001.
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In contrast the DPP’s guiding document is its party charter, in which key identity 
principles are democratisation, Taiwan independence, Taiwanese self-determination 
and promotion of Taiwanese identity and culture. Although “Pure Taiwan 
independence” is clearly unpopular among voters the DPP has repeatedly resisted 
calls to remove or revise the TIC. Lin Zhuoshui remarked that the main reason for 
the failures to revise the TIC was because “the majority of DPP members are 
Taiwan independence”709 hi fact even attempts to change the tone of campaign 
propaganda have faced resistance from the ideological left of the party. As former 
Propaganda Chief Chen Fangming explained, “Actually this (1992 de-emphasising 
independence) strategy invited so much criticism from the fundamentalists. They 
said you are diverting the party’s direction from our basic line of the democratic 
movement. They regarded independence as the most important goal we have to 
pursue. So if you want to change the slogan, that means you’re going to violate the 
original goal that we want to pursue.”710
The strength of belief in “Diluted Taiwan Independence” and Taiwanese identity 
among DPP politicians has ensured that national identity sub-issues have been 
central to most DPP national level election campaigns to date. In addition, these 
beliefs also deeply effect their treatment of other interrelated issues. For instance, 
the DPP desire to abolish the Provincial Government was not aimed at 
administrative efficiency but due to the fact it symbolised that Taiwan was a 
province of China, not an independent country.
Although the DPP has not removed the TIC, I argue that it would be more accurate
709 Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taibei, September 24, 2001.
710 Chen Fangming, interview by author, Taibei, November 2, 2001.
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to say the belief in Taiwanese self-determination rather than an ROT unifies the 
party. The DPP’s party charter has played a similar role to the NUG for the KMT. 
Both give a broad framework for handling national identity questions, but also give 
room for manoeuvre. According to Tang Jinquan, “In fact the DPP’s party charter is 
quite flexible. We have not declared Taiwan independence on coming to power and 
we’re maintaining the ROC, these are all aimed at stabilising cross strait relations. 
He (Chen Shuibian) can even say long live the Three Peoples’ Principles 
H ).”711 The fact that the ROT was never mentioned by the DPP in campaigns after 
1991 reflects Xu Xinliang’s view stated in 1997 that the TIC is just a “historical 
document.”712 The DPP has shown a degree of ideological flexibility by 
de-emphasising and repackaging Taiwan independence, and by passing and later 
upgrading the “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future,” the DPP has effectively 
removed the TIC.
5.6 Conclusion.
This chapter has shown how national identity has been one of the most salient 
electoral issues in Taiwan. There is a clear pattern of issue ownership with the DPP 
dominating “Taiwan Independence: Positive” and the KMT and NP sharing “Taiwan 
Independence: Negative.” There has been a degree of convergence, but this has been 
constrained and there has been no leapfrogging between Pan Blue and Pan Green 
parties. Although there have been instances of attempted issue stealing, on the 
whole issue ownership remained intact. There has also been a high degree of parity 
in the direction of party movement shown in my qualitative and quantitative 
advertising, elite and survey data.
711 Tang Jinquan, interview by author, Gaoxiong, August 25, 2001.
7,2 Ziyoushibao, December 8, 1997, 2.
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The leading parties began the 1990s at highly polarised positions with their 
alternative national identity solutions of TIC andNUG. However, both have 
moderated their positions in response to public opinion and election results. The 
DPP has de-emphasized and repackaged its Taiwan independence appeals, returning 
to its original position of Taiwanese self-determination. It has employed Taiwanese 
ethnic appeals, though it has gradually dropped the tragic Taiwanese appeals. After 
Li Denghui consolidated his power, the KMT moved towards the centre by 
increasingly appealing to Taiwanese identity and briefly even promoting a diluted 
form of Taiwan independence. However, the strength of party ideology and 
ideologically orientated factions has ensured that movement has been constrained 
and the parties remain differentiated. Since 2000 the NP and KMT have both moved 
to the right, returning to positions occupied by the KMT in the early 1990s, while 
the DPP has been unable to move too close to the centre since coming to office.
This case study has shown that democracy is working in Taiwan. Through electoral 
debate consensus has been reached on many formally controversial national identity 
issues. The speed that norms have changed on these issues has been astonishing. 
Much of what were formally the seditious DPP demands have become mainstream 
and accepted by all political parties. For example, the complete re-election of 
parliaments, direct presidential elections, abolition of the provincial government and 
national assembly, Taiwanised education, application to join UN, pragmatic 
diplomacy, and constitutional revisions. The comments of the TIC’s author Lin 
Zhuoshui reflect the degree norms have changed, “In my view the Taiwan 
independence movement is basically like a hire purchase, I mean that you have 
already had the first, second and third payments. The remaining payment is
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international recognition, and even now we are not completely unrecognised, now is 
an incomplete recognition... The point is that once most of the (TIC) goals have 
been achieved, why continue focusing on the question? I cannot just make a speech 
shouting ‘Taiwan independence!’ ‘Taiwan independence!’ all the way through for 
ten minutes, then come off the stage.”713
713Lin Zhuoshui, interview by author, Taibei, September 24, 2001.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
In this final chapter I return to the core questions, raised in the introduction chapter. 
Namely, how and why Taiwan’s parties and party competition have changed, and 
what are the implications of these developments for the state of Taiwan’s 
democracy?
In 1991 the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy was still in doubt. In the first 
multi-party election competition appeared to be divergent, with the parties taking 
diametrically opposed positions on a single core electoral issue. Moreover the 
overwhelming KMT victoiy and intense factional divisions within the main 
opposition party implied that Taiwan could follow the Japanese LDP model of a one 
party dominant system.
However, this study has shown it is possible for a new democracy to rapidly 
institutionalise a pattern of inter-party competition similar to its mature counterparts 
in Western Europe. Generally the competition in Taiwanese elections has been 
convergent, as Taiwan’s parties have moved away from extremism towards more 
moderate centrist positions and tacit agreement on many issues. Taiwan’s election 
orientated politicians have been highly responsive to perceived signals from opinion 
polls and election results, by moderating and adjusting their issue emphasis. 
However, unlike other new democracies, the parties have not merged into 
indistinguishable personality centred catchall parties. Instead party ideology and 
inner party factional balance have constrained party movement and maintained 
moderate party differentiation. Moreover, Taiwan has not followed the one party 
dominant model. Instead, it has moved towards a two party and at times a
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multi-party system, and peaceful transfers of ruling party have occurred at both the 
local and national government levels.
After showing the parties are differentiated in broad trends of issue emphasis for the 
whole decade, I looked at party change in three issue case studies. The direction of 
change has been determined by the interaction between centrifugal electoral 
pressures and the constraining role of party ideology and conservative party factions. 
In all three cases, the opposition parties placed new issues on the political agenda in 
a bid to expand support bases and win elections. Despite initial KMT dismissal of 
these opposition policy proposals, it has often hied to steal these popular issues. 
However, with the public and parties viewing issues as owned, in most instances 
issue stealing has failed and issue ownership has remained intact. Leapfrogging has 
been rare, as party movement has been constrained. The constraining role of 
ideology has been strongest in the case of national identity. The pressures from the 
PRC have also limited parties’ room for manoeuvre on national identity, as voters 
will reject extreme positions both on the left and right of this spectrum. While on 
the political corruption issue inner party factional balance has prevented the KMT 
from removing its “black gold” reputation. The parties have had more scope for 
movement with social issues, thus the only case of successful KMT issue stealing 
occurred with NHI, in the social welfare chapter. However, this was an exceptional 
case, only possible because NHI was a marginal opposition issue. In contrast, the 
pensions episode of 1997 showed the difficulty of stealing an issue once the public 
views it as owned. In short, electoral forces have promoted convergence of parties, 
while party ideology and the strength of conservative factions have maintained party 
differentiation.
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Recently, many observers in Taiwan have become pessimistic over the state of 
Taiwanese democracy, particularly in the light of the inter-party fighting and 
economic recession since the DPP came to power. For instance, the NP’s Feng 
Huxiang claims things are so bad that, “many people think that early unification is 
better than continuing to be tortured by the DPP. Taiwan’s economy and future seem 
more and more hopeless, so people think it’s better to negotiate unification.”714 In 
contrast, I argue this study shows numerous positive signs for the state of Taiwan’s 
democracy.
I have shown that in Taiwanese elections issues do matter, as parties have repeatedly 
stressed issues. By consistently offering distinct patterns of issue emphasis, parties 
have thus given voters a real policy choice at election time. The study has revealed 
the sophisticated and moderate nature of Taiwanese public opinion. Taiwan’s voters 
are able to accurately locate parties on a number of issue spectmms, a key 
prerequisite for policy voting. Moreover, time and again, voters have rejected 
parties whenever they have taken radical stances.
The Taiwan case shows having genuine opposition parties can really make a 
difference, as the consequent democratic electoral debate has brought tangible 
benefits to Taiwanese society. Firstly, though national identity remains the main 
dividing line between parties, the rise of new electoral issues, such as political 
corruption and social welfare created new cross cutting cleavages, a phenomenon 
political scientists view as conductive to democratic stability. Secondly, we can see 
the conflict resolution benefits of democracy, as elections have allowed important 
and contested issues to be debated in a democratic manner. By the end of the decade
7H Feng Huxiang, interview by author, Taibei, October 19, 2001.
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there have been huge changes in the accepted norms on all three issues in this study 
and broad consensuses on solutions to these questions have been reached. Products 
of these new mainstream values include a much expanded and more inclusive 
welfare system, broader norms on what constitutes political corruption and stricter 
anti corruption legislation. Thirdly, on the most controversial issue in Taiwanese 
politics, the mainstream parties have reached a tacit understanding on many aspects 
of the national identity question. In short, I argue that democracy is working in 
Taiwan.
Methodologically this study is significant in a number of ways. Firstly, this study 
has employed a variety of datasets to analyse party change in Taiwan. However, the 
general patterns of party movement and issue ownership have been consistent 
regardless of the data source. Secondly, this is the first attempt to systematically plot 
party change in Taiwan using election propaganda as the major source material. The 
results show the potential for using newspaper election ads as a source for plotting 
party positions, particularly where manifestoes are not regularly issued. Thirdly, the 
applicability of the revised MRG coding scheme shows this system can be used in a 
variety of electoral systems, not just in Western Europe. The study has also 
suggested some prospective directions for future research. As Taiwan’s parties have 
begun to routinely issue manifestoes since 1998, it would useful to compare party 
issue emphasis in manifestoes with election advertisements. Moreover, as the use of 
newspaper advertising declines, other new propaganda sources should receive more 
attention, particularly party and candidate websites, and Internet and TV 
advertising.
Finally, despite the optimistic appraisal this dissertation has given of the state of
246
Taiwan’s inter-party competition, I end with a note of caution. Although I have 
shown that Taiwan’s parties do show a pattern of reduced polarization but 
maintained policy differentiation in the first decade of multi-party elections, it 
cannot be taken for granted that this will continue indefinitely. The possibility of the 
parties again becoming polarised on national identity camiot be totally ruled out. In 
addition, the most salient cross cutting issues of the 1990s can no longer arouse the 
same enthusiasm and controversy of past campaigns, and may gradually fade in 
salience. The maintenance of party differentiation will depend on whether Taiwan’s 
politicians continue to run issue orientated campaigns and if they can find the new 
issues to mobilise voters and win elections.
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111 A Pure Taiwan 415: Marxist Analysis
Independence 416: Anti Growth Economy
111B Diluted Taiwan 420: Economic Growth and
Independence Prosperity
112 Taiwan Independence
Negative
112A Taiwan
Independence Negative
112B Chinese Unification
Domain 2: Freedom and Domain 5: Welfare and Domain 9: Candidate and
Democracv Oualitv of Life Partv
201: Freedom and Human 501: Environmental 901: Candidate: Positive
Rights Protection 902: Candidate: Negative
202: Democracy 502: Culture 903: Party: Positive
503: Social Justice 904: Party: Negative
203: Constitutionalism: 504: Welfare State 904V: Party Negative:
Positive Expansion Violence
204: Constitutionalism: 505: Welfare State
Negative Limitation
506: Education Expansion 
507: Education Limitation
Domain 3: Political Svstem Domain 6: Fabric of Societv
301: Decentralization: 
Positive
302: Decentralization: 
Negative 
303: Govt and 
Administrative Efficiency
304: Political Corruption
305: Political Authority
305: Political Stability
305B: Party Government 
Competence
305C: Other Parties’ lack of 
Government Competence
601: Chinese Nationalism 
601T: Taiwan Nationalism
602: National Way of Life: 
Negative
603: Traditional Morality: 
Positive
604: Traditional Morality: 
Negative
605: Law and Order 
606: Social Harmony 
607: Multiculturalism: 
Positive
608: Multiculturalism: 
Negative
Note 1: The categories featuring in my case study chapters are in bold print.
Note 2: This revised MRG coding scheme is similar to the one used by Liu Tsungwei, for the 
differences see Chapter 1, notes 39-40.
Sources: Ian Budge, Hans Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara & Eric 
Tanenbaum, Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 
1945-1998, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) Appendix 3; Liu Tsung-wei, “The 
Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan 1989-1998: with particular 
reference to Single Non Transferable Vote” (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Essex, 2002) 
Table 7.1
Table 1.2 Official Newspaper Ads Issue Domains Tables (1991-2000)
KMT ppp NP Average
Domain 1: 13.1% 14.6% 23 16.9%
External Relations (3) (3) (2) (3)
Domain 2: 3.4% 8.9% 4.6% 5.6%
Freedom and 
Democracy
(6) (4) (6) (5)
Domain 3: 32.2% 27.7% 15.3% 25.1%
Political System (1) (1) (3) (1)
Domain 4: 8.6% 2% 2% 4.2%
Economy (4) (8) (8) (7)
Domain 5: 2.2% 5.3% 7.4% 5%
Welfare and 
Quality of Life
(8) (7) (4) (6)
Domain 6: 6.7% 8% 6.3% 7.1%
Fabric of Society (5) (5) (5) (4)
Domain 7: 2.5% 6% 2.2% 3.5%
Social Groups (7) (6) (7) (8)
Domain 9: 20.3% 17.9% 29.4% 22.5%
Candidate and 
Party
(2) (2) (1) (2)
Uncategizable/others 11% 9.5% 9.9% 10.1%
Note 1: This table shows the percentage of issue mentions for each party in the eight 
issue domains and the uncategerizable/others domain.
Note 2: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative domain rankings.
Note 3: For details of the composition of each issue domain see Table 1.1 
Source: These figures are based on my content analysis of 583 official party 
newspaper ads from each national level election between 1991 and 2000
Table 2.1 Principal Elections and verdict on results 1989-2001
Year Election held Result verdict
1989 Legislative Yuan 
(Supplementary) & 
Municipal Executives
DPP won
1991 National Assembly KMT won 
DPP lost
1992 Legislative Yuan DPP won
1993 Municipal Executives KMT won
1994 Provincial Governor, Taibei 
& Gaoxiong Mayor
Tie
1995 Legislative Yuan NP won
1996 President & National KMT won
Assembly DPP lost
1997 Municipal Executives DPP won 
KMT lost
1998 Taibei and Gaoxiong Mayor KMT won
& Legislative Yuan NP lost
2000 President DPP won 
KMT lost
2001 Municipal Executive & DPP won
Legislative Yuan PFP won 
KMT lost
Note: The result verdict is based on my reading of individual campaign reviews and 
the views of interviewed politicians and political scientists. For a list of interviewees 
see Appendix 1.
Table 2.2 Top Ten Issues in three categories
Ranking Official Ads Liu Study Elite Survey
1 Political Corruption 
(13.2)
Welfare State 
Expansion (10.1)
National Identity
2 Party Positive 
(9.5)
Technology and 
Infrastructure (5.9)
Political Corruption
3 Taiwan Independence: 
Negative (6.8)
Non Economic 
Demographic Groups 
(5.2)
Economy
4 Candidate: Negative 
(5.8)
Education Expansion 
(4.2)
Social Welfare
5 Government Ability 
(4.6)
Social Justice 
(3.9)
Democracy
6 Party: Negative 
(4.1)
Law and Order 
(3.9)
Government Ability
7 Democracy
(4)
Environmental 
Protection (3.5)
Law and Order
8 Other Pallies’ Lack of 
Government 
Competence (3.6)
Political Corruption 
(3.5)
9 Taiwan Independence: 
Positive (3.3)
Efficiency of the 
Legislative Yuan 
(3.1)
10 Political Stability 
(3.2)
Productivity
(2.8)
Note 1: The official ads top ten represents the top issues for the KMT, DPP and NPbetween 
1991 and 2000. The numbers in brackets are average percentage of issue mentions. The 
source is my content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from the nine national level 
election between 1991 and 2000.
Note 2: Liu’s top ten represents the top issues for all Legislative Yuan candidates between 
1989 and 1998. The numbers in brackets are average percentage of issue mentions. The 
source is Liu Tsung-wei’s content analysis of legislative candidates’ policy proposals in 
election gazettes. See Liu, 2001, Table 8.1
Note 3: The top elite issues are based on my interviews of 61 experienced Taiwanese 
politicians, and specifically their reply to the question, “What have been the most salient 
political issues in Taiwan’s elections over the last decade? (1991-2001)” See Table 2.6 in this 
dissertation for details.
Table 2.3 Official Party Newspaper Ad Top Issues for the decade 1991-2000
KMT DPP NP
1 Government 
Competence (11.6)
Political Corruption 
(23.9)
Party Positive 
(12.8)
2 Other Parties’ Lack of 
Government 
Competence (9.5)
Party Positive 
(8.4)
Taiwan independence: 
Negative (12.7)
3 Taiwan independence: 
Negative (7.6)
Diluted Taiwan
independence
(8)
Political Corruption 
(12.3)
4 Political Stability (7.6) Non-Economic 
Demographic Groups 
(5.9)
Candidate: Negative 
(11.8)
5 Party Positive 
(7.3)
Democracy (5.7) Peace (5.5)
6 Economic Growth and 
Prosperity (6.1)
Party: Negative 
(5.6)
Democracy (4.2)
7 Candidate: Negative 
(4.2)
Pure Taiwan
independence
(4.3)
Chinese Nationalism 
(3.8)
8 Law and Order 
(3.5)
Freedom and Fluman 
Rights (3.2)
Party: Negative 
(3.3)
9 Political Corruption 
(3.5)
Taiwan nationalism
(3)
Foreign Special 
Relationships: Positive 
(3.3)
10 Party: Negative 
(3.5)
Social welfare 
(2.7)
Education expansion 
(2.1)
Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for each party between 1991 and 2000
Note 2: Numbers in brackets show the average percentage of issue mentions for each party in 
national elections between 1991 and 2000.
Source: My content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national level 
election between 1991 and 2000. For the annual issue Tables details see Tables 1.9. 1.10 & 
1.11
Table 2.4 Official Party Newspaper Ad Top issues for frequency of getting into 
annual top ten (1991-2000)
K M T DPP jyp
1 Government 
Competence (8)
Party Positive (8) Party Positive (5)
2 Taiwan independence: 
Negative (7)
Diluted Taiwan 
independence(7)
Democracy (4)
3 Political Stability (7) Political Corruption (7) Political Corruption (4)
4 Other Parties’ Lack of 
Government 
Competence (7)
Democracy (6) Party Negative (4)
5 Political Corruption (6) Social Welfare 
Expansion (4)
Taiwan independence: 
Negative (4)
6 Party Negative (6) Social Justice (4) Candidate Negative (3)
7 Economic Growth and 
Prosperity (5)
Non-Economic 
Demographic Groups (4)
Peace (2)
8 Party Positive (5) Candidate Positive (4) Environmental 
Protection (2)
9 Party Negative: 
Violence (4)
Party Negative (4) Education Expansion (2)
10 Candidate Negative (3) Taiwan nationalism (4) Culture (2)
Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for each party on the basis of frequency of 
featuring in parties’ annual issue top ten. The figures in brackets are number of occasions each 
issue has appeared in parties’ annual issue top tens in the nine national elections between 1991 
and 2000.
Note 2: Frequencies are lower for the NP as it only contested seven elections.
Source: My content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national level 
election between 1991 and 2000. For details of annual top tens see Table 1.9. 1.10 & 1.11
Table 2.5. Party Issue Overlap on Official advertisement Top Tens
Only KMT Political Stability (305A), Party Government Competence (305B), Other 
Parties’ Lack of Government Competence (305C), Economic Growth 
and Prosperity (420), Law and Order (605), Party Negative: Violence 
(904V)
Only DPP Pure Taiwan Independence (111A), Diluted Taiwan Independence 
(11 IB), Freedom and Human Rights (201), Social Justice (503), Welfare 
State Expansion (504), Taiwan Nationalism (60IT), Non-Economic 
Demographic Groups (706), Candidate Positive (901)
Only NP Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (101), Peace (106), Education 
Expansion (506), National Way of Life: Positive (601), Environmental 
Protection (501), Culture (502)
KMT & 
DPP
KMT & NP Taiwan Independence: Negative (112A), Candidate Negative (902)
DPP & NP Democracy (202)
All Three 
Parties
Uncategerizable/others (000), Political Corruption (304), Party Positive 
(903), Party Negative (904)
Note 1: This table shows the degree of issue emphasis overlap from parties’ top ten tables 
shown in Table 2.3 and 2.4.
Note 2: Numbers in brackets are the MRG issue category code numbers, for details see Table
1.1
Source: My content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national level 
election between 1991 and 2000.
Table 2.6 Elite Views on issue saliency and ownership
KMT DPP NP
What have been 
the most salient 
political issues in 
Taiwan’s elections 
over the last 
decade? 
(1991-2001)
1. National 
identity
2. Economy
3. Money politics
4. Social welfare
5. Crime
1. National identity
2. Money politics
3. Social welfare
4. Economy
5. Democracy
1. National identity
2. Economy
3. Money politics
4. Social welfare
5. Social justice
What issues have 
you and your party 
stressed most in 
elections over the 
last decade? 
(1991-2001)
1. National 
identity
2. Economy
3. Stability
4. Prosperity
5. Education
1. National identity
2. Money politics
3. Democracy
4. Social welfare
5. Environmental 
protection
1. National identity
2. Money politics
3. Economy
4. Social welfare
5. Democracy
Note 1: The top elite issues rankings are based on my interviews of 61 experienced Taiwanese 
politicians, the sample included 22 from the KMT, 29 from the DPP and ten from the NP. For 
a full list of respondents see Appendix 1
Table 2.7 : Annual KMT Official Ads Top Tens
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 Average
1 305B
(36.3)
305A
(27.7)
903
(21)
605
(20.1)
305B
(16.8)
901
(12.3)
305C
(24.7)
305B
(15.1)
902
(18.8)
305B
(11.6)
2 305C
(H )
420
(18.3)
706
(14.3)
305C
(18.2)
112A
(15.8)
902
( 11.1)
605
(11.4)
903
(13.7)
305B
(7.9)
305C
(9.5)
3 112A
(10.3)
305B
(8.9)
305A
( 11.1)
112A
(15.5)
904V
(10.9)
11 IB 
(9.3)
304
(9.8)
420
(6.9)
504
(7.4)
112A
(7.6)
4 204
(9.7)
305C
(8.9)
305C
(9.5)
904V
(7.9)
904
(8.4)
202
(8.2)
112A
(8.9)
904
(6)
305C
(7)
305A
(7.6)
5 903
(7)
903
(8.9)
305B
(8.2)
305
(6.8)
202
(8.2)
305A
(5)
903
(6.2)
305
(5.8)
304
(6.1)
903
(7.3)
6 420
(4.6)
420
(7.7)
904
(5.9)
420
(6.4)
112A
(4.7)
902
(6)
606
(5.7)
901
(5.9)
420
(6.1)
7 904
(3.7)
112A
(7.6)
304
(4.7)
903
(6.3)
305B
(4.6)
411
(4.9)
904V
(4.7)
601T
(4.6)
902
(4.2)
8 305A
(3.4)
411
(5.6)
305B
(4.2)
305C
(6)
606
(4.32)
904V
(4.8)
503
(4.1)
305
(3.6)
605
(3.5)
9 904
(2)
104 A 
(4)
106
(3.8)
304
(4.2)
904
(3.1)
304
(3.2)
112A
(3.2)
304
(3.5)
10 202
(0.9)
607
(2.8)
304
(3.5)
411
(3.9)
111B 
(3)
101
(2.84)
106
(3.1)
904
(3.5)
104A: Military: Positive 305C: Other Parties Lack o f  
Government Competence
607:Multiculturalism: Positive
106: Peace 411: Technology and 
Infrastructure
706: Non Economic 
Demographic Groups
11 IB: Diluted Taiwan 
Independence
420 Economic Growth & 
Prosperity
901: Candidate Positive
112A; Taiwan Independence: 
Negative
503: Social Justice 902: Candidate Negative
202: Democracy 504: Welfare State Expansion 903: Party Positive
304 Political Corruption 601T: Taiwan Nationalism 904 Party Negative
305A: Political Stability 605: Law and Order 904V: Party Negative: Violence.
305B: Government Competence 606: Social Harmony
Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for the KMT in each election between 1991 and
2000.
Note 2: Issue categories are shown by their MRG code number. For instance 304 stands for 
“Political Corruption.”
Note 3: Numbers in brackets are the percentages of issue mentions for the top issues that year. 
Source: My content analysis of 261 official KMT party newspaper ads from each national 
level election between 1991 and 2000.
Table 2.8: Annual DPP Official Ads Top Tens
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 Average
1 111A
(27.7)
304
(29.8)
304
(70.8)
304
(37.4)
304
(36)
11 IB 
(26.9)
706
(42.9)
903
(49.6)
304
(22.4)
304
(23.9)
2 202
(27.3)
111B
(18)
305B
(4.8)
601T
(9.3)
11 IB 
(13.4)
111A
(10.5)
904
(32.9
304
(13.3)
901
(10.3)
903
(8.4)
3 201
(17)
202
(9.2)
504
(4.8)
904
(8.8)
903
(9.8)
106
(9.1)
605
(23.5)
305
(3.7)
504
(9.4)
111B
(8)
4 304
(4.3)
402T
(7.1)
503
(4.3)
607
(7.7)
901
(5.9)
201
(8.3)
903
(0.7)
904
(2-2)
601T
(8.2)
706
(5.9)
5 901
(2.8)
903
(4.3)
601T
(3.4)
503
(6.4)
202
(5.6)
601T
(5.9)
/ 305C
(1.5)
111B
(5.7)
202
(5.7)
6 903
(2.7)
105
(4.1)
903
(3.3)
504
(5.6)
606
(5.5)
903
(3.5)
/ 111B
(0.7)
902
(3.8)
904
(5.6)
7 904
(2.5)
706
(3.1)
501
(2.7)
305C
(4.6)
504
(4.1)
902
(3.4)
/ / 305
(3.4)
111A
(4.3)
S 11 IB 
(2.2)
503
(2.5)
706
(1.1)
111B
(3.7)
305B
(3.3)
901
(3.2)
/ / 202
(3.3)
201
(3.2)
9 503
(1.9)
902
(2.5)
202
(0.9)
202
(2.9)
706
(2.9)
104 A 
(2.5)
/ / 607
(3.1)
601T
(3)
10 706
(1)
904
(1.9)
904
(0.6)
903
(1.8)
607
(2.6)
503
(2.1)
/ I 303
(3.1)
504
(2.7)
104A: Military: Positive 305B: Government Competence 605: Law and Order
105: Military: Negative 305C: Other Parties Lack of 
Government Competence
607‘.Multiculturalism: Positive
111 A: Pure Taiwan Independence 411: Technology and 
Infrastructure
706: Non Economic 
Demographic Groups
11 IB: Diluted Taiwan 
Independence
420 Economic Growth & 
Prosperity
901: Candidate Positive
201: Freedom and Human Rights 501: Environmental Protection 902: Candidate Negative
202: Democracy 503: Social Justice 903: Party Positive
304 Political Corruption 504: Welfare State Expansion 904 Party Negative
305A: Political Stability 601T: Taiwan Nationalism 904V: Party Negative: Violence.
Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for the DPP in each election between 1991 and
2000 .
Note 2: Issue categories are shown by their MRG code number.
Note 2: Numbers in brackets are the percentages of issue mentions for the top issues that year. 
Source: My content analysis of 236 official DPP party newspaper ads from each national level 
election between 1991 and 2000.
Table 2.9 Annual NP Official Ads Top Tens
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 Average
1 902
(75)
903
(17 .9 )
304
(23 .7)
106
(24 .5)
101
(20.8)
903
(30 .5)
112A
(75)
903
(12.8)
2 601
(25)
304
( 12.2)
903
(14 .4)
903
(19 .2)
202
(13 .3)
304
(30.2)
106
(12 .5)
112A
(12.7)
3 901
(6)
202
(11.9)
112A
(6.2)
506
( 12.6)
904
(7.8)
304
(12 .5)
304
(12.3)
4 504
(4 .3 )
502
(7 .3)
606
(5 .6 )
903
(7 .7 )
902
(3 .3)
902
(11.8)
5 305B
(3 .5 )
904
(6 .5)
109
(4 .62)
304
(7 .6 )
112A
(1 .9)
106
(5.5)
6 904
(3 .3 )
112A
(5 .6)
4 2 0
(4 .3)
706
(6 .7)
705
(1 .4)
202
(4.2)
7 502
(3 .2 )
503
(4 .8)
902
(4 .2)
504
(5)
305C
(1 .3)
601
(3.8)
8 503
(3 .2 )
303
(1 .9)
202
(2 .7)
705
(5)
403
( 1.1)
904
(3.3)
9 501
(2 .7 )
410
( 1.6)
104A
(2 .4)
501
(4 .2)
202
( 1)
101
(3.3)
10 9 0 4 V
(2 .3 )
606
(1 .5)
305
(2.1)
904
(4)
305B
(0 .9)
506
(2.1)
101: Special Foreign 
Relationships: Positive
403: Market Regulation 705: Underprivileged Minority 
Groups
104A: Military: Positive 410: Productivity 706: Non Economic
Demographic Groups
106: Peace 411: Technology and 
Infrastructure
901: Candidate Positive
112A: Taiwan Independence: 
Negative
501: Environmental Protection 902: Candidate Negative
202: Democracy 502: Culture 903: Party Positive
303: Efficiency o f  Legislative 
Yuan
503: Social Justice 904 Party Negative
304 Political Corruption 504: Welfare State Expansion
305: Political Stability 601: Chinese Nationalism
305B: Government Competence 606: Social Harmony
Note 1: This table shows the top ten issues for the NP in each election between 1993 and 
2000 .
Note 2: Issue categories are shown by their MRG code number.
Note 3: Numbers in brackets are the percentages of issue mentions for the top issues that year. 
Source: My content analysis of 86 official NP party newspaper ads from each national level 
election between 1993 and 2000.
Table 3.1 Social Welfare Issues in Taiwan
Sub-issue Initiator Ownership Salience
NHI DPP Originally DPP but 
stolen by KMT 
before becoming 
salient
Medium
Pensions DPP DPP, KMT 
unsuccessful at 
stealing
High
Children and 
women’s welfare
DPP Contested Medium
Jungongjiao welfare 
(including veteran 
welfare)
DPP initiates attacks 
against unfair 
welfare system 
NMKMT/NP defend 
old system
KMT/NP own 
support for 
jungongojiao 
welfare, while DPP 
attacks unfair 
welfare.
Medium
Welfare state DPP DPP Low
Unemployment
benefits
Not initiated as 
electoral issue
Free Low
Housing Not initiated as 
electoral issue
Free Low
Disabled welfare Not initiated as 
electoral issue
Free Low
Note 1. This table shows the main social welfare issues in Taiwan, the party that 
initiated them as electoral issues, the party that owns the sub-issue and the saliency of 
the sub-issue.
Note: 2. The ownership and saliency of sub-issues is judged by the author of the basis 
of my interviews, and analysis of election propaganda and campaign reviews.
Table 3.2 Where would you place yourself and the main parties on a spectrum in 
which passively maintaining the existing social welfare system equals 0 and 
actively promoting social welfare equals 10?
Year of 
survey
Respondent KMT DPP NP PFP
2000 5.6 4.8 6.5 5.2 5.3
Note: 89.1% of respondents could place themselves, 69.2% could place the DPP and KMT, 
48% could place the KMT, DPP & NP, and 44.5% could place all four parties.
Source: Data supplied by Sheng Xingyuan of the ESC.
Table 3.3 Which party is better able to design a fair and reasonable social welfare 
system?
KMT DPP NP Don’t
know/other
10/1998 Survey 18% 30.7% 4.7% 46.5%
3/1999 Survey 21.7% 27.8% 4% 44.4%
8/1999 Survey 20.7% 32.9% 2.7% 43.8%
Note: All three telephone surveys were conducted nationally by the DPP’s Survey Research 
Department. The number of valid cases were 1090 in October 1998, 1034 in March 1999, and 
1346 in August 1999.
Source: “11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image” (Unpublished paper by DPP 
Survey Research Department, 1999), 3.
4.1 Political Corruption issues in Taiwan
Category Sub-issue
White 1. Election Banquets
Grey
Black
White-Gray 1. Government Business Collusion (Hf iHf
£ Jin)
2. White Gold ( f i # )
3. Factional Candidates
4. Grassroots Elections (^ jfliillfl)
5. Golden Oxen (^fr-p)
6. Xingpiao case (||L|p|5^)
7. Link between corruption and former 
president Li Denghui.
White-Grey-Black 1. Party Assets OS®)
2. Vote Buying (M U)
3. Municipal Executive Corruption (f^Tf?
4. Land Speculation ftkj^)
5. Corruption of high level central 
government officials
W M ^ f )
6. Corruption involving national 
construction projects.
Grey-Black 1. “Black Gold”/ Gangster influence on 
politics (M ^/M M )
Note 1: This table places the corruption sub-issues into categories according to how
mainstream norms have changed over the 1990s. The fact that almost all sub-issues 
have made the transition to either grey or black corruption reveals the pace that 
perceptions of corruption have changed over the decade.
Table 4.2 United Daily News Survey on the percentage of respondents viewing 
the KMT/DPP as clean or corrupt (1992-1997)
Year of Survey KMT is clean DPP is clean KMT is corrupt DPP is corrupt
1992 37 26 28 29
1993 32 41 36 19
1994 31 39 34 17
1995 23 41 43 20
1996 25 41 45 22
1997 21 47 50 23
Note: This table shows the percentage of respondents viewing the main parties as 
either clean or corrupt in six national surveys carried out by the Lianhebao (United 
Daily News)
Source: Christian Schafferer, “The 1997 city and county magistrate elections in 
Taiwan,” 26-27.
Table 4.3 Why do you dislike a party?
Survey Date: October 1998
1 2 3
KMT It embezzles It’s inefficient It’s corrupt
DPP It’s violent/extreme It advocates
Taiwan
independence
It often creates 
political conflict
NP It’s divided/internal 
struggles
It does not identify 
with Taiwan
All words and no 
action
Survey Date: March 1999
1 2 3
KMT It embezzles, It’s 
corrupt, It’s black 
gold
It’s inefficient Just hate it/no reason
DPP It’s violent/extreme It often creates 
political conflict
Just hate it/no reason
NP Just hate it/no reason All words and no 
action
It does not identify 
with Taiwan
Survey Date: August 1999
1 2 3
KMT It embezzles It has links to 
gangsters
It’s inefficient
DPP It’s violent/extreme It advocates
Taiwan
independence
It often creates 
political conflict
NP All words and no 
action
It does not identify 
with Taiwan
It’s divided/ has 
internal struggles
Note 1: This table shows the three most common reasons respondents gave for liking a party 
in three separate surveys.
Note 2: The number of valid cases were 1090 in October 1998, 1034 in March 1999, and 1346 
in August 1999.
Note 3: Answers especially relevant to the case study chapters have been highlighted in block 
letters.
Source: “11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image” (Unpublished paper by DPP 
Survey Research Department, 1999), 5.
Table 4.4 Why do you dislike a party?
Survey Date: October 1998
1 2 3
KMT Good government 
ability
Used to the KMT in 
power
Its contribution to 
democratic politics
DPP It gets things done It’s clean It cares about public 
opinion
NP It’s clean It can get things 
done
It cares about public 
opinion
Survey Date: March 1999
1 2 3
KMT Stability/Safety Just like it/no reason It can get things 
done
DPP It can get things 
done
It’s clean Just like it/no reason
NP It’s clean It has talent It can get things 
done
Survey Date: August 1999
1 2 3
KMT Used to KMT in 
government
Just like it/no reason Good government 
ability
DPP It can get things 
done
It’s clean It supervises and 
balances
NP It’s clean It can get things 
done
Just like it/no reason
Note 1: This table shows the three most common reasons respondents gave for liking a party 
in three separate surveys.
Note 2: All three telephone surveys were conducted nationally by the DPP’s Survey
Research Department. The number of valid cases were 1090 in October 1998, 1034 in March 
1999, and 1346 in August 1999.
Note 3: Answers especially relevant to the case study chapters have been highlighted in block 
letters.
Source: “11th National Public Opinion Survey: Party Image” (Unpublished paper by DPP 
Survey Research Department, 1999), 4.
Ta
ble
 
5.1
 I
nd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
Ve
rs
us
 U
ni
fic
at
ion
 
(T
on
gD
u)
 S
pe
ct
ru
m
CD
■ S
r ^ |
9  «
3  P
OX) cd■M Q
P  «
M * 8
P  P
3
£
s
!*S_Oj)
d
CD
U
e3T3
CD
p
CDP
(D
(D
U
p
CD
p1-1
Cdp
<D
>* rP -M
cd
OX)
(D
£
CD
CD
d
<DrO
d
CDd*
<DT3
d
CD U
d O
M &T3
d
CD
T3
3i
£
3
32£
-m
cd
<D
P
U
§
u
H-1
H
i
o
p P
B
(D
P
CD
P  P
d03
dT
cd
d
d
CD
p
P
d
0  
d
a
IZ3
1+-»
00
sd
CD
a
o
da
C/3
3
03-4^GO
(D
£
• S
8
3
8
d>
CD
d
P
d
<D
P
CD
PP
§
d"
0
td
CDP
1
CD
CD
d
<D
P
d
cd
p
• 8
.8
£
£
'<3
Fcm
O
d
p
psJ
<d
P
H
d
o
£
£
3
HoPi
£
CD
d
CD
O
8
* §  y
p  H--8
,d
d
cd
£
cd
a>
P
<D
£
CD
P
d
CD
£T3
s
cd
d
<D
P
d9OX)
d
£
<D
£
d
o
M
<D
d
d
(D
P
O
P
•§
P
H
CD
M
O
£
cd
U
P
O h
£
O
P
PT3
(L)
cu
p
>■.
i
Ta
ble
 5
.2.
 T
aiw
an
es
e 
Ve
rs
us
 C
hi
ne
se
 I
de
nt
ity
 
Sp
ec
tr
um
o
.BftCJ
ft!oo
s
cdft
G
Go
£
o
CDft00
GO
f t
o
a
CD
CD
OX)f t
G
CD
t
g
cdf t
f t
u
s
"obs
s
§u
cd
GO
f t>
cd
G
u
§
u
9f t  00
ft 9a .s
CD ,£ 3
•a ug
cd
cd
GO
t d£
u o
OX) f t  
cd
cd
fto
G
ft
uo
ft
a o
G
cd oo
0
51
OX)
.G
u
.It’-4-*
G
8^
cd
GQ
cdft
G0)
U
G
f t
G
G
Q
G
cdft
cd
G
3u
CD
g
£ • ^
eS
<l>
3
CO
.a
'cd
a
CDf t
£of t
f t
cd
f tH
CDft-‘o
£
0)
*S3ft!To
£
f t
CDft
I
(D
o
£  -I—>
G
CD
g
£
oXft
f t
CDft
cdft
£
PS
*8
CD
G
G
£
3
g
£
G *f t  DO
& PQ 
f £1 CD
1 ft O
ftDO
£
g
£
£
00
Gf t
f t
O
f t
g
.5
* *
G
CDft
&G
CD
G
G
£  
e3
00^  .a13 '53 ft ft O ft— o
ft ft-
G  f t
CDftft F* cT ft
Table 5.1 National Identity issues (see other file)
5.2 Taiwanese versus Chinese identity (see other file)
Table 5.3 Do you think the KMT/DPP/NP is a party that represents the 
Mainlanders (WSR), the native Taiwanese (BSR) or both?
The KMT is a party 
that represents:
The DPP is a party that 
represents:
The NP is a party that 
represents:
WSR BSR Both WSR BSR Both WSR BSR Both
1992 16.8 6.5 53.8 1.1 55.7 16.3
1993 19.7 6.5 52.9 0.4 59.6 17.7
1996 11.6 7.5 63.5 1.2 44.6 22.1 32.8 2.4 34.5
Elite 15.2 37.9 46.9 0 60.6 39.4 66.7 0 27.3
Note 1: The 1992, 1993 and 1996 rows show the percentage of respondents viewing 
the parties as representing the Mainlanders (WSR), the Taiwanese (BSR), or both. 
Note 2: These surveys were carried out by the NTU using face-to-face interviews. The 
number of cases was 1,384 in 1992, 1,398 in 1993 and 1,376 in 1996.
Note 3: The elite survey was carried out by Lin Chia-long, interviewing 66 legislators 
from all three parties between 1995 and 1996.
Source: Lin Chia-long (1998) Table 12-7
Table 5.4 Do you think the KMT/DPP/NP is a party that supports independence, 
Chinese unification or the status quo?
The KMT is a party 
that supports:
The DPP is a party that 
supports:
The NP is a party that 
supports:
TI CU SQ TI CU SQ TI CU SQ
1992 1.3 67.7 3.5 65.9 2.1 2.7
1993 1.8 63.9 6.5 65.9 3 3.5
1996 7.3 33 22.7 66.4 1.4 3.8 4.1 36 16.9
Elite 1.5 66.7 31.8 98.5 0 1.5 0 100 0
Note 1: This table shows the percentage of respondents viewing the parties as 
supporting Taiwan independence (TI), Chinese Unification or maintaining the status 
quo (SQ).
Note 2: These surveys were carried out by the NTU using face-to-face interviews. The 
number of cases was 1,384 in 1992, 1,398 in 1993 and 1,376 in 1996.
Note 3: The elite survey was carried out by Lin Chia-long, who interviewed 66 
legislators from all three parties between 1995 and 1996.
Source: Lin Chia-long. (1998) Table 12-8
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